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Abstract
This dissertation contributes to an understanding of the manner in which various dimensions of
malpractice law shape physician behavior and how this behavior, in turn, impacts health outcomes. In
Chapter 1, I explore the association between regional variations in physician practices and the
geographical scope of the standards of care to which physicians are held in malpractice actions. To
investigate this general association, I explore whether treatment utilization rates in a state converge
towards national utilization levels as states abandon the use of "locality rules" to adopt laws requiring
physicians to comply with national standards of care. I focus the analysis on the case of cesarean
delivery and find robust evidence of convergence in cesarean section utilization, whereby as much as 40
- 60% of the gap between state and national cesarean rates is closed upon the abandonment of a
locality rule.
In Chapter 2, I estimate the returns to regional cesarean intensities, drawing on an arguably
exogenous source of variation in cesarean rates resulting from the adoption of national-standard laws. I
first document robust evidence of triage in regional cesarean utilization, whereby physicians in high
intensity regions begin to perform cesareans on mothers who are less in need of this intensive delivery
alternative. Second, I find no evidence to suggest that an increase in regional cesarean rates otherwise
leads to an increase in average neonatal outcomes. Third, I find evidence suggesting that increases in
regional cesarean rates may be crowding out mothers otherwise in need of cesarean delivery.
In Chapter 3, I consider another dimension to malpractice law and estimate the relationship
between different levels of malpractice pressure, as identified by the adoption of non-economic damage
caps and related malpractice laws, and certain decisions faced by obstetricians during the delivery of a
child. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I find no evidence to support the claim that malpractice
pressure induces physicians to perform a substantially greater number of cesarean sections. However, I
do find evidence of positive defensive behavior in the utilization of episiotomies during vaginal deliveries
and in the durations of maternal lengths of stay.
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Introduction
Two of the most important questions that health economists have faced over the last several decades
concern (1) why some regions spend so much in the care of patients relative to other regions and (2) in
turn, whether those regions that practice at high levels of treatment intensity generate superior health
outcomes. I address these questions in the first two-thirds of this dissertation, focusing largely on the
case of deliveries via cesarean section and exploring the role that malpractice standards of care play in
shaping regional practice patterns. This analysis focuses on a dimension of malpractice law relating to
the process by which physicians are determined to be liable in the first instance. In the final third of this
dissertation, I consider a related inquiry that explores the association between physician behavior and
variations along another dimension in malpractice law related to the expected levels of liability that are
imposed in the event that physicians are found to have breached the requisite standard of care.
Physician practices vary in a striking and persistent manner across different regions of the
United States. Unable to explain the full extent of these regional patterns, many scholars attribute
residual variations to regional "schools of thought." In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I explore the
association between regional variations in physician behavior and the geographical scope of the
standards of care to which physicians are held in malpractice actions. Malpractice laws that require
physicians to comply with the standards set by local physicians may help to perpetuate divergent
schools of thought. Over time, most states have come to abandon the use of "same-locality" or "same-
or-similar-locality" rules in favor of laws requiring physicians to comply with national standards of care.
Drawing on this rich set of variations and using data on physician behavior from the 1977 - 2005
National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS) files, I explore whether treatment utilization rates in a state
converge towards national utilization levels as states adopt national standard-of-care laws. I document
robust evidence of convergence in cesarean section utilization, whereby as much as 40 - 60% of the gap
between state and national cesarean rates is closed upon the abandonment of a locality rule.
I demonstrate the robustness of the cesarean results to certain key falsification and specification
tests. For instance, when I look to a set of utilization rates and events that are not likely to be shaped by
physician discretion and that are thus not likely to respond to a shift in malpractice laws (e.g., AMI
discharge rates), I estimate convergence coefficients that are close to zero in magnitude. While the
cesarean model is particularly well suited to address certain limitations of the NHDS files, I also extend
the analysis to a broader range of treatments (e.g., prostatectomies and hip replacement surgeries). I
largely estimate convergence coefficients consistent with the findings of the cesarean model, though
these estimates are generally noisier and, with several exceptions, statistically insignificant.
In Chapter 2, I evaluate the welfare consequences that may arise from excessive utilization of
cesarean delivery within regions. To identify the returns to regional cesarean intensities, I draw on the
findings of Chapter 1 and consider an arguably exogenous source of variation in regional cesarean rates
resulting from the adoption of laws that require physicians to comply with national standards of care.
While cesarean sections remain an important element of obstetric practices and may provide benefits to
a significant number of mothers, they may be utilized to such a great extent within regions that they
offer few benefits to those on the margin. Using hospital discharge data from the 1979 - 2005 NHDS
files, I document robust evidence of triage in regional cesarean utilization, whereby physicians begin to
perform cesareans on mothers who are less in need of this intensive delivery alternative as they
increase their utilization levels within regions. Specifically, I estimate that the predicted cesarean
probability for the marginal mother (i.e., a parameterization of her case mix) is lower than that of the
average mother by an amount that is nearly 60% of the average level.
Moreover, using data from the 1978 - 2004 Natality Detail files, I find no evidence to suggest
that an increase in regional cesarean rates is otherwise associated with an increase in average neonatal
outcomes. In further support of the contention that physicians may be over-utilizing cesarean sections, I
find evidence consistent with a story of crowd-out in regional cesarean practices whereby mothers are
less likely to receive cesarean delivery, regardless of their need, when they are surrounded by a large
number of women also in need of cesarean delivery.
The analysis in Chapter 1 focuses on estimating the relationship between physician behavior and
variations in the process by which physician are found liable. This relationship may exist even if
physicians universally comply with the standards that are, in fact, set by courts. While this relationship
may have important welfare implications, as indicated above, it does not capture what is commonly
referred to as "defensive" medicine. While analysts differ as to the precise definition to be applied,
"defensive" medicine generally refers to a situation in which the general threat of liability, taking as
given the process by which liability is determined, induces physicians to take sub- or supra-optimal
levels of care. I turn to an analysis of defensive physician practices in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
Using data from the 1979 - 2005 NHDS files, I estimate the relationship between malpractice
pressure, as identified by the adoption of non-economic damage caps and related malpractice laws, and
certain decisions faced by obstetricians during the delivery of a child. The NHDS is a particularly
powerful data source for this analysis in that it allows for the identification of changes in cesarean
behavior over the 1980's, a time period marking the substantial majority of the adoptions of non-
economic damage-cap provisions. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I find no evidence to support
the claim that malpractice pressure induces physicians to perform a substantially greater number of
cesarean sections. Extending this analysis to certain additional measures, however, I do find some
evidence consistent with positive defensive behavior among obstetricians. Specifically, I estimate that
the adoption of a non-economic damage cap leads to a reduction in the utilization of episiotomies
during vaginal deliveries and in the durations of maternal lengths of stay (without a corresponding
change in observed neonatal outcomes), implying that malpractice pressure had previously induced
over-utilization of these measures.
Chapter 1 Malpractice Standards of Care and Regional Variations in
Physician Practice Styles
1.1 Introduction
One of the most important tasks that health economists have faced over the last several
decades and that they will continue to face in the years to come involves understanding why some
regions spend so much in the care of patients relative to other regions. Since Glover (1938) first
documented striking variations in tonsillectomy utilization rates across different regions of the United
Kingdom, a large literature has focused on documenting and analyzing regional variations in physician
practices. To the extent that these variations capture regional differences of opinion concerning optimal
treatment methods, such variations may be associated with potentially huge welfare losses, which some
scholars have estimated to be of the same order as the traditionally emphasized welfare losses arising
from health-insurance-related disincentives (Phelps and Mooney 1993).
Any attempt to alleviate the extent of such losses must begin with an understanding of how
they materialize. While much of the regional variations in physician practices may be attributed to
variations in patient characteristics (demand) or hospital or physician characteristics (supply), health
economists are still unable to explain a large portion of the observed regional patterns. In this paper, I
explore the potential contribution of one factor that has been identified by leading theoretical scholars
in the regional-variations literature (Phelps 1992), but that has yet to be explored empirically: laws
respecting the geographical nature of the standards of care employed in medical malpractice actions.
To determine the standards to which physicians are held, courts generally defer to customary
physician practices. Historically, courts looked to the practices applied by physicians in the same
locality. Driven largely by concerns over the ability of plaintiffs to find physician experts willing to testify
against their peers, most jurisdictions came to relax this "locality rule" by the middle of the 20t h century
to require that physicians be held to a standard of care applied in the same locality or in a similar
locality. Since the 1960's and 1970's, the majority of states (though not all states) have gone one step
further and abandoned the use of local-standard rules to adopt requirements that physicians comply
with national standards of care (or standards that are not limited by geography).
It is quite natural to ask whether this geographical distinction in malpractice law contributes to
regional variations in physician practices. After all, where physicians are only expected to comply with
customary local standards, it may be reasonable to expect that malpractice forces help to perpetuate
divergent practice patterns. In this paper, I draw on within-state variations in malpractice standard-of-
care laws to determine whether physician behavior in a state that uses local standards of care converges
to national levels of physician behavior when that state amends its malpractice laws to require that
physicians comply with national standards. These specific convergence findings should prove
informative on the broader question of the association between regional variations in health care
practices and malpractice standards of care.
To study physician behavior, I generate utilization rates of a number of inpatient medical
procedures using hospital discharge records from 1977 to 2005 from the National Hospital Discharge
Survey (NHDS). The NHDS provides an annual sample of national inpatient records that is long enough
and broad enough to allow for an investigation that takes advantage of the significant within-state
changes in malpractice standard-of-care laws that have occurred since the 1970's. I test for
convergence in physician behavior over a range of treatments that have been studied extensively by the
area-variations literature to date and that represent some of the most common occurrences in hospital
discharge records. Such treatments include, among others, cesarean sections, cholecystectomies,
appendectomies, prostatectomies, cardiac catheterizations, and coronary artery bypass grafts.
Despite this broad exploration, I focus the analysis on the case of cesarean utilization. Relative
to most other treatments, cesarean deliveries are particularly well suited to address various limitations
of the NHDS sample. As states adopt laws requiring the use of national standards, I find evidence that
state cesarean rates converge towards national levels. Specifically, I find that the absolute value of the
deviation between state and national cesarean utilization rates, as a percentage of national rates, falls
by 4 - 6 percentage points in connection with the adoption of national-standard laws, amounting to a
convergence effect in which 40 - 60% of the gap between state and national cesarean rates is closed. In
an alternative parameterization of the convergence mechanism, I find that the probability of cesarean
delivery increases by a level of 1.1 percentage points in those states that begin the sample period with
cesarean rates below the national average and decreases by 1.7 percentage points in those states that
begin with above-average rates. These results do not appear to be driven by state-specific convergence
trends (i.e., mean reversion) in physician behavior that pre-date the adoption of national standard laws.
To the extent that the above results generalize to other treatment decisions, the estimated
within-state changes in cesarean utilization rates suggest that the distinction between local and national
standards of care may be responsible for some of the variations that persist across regions in physician
behavior. However, the physician response to a change in laws respecting the geographical scope of
malpractice standards is likely to vary across treatments, depending on, among other things, the nature
of the standard-of-care analyses that arise in connection with such treatments. Expanding the scope of
the analysis, I find statistically-significant evidence of convergence in utilization rates for certain non-
cesarean procedures, including transurethral prostatectomies, cardiac catheterizations and coronary
artery bypass grafts. The estimates for the remaining procedures explored, however, are relatively
noisy, limiting the ability to make inferences regarding the general effect of malpractice standard-of-
care laws.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides background on the regional variations
literature, while Section 1.3 provides a background on malpractice standard-of-care laws. Section 1.4
describes the data. Section 1.5 describes the empirical methodology. Section 1.6 presents results of the
convergence model and Section 1.7 discusses certain implications of these findings. Finally, Section 1.8
concludes.
1.2 Regional Variations Background
Aggregate health care expenditures will total over $2 trillion in 2008, representing a per-capita
amount of nearly $8,000 (Keehan et al. 2008). These per-capita expenditures, significant as they may
be, also vary remarkably across different regions of the country, largely due to extensive regional
variations in the amount and type of care that physicians provide. A large literature in health economics
and medical science has devoted itself to the study of regional variations in health care practices. This
literature has generally taken one of two paths: (1) documenting the existence of such variations, and
(2) exploring the causes behind regional variations.'
Perhaps the most influential work conducted along the first path has been performed by the
researchers at the Dartmouth Atlas Project. The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care documents risk- and
price-adjusted regional variations in a host of utilization and expenditure measures, along with
variations in certain supply factors (Wennberg and Cooper 1999). For instance, they present evidence of
marked variation in average pay-per-service Medicare expenditures (per enrollee) across 306 "Hospital
Referral Regions" in the United States, with generally higher levels in certain areas of the Southern and
Eastern states and generally lower levels in certain areas of the Western, Mountain and Mid-Western
states. Representing one of their more common comparisons, they demonstrate that average 1996 per-
capita Medicare payments in Miami ($8,913) are more than double the same payments in Minneapolis
($3,708).
1 Another interesting direction that this literature has taken involves using unexplained variations in physician
behavior across regions as a source of exogenous information to explore the relationship between health care
utilization and health outcomes. For an example of a study along these lines, see Skinner et al. (2005). I discuss
these considerations in further detail in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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A number of studies have also explored geographical variations in the utilization rates of specific
treatments. For instance, Baicker, Buckles and Chandra (2006) address variation in cesarean section
utilization rates and find that unadjusted cesarean rates for normal birth-weight children range from
6.7% to 28.9% across the largest 198 counties in the United States. The existence of regional variations
of this nature implicates a number of potential concerns. Primarily, to the extent that these variations
represent over- or under-use of particular treatments in certain regions, they may be associated with
large social welfare costs (Phelps 2000). With these possibilities in mind, another important line of the
area-variations literature has endeavored to explain the causes behind such variations.
Providing an excellent overview of both the theoretical and empirical issues implicated in a
regional-variations analysis, Phelps and Mooney (1993) and Phelps (2000) dismiss many economic and
other explanations for the extent of the variations observed, including (1) pure randomness, (2) income
and price effects, (3) substitution among alternative treatments, (4) differential demand inducement,
and (5) illness patterns. Having demonstrated the failure of these explanations, the authors conclude
that the extent of the variations likely arise from informational forces. To demonstrate how regional
patterns may persist over time, Phelps and Mooney (1993) introduce a learning-by-doing model in
which physicians seek low-cost sources of information by observing the treatment decisions of their
immediate peers. With this information, they recalibrate their own beliefs as to the proper indications
for alternative treatment approaches. Likewise, to demonstrate how regional patterns arise in the first
instance, Phelps and Mooney introduce a model in which physicians learn of the effectiveness of a new
treatment, absent guidance from a well-designed randomized control trial, by basing initial treatment
beliefs on a small sample of observed outcomes derived from local experimentation.
Inherent in these informational stories is the notion that physicians often disagree as to where
to draw the line of separation between the proper indication of one treatment over another. Indeed, in
many medical situations, there does not appear to be a national consensus as to how patients should be
treated (Wennberg and Peters 2002). In these instances of medical uncertainty, variations in the
processes by which physicians are found liable for medical malpractice may also contribute to regional
variations in the resulting physician behaviors.
Numerous other empirical studies have explored the extent to which variations in regional
health care patterns can be explained by variations in certain identifiable factors. While these studies
generally take different methodological approaches and derive a range of results concerning the amount
of regional variations that can be explained by regional demand or supply factors, one common thread
that generally emerges throughout each study is the inability to explain a substantial portion of the
variation in practices. 2 Accounting for regional differences in certain socioeconomic, patient and other
factors, Baicker, Buckles and Chandra (2006), for instance, are unable to explain about 40% of the
variation in cesarean utilization rates for normal birth-weight babies across the largest 198 U.S. counties.
Empiricists often reach the same conclusion offered by Phelps and Mooney (1993) - i.e., that
unexplained residuals are likely attributable to practice-style variations across regions.3
Only a few studies have considered the contribution of malpractice factors to regional variations
in health care practices. In one such study, Baicker, Buckles and Chandra (2006), find that 14.8% of the
cesarean utilization variation across U.S. counties is explained by certain measures of regional
malpractice intensity: (a) the frequency and severity of malpractice judgments and settlements and (b)
prevailing malpractice insurance premiums. Those rare regional-variations studies that have addressed
the possible role of malpractice focus on malpractice outcomes that are directly associated with the
expected levels of liability likely to be faced by physicians, taking as given the process by which liability
itself is determined. These factors may be relevant to a regional-variations analysis to the extent that
regional differences in these outcomes / laws contribute to regional differences in physician behavior.
Prominent examples include Wennberg and Cooper (1999) and Cutler and Sheiner (1999).
3 John Wennberg has been the most prominent proponent of this viewpoint. For an example discussion of the
residual role of practice style variations, see Wennberg (1984).
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Focusing on the expected-liability dimension, however, overlooks that element of malpractice law
that is potentially most relevant to a discussion of the causes behind regional practice patterns: the
geographical nature of the standards of care used in malpractice actions. That is, in determining
whether liability should be imposed in the first instance, should physicians be expected to comply with
local practice patterns or should physicians be judged according to a process that does not impose any
geographical limitations? Taken as given the level of liability to be imposed in the event of a breach of
the standard of care, variations in the process by which that standard is determined may also contribute
significantly to variations in physician behavior. While theoretical scholars have discussed the possible
role that locality rules may play in perpetuating divergent practices (Phelps 1992), this possibility has yet
to be explored empirically.
1.3 Malpractice Standards of Care Background
1.3.1 The Evolution of Malpractice Standard-of-Care Laws
Medical malpractice is a form of negligence. As such, in addition to proving the existence of a
harm and establishing that a physician caused the harm, a plaintiff must establish that the relevant
physician's actions fell below some threshold level of care. While negligence law generally sets a
standard of care by determining what a "reasonable" person would do under the circumstances, the
legal system takes a special approach with respect to physicians and generally sets operable standards
of care in malpractice actions by determining what physicians actually do under similar circumstances.
Malpractice law varies across jurisdictions, however, in specifying the set of physicians to which the
court should look in setting these standards.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, courts employed the "locality rule" to set relevant
standards of care by looking to the behavior of physicians practicing in the same locality as the
defendant physician (Silver 1992). The traditional locality rule contains two elements: one substantive
and one procedural. The substantive element pertains simply to the geographical nature of the
standard itself: physicians are expected to behave according to the practices of local physicians. The
procedural element pertains to a specification of those physicians that are allowed to testify in order to
establish this standard of care. In the traditional application of the locality rule, plaintiffs were forced to
use local physicians to testify as to the customary practices in that locality.4
Over time, jurisdictions began to liberalize their malpractice standard of care laws and relax the
geographical restrictions of the locality rule. There were two primary reasons for these developments.
First, the procedural forces inherent in the strict application of the locality rule often hindered the ability
of a plaintiff to bring a malpractice case due to the difficulty in finding a local physician willing to testify
against his or her peers (Massie 2004). Many states amended their malpractice laws by the 1970's to
alleviate the consequences of this "conspiracy of silence." While maintaining the substantive elements
of the same-locality rule, some jurisdictions addressed this concern by relaxing the requirement that
expert witnesses come from within the locality, instead allowing the use of outside experts who possess
knowledge of the customary practices within that locality.5 Other jurisdictions additionally chose to
reformulate their standard of care requirements to provide that physicians comply with the customary
practices of physicians in the same locality or in a similar locality (Massie 2004; Furrow et al. 2004).
Second, some jurisdictions relaxed the geographical restrictions of the locality rule because the
initial substantive rationale for that rule - i.e., to account for disparities in resources, educational
opportunities and training across regions - had long since dissipated. For instance, in justifying its
abandonment of the locality rule in 1985, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Hall v. Hilbun6 argued that
4For an excellent discussion of the distinction between the procedural and substantive components of the locality
rule, see Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (1985).
s See, for example, Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552 (1954) ("[t]he mere fact that a physician has not practiced in
the immediate neighborhood in which the claimed malpractice has occurred does not necessarily disqualify him
from testifying as to the standards of practice in that locality. The crucial question is whether he knows what those
standards are").
6 466 So. 2d 856 (1985).
the protections provided by the rule are no longer necessary due to increased mobility in the physician
labor market and the standardization and nationalization of medical school admissions, medical school
curriculum, post-graduate training, and board certification. As such, many jurisdictions elected to
amend the substantive nature of their malpractice laws by abandoning the locality rule in favor of the
adoption of laws requiring that physicians comply with national standards of care, or standards of care
that are not subject to geographical limitations. These legal developments generally occurred many
years after the motivating standardization developments. 7 As will be discussed further in Sectionl.7
below, many of the states that adopted national-standard laws nonetheless continued to allow
consideration of certain local factors - primarily respecting local resource availability - in the
determination of operable standards of care (Furrow et al. 2004). However, unlike the situation under a
locality rule, geographical considerations were no longer conclusive under these amended regimes.
I focus on estimating the association between physician behavior and the ultimate adoption of a
national-standard law, as opposed to estimating the intermediate effect of moving from same-locality to
same-or-similar locality standards. I group these two versions of local-standard rules for three primary
reasons. First, as suggested above, these initial amendments were largely made with procedural effects
in mind. It is the national / non-national dimension that is likely to bring substantive changes, which are
arguably most relevant to the regional variations analysis. As stated by the Washington Supreme Court
in one of the pioneering locality-rule abdication cases, "[b]roadening the rule to include 'similar
localities' or 'similar communities' alleviated, to a certain extent, the first practical difficulty of the
'locality rule' -- additional witnesses might be available; but it did little to remove the deficiencies
springing from the second" - that is, "the possibility of a small group, who, by their laxness or
carelessness, could establish a local standard of care that was below that which the law requires."8
7 For a discussion of these developments, see, e.g., Massie (2004), Pearson (2005), Zitter (2005), and Van Tassel
(2006).
8 Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
Physician behavior may not be expected to deviate much from local levels with the adoption of same-or-
similar standard laws given that compliance with local standards remains a defense to physicians'
actions.
Second, I focus only on national-standard adoptions given that most of the variation in
malpractice laws over the sample period derives from a move from same-or-similar standards of care to
national standards of care. There is much less information to draw from in order to estimate the
separate impact of adopting same-or-similar standards. Finally, while the adoptions of national-
standard laws come at relatively sharp and observable points in time, it is relatively difficult during the
1970's and early 1980's to determine whether certain states apply a same-locality standard or a same-
or-similar standard.
Based on research of statutory and common law, I document the evolution of each state's
malpractice standard-of-care laws from the mid-1970's to the present. For each state-year cell, I
determine whether the prevailing malpractice law requires the use of a national standard of care or a
local standard of care (i.e., a same locality standard, same-or-similar locality standard, or, in some rare
instances, a statewide standard of care). The legal variation over this time period is largely substantive
in nature. Most of the procedural / evidentiary developments had already taken place before the
beginning of the sample period used in the analysis (either by allowing the use of outside experts or
modifying same-locality standards to require same-or-similar locality standards). 9 Since 1977, I
document 16 states that abandoned the use of local standards in favor of national standards, along with
1 additional state (i.e., Maryland) that moved in the other direction, where the state legislature decided
9As indicated previously, it is difficult to determine whether certain states applied same-locality or same-or-similar
locality standards at the beginning of the sample period. Nonetheless, it appears that, out of the 31 states with
some version of a local-standard rule in 1977, a significant majority had already adopted a modified version of that
rule.
to cut back on a previous national-standard adoption.'0 To this day, 16 states retain some element of
locality in their substantive standard-of-care laws. Appendix A provides more information on the source
and the nature of these legal variations.
1.3.2 Impact of Variations in Malpractice Standard-of-Care Laws
The maintenance of a locality rule may facilitate the persistence of local practice patterns under
two mechanisms: an incentive mechanism and an information mechanism. First, physicians may face
pressure to follow the practice decisions of their peers over fear of liability from deviating from this local
standard. Thus, the abandonment of a local-standard rule may lead to a shift in physician practices,
provided that "practice-style" variations do exist across regions -- e.g., that regions do differ in their
opinions regarding the efficacies of particular approaches. That is, if regional variations in practices are
solely due to factors which will be accounted for under the "circumstances" prong of the malpractice
standard-of-care calculation (e.g., differences in patient illness levels across regions), then there may be
no reason to expect convergence in behavior following the adoption of national standards.
Second, local-standard laws may reinforce informational mechanisms that also lead to
divergent practices. Consider Phelps and Mooney's (1993) model of information diffusion, in which
physicians seek low cost sources of information and look to the practice patterns of local peers in order
to generate their beliefs over treatment efficacies. With local standard-of-care laws also forcing
physicians to look to their immediate peers for guidance, physicians will continue to avoid sources of
information from outside of their regions. As states adopt national standards, the incentive forces
discussed above may also create informational spillover effects by forcing physicians in those states to
consider outside sources of knowledge. As with the case of liability incentives, by inducing physicians to
10 As explained more in Appendix A, I focus on rules that pertain specifically to specialists. Some states take
separate approaches for general practitioners and specialists. Moreover, several other states, including Virginia
and Utah, amended their malpractice laws since 1977 to move from same-locality standards to same-or-similar
locality standards or to statewide standards.
broaden their informational exposure, the adoption of national-standard rules may result in the
convergence of physician behavior towards national levels.
The nature of these incentive and information responses to the adoption of national standard
laws may differ depending on whether physicians come from regions that initially practice at a "lower"
level of care than the national average or from regions that practice at a "higher" level than the national
average. For initially high-level-of-care regions, the result of local standard-of-care laws may be to force
physicians to maintain levels of care that are higher than they would otherwise desire to maintain, in
which case one might expect them to take advantage of the slack provided by a removal of any
geographical limitations. For those regions starting on the other end, the use of local standards may
reinforce the desires of physicians to maintain lower standards, in which event the adoption of national
standards would force them to move in a direction that they otherwise would have avoided. Thus, while
the locality rule was largely developed under the rationale that it would insulate low-standard regions
(i.e. rural, limited-resource regions) from pressures to comply with their high-standard counterparts, the
rule, in effect, may create isolating forces in both directions: from the top and the bottom. In the
empirical investigation below, I test for both two-sided and one-sided convergence separately.
In light of the abundant evidence of regional variations in physician practices, it is not
immediately clear what direction the adoption of a national-standard law will push physician behavior,
out of the many approaches taken by physicians throughout the country (Drapp 2003). However,
considering the nature of the standard-setting process and the incentives of the respective parties, it is
reasonable to expect that national-standard laws will push physicians in the direction of the national
mean, as I have assumed thus far. To support this contention, I introduce a simple model in Appendix B
of the process by which standards of care are determined in malpractice actions. The basic prediction of
the model is that, even though expert witnesses can come from any one of a number of very different
regions following the adoption of a national-standard law, courts will likely set standards close to the
middle of the utilization distribution given that each side will endeavor to find expert witnesses who will
opine on standards that are on opposing ends of the utilization spectrum.
1.3.3 Malpractice Law and Physician Behavior: Literature Background
Several studies have explored the relationship between the locality rule and certain indicators of
prevailing malpractice pressure. For instance, Waters et al. (2007) estimate a negative relationship
between the frequency and severity of malpractice claims and an index measure that increases with the
restrictiveness of state expert-witness requirements, where the adoption of a national standard-of-care
law contributes negatively to the construction of this index.1 No studies to date, however, have directly
explored the relationship between the locality rule and regional variations in physician behavior,
specifically, or even physician behavior, generally. Moreover, the anticipated shift in physician behavior
that may result from the adoption of a national-standard law need not occur through any change in
these measures of malpractice pressure. Rather, the anticipated shift in behavior derives primarily from
a change in the standard of care itself and requires only some level of underlying malpractice pressure.
Thus, the results derived from Waters et al. (2007) and related studies are not determinative of the
manner in which physicians will respond to an abandonment of the locality rule. 12
The results presented below build on a larger literature exploring the relationship between
malpractice law and defensive physician behavior. I describe this literature in more detail in Chapter 3
11 Adams and Zuckerman (1984) similarly estimate a positive, yet statistically-insignificant, association between the
frequency of malpractice claims and the adoption of laws requiring the use of broader geographical standards of
care. Danzon (1984) also finds that the adoption of any one of four separate pro-plaintiff common-law doctrines
(including the abolition of the locality rule) by 1970 contributed to an increase in claims frequency throughout the
1970's.
12 Nonetheless, if changes in the laws respecting how standards of care are determined actually lead to changes in
the expectations that the malpractice system places on physician behavior, we may expect to see resulting
changes in both (a) physician behavior and (b) these measures of malpractice pressure. Thus, any evidence of a
relationship between this legal variation and malpractice market outcomes may provide further evidence that legal
amendments of this nature lead to changes in the expectations placed upon physicians. Any such evidence may
therefore provide greater confidence in the primary physician behavior results.
of this dissertation. The seminal work in this literature is Kessler and McClellan (1996), who find that
malpractice reforms that directly reduce malpractice pressure, such as those that cap non-economic
damage awards, are associated with a 5-9% decrease in medical expenditures. However, as with those
rare regional-variations studies that consider the role of malpractice factors, these traditional
malpractice / physician-behavior studies focus on a different aspect of malpractice law that largely
impacts the expected level of liability that physicians will bear, taking as given the circumstances of the
physician behavior leading to the finding of liability. The element of malpractice law explored in this
paper operates on a different dimension and largely concerns a delineation of those circumstances in
which liability should be imposed in the first instance. It is possible that physicians will respond in very
different manners to legal variations along each of these two dimensions. Accordingly, this latter
dimension merits separate investigation.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Data Overview
Data on physician behavior is from the National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS), a nationally-
representative survey of inpatient records from short-stay, non-federal hospitals conducted annually by
the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). For approximately 260,000 inpatient records per year
(on average), the NHDS contains information on, among other things: (a) primary and secondary
diagnosis and procedure codes associated with the relevant discharge, (b) certain demographic
characteristics of the patient, and (c) certain characteristics of the hospital. I supplement the public
NHDS files with geographic identifiers (restricted-use variables) received from the Research Data Center
at the NCHS. The resulting sample covers the years 1977 to 2005. All empirical work using the NHDS
records was conducted onsite at the NCHS headquarters.
In the primary specifications estimated below, I use aggregate state-year cells as the relevant
unit of observation. In alternative specifications, I base the regression specifications on individual
discharges. In the former case, the dependent variable is derived from a measure of the state-year
utilization rate for the appropriate treatment. In the latter case, the dependent variable is a dummy
variable indicating the utilization of a particular treatment. I examine the utilization of a range of
treatments that have received significant attention in the regional-variations literature and that
represent some of the most commonly used procedures in inpatient care: cesarean sections,
episiotomies, carotid endarterectomies, cardiac catheterizations, coronary artery bypass grafts (CABG's),
prostatectomies, transurethral resections of the prostate (TURP) for benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH),
cholecystectomies, hip replacements, knee replacements, appendectomies, hysterectomies and
colectomies (non-cancer related). Appendix C provides additional details on these procedures. Each
treatment is identified in the NHDS records using the appropriate ICD-9-CM (1979-2005) and ICD-8
(1977-1978) diagnosis and procedure codes associated with each discharge record.
For some of these treatments, both the numerator and the denominator of the utilization rate
calculation are naturally contained within the NHDS records. For instance, since the sample of state-
year discharges provided by the NHDS files contains a subsample of deliveries, I calculate the state-year
cesarean rate by counting the number of cesareans performed within the state-year cell and dividing by
the associated number of deliveries within that cell. Having calculated these cesarean rates, I can then
compare the rates of a given state with those of the remaining states and determine a measure of the
deviation between state and national cesarean behavior.
For most of the remaining treatments, I would ideally calculate the relevant utilization rate by
estimating the total number of treatments performed annually in the relevant state and then dividing by
the population of that state. While the NHDS does allow for a fixed-effects specification exploring
within-group changes in behavior, it is not designed to generate aggregate state-specific estimates.13
Nonetheless, it is necessary to normalize the state-year treatment counts in some fashion in order to
facilitate a comparison between national physician behavior and the behavior of physicians represented
in each state-year cell. This comparison is a necessary component of the convergence analysis. When a
rational denominator is not naturally contained within the NHDS records, I achieve the necessary
normalization by dividing the state-year treatment count by a state-year health index, calculated (using
NHDS records) by summing the number of discharges associated with at least one of the following
events: (1) acute myocardial infarction (AMI), (2) gastrointestinal bleeding, (3) hip fracture, (4) stroke,
(5) resection for colorectal cancer, or (6) resection for lung cancer. 14 Patients will almost always seek
treatment at a hospital in connection with these events (Wennberg and Cooper 1999; Skinner et al.
2005). Thus, changes in malpractice law that may impact physician behavior should not be expected to
impact the value of this constructed health index.
1.4.2 Sample Restrictions and Sample Means
The design of the NHDS leaves a small number of states with little or no representation in the
sample. Moreover, a redesign of the NHDS sample in 1987 left certain additional states with a weak
presence in either the pre- or post-1987 period. Large inconsistencies in within-state sample sizes of
this nature could confound the primary convergence analysis given that the dependent variable in some
specifications is calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference between state and national
13It is the within-state change in behavior that allows for the identification of the effect of adoptions of national-
standard laws. Representative estimates of state utilization measures themselves are not required for this analysis
(Dafny and Gruber 2005). Moreover, within-state sampling variability (over time) may simply contribute to noise
in the calculated dependent variable. However, given no expected association between such variation and the
adoption of national-standard laws, the specifications estimated below will still allow for identification of the
relationship in question.
14 In the empirical analysis below, utilization rates based on this health index are constructed for 1979 - 2005 only.
The change in coding standards (from ICD-8 to ICD-9-CM) between 1978 and 1979 complicates any attempt to
identify a consistent set of gastrointestinal bleeding occurrences across this transition period. Nonetheless, the
pattern of results presented below is robust to an alternative approach that uses data from 1977 - 2005 and that
uses a health-index denominator based on the five remaining measures (e.g., AMI's).
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utilization rates. Weakly represented state-year cells may, on average, demonstrate relatively more
significant absolute deviations from national averages simply as a result of low sample sizes. With
dependent variables of this nature, large increases in state sample sizes over time may thus lead to a
spurious convergence in state utilization rates. Of course, there may be little reason to believe that
these spurious-convergence scenarios would correlate with national-standard adoptions. Nonetheless,
to alleviate these concerns, I restrict the NHDS sample to those states that maintain consistently large
sample sizes (with at least 700 discharges per cell) throughout the sample years.
Thus, while 17 states adopted national-standard laws (or dropped previously adopted national-
standard laws) over the sample period, the restricted sample includes only 10 such treatment states. 5
In Appendix D, I provide further information on these restrictions and present results from unrestricted
specifications that include all state-year cells. The results presented in Section 1.6 below are quite
robust to this unrestricted approach, and thus the findings presented below do not appear to be
sensitive to NHDS sample-selection concerns or to within-state sampling variations. Moreover, in the
analysis of cesarean utilization, I also avoid concerns arising from the use of absolute values in the
dependent variable calculation by estimating alternative specifications that use the incidence of
cesarean delivery as the relevant dependent variable. I estimate similar convergence results in each of
these approaches. The average number of discharges contained in each state-year cell in the restricted
sample is nearly 8000, while the average number of deliveries in each cell is just over 800 (ranging from
roughly 20 to over 6000).
Descriptive statistics for the various treatments and medical events considered in the analysis
below are presented in Table 1.1. Column 1 presents utilization and occurrence rates for each such
treatment or medical event. Column 2 provides summary statistics for the various dependent variables
used in the aggregated convergence specifications estimated below. Representing a measure of the
is Due to confidentiality concerns and pursuant to the rules set by the Research Data Center, I cannot reveal which
states are affected by these sample restrictions.
closeness between state and national physician behavior, these measures equal the absolute value of
the deviation between state and national utilization rates (normalized by the national rate). Panel A of
Table 1.1 contains summary statistics for the obstetric-related treatments considered. The
denominators used in the relevant utilization rates in this Panel are based on the appropriate delivery
measure (discussed further below). Panel B provides statistics for the other procedures investigated. As
discussed above, lacking a self-contained denominator, these utilization measures are normalized by a
constructed health-index level that measures the extent to which certain non-discretionary medical
events (e.g., strokes) occur in the relevant set of state-year discharges. Finally, Panel C provides
occurrence rates for the key components of that non-discretionary health index. The denominator used
in Panel C equals the index level itself, in which case the relevant utilization rate equals the proportion
of the health index represented by the particular medical event.
Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics for certain of the remaining variables used in the
regression analyses below. The statistics presented in Column 1 of Table 1.2 are based on the sample of
state-year cells used in the aggregated convergence specifications, weighted by the number of deliveries
contained in each state-year cell. Those statistics presented in Column 2 are based on the sample of
individual deliveries used in the alternative cesarean specifications estimated below. As such, these
statistics are to be considered in association with the set of obstetric-related results. For purposes of
brevity, I omit the associated table for the general utilization analysis. Panel A of Table 1.2 provides
statistics for those state-year measures matched to the NHDS records from outside sources, including
the relevant malpractice standard-of-care laws, additional tort measures (e.g., damage caps), and
certain additional variables (e.g., fertility rates). Panel B provides statistics for certain patient and
hospital characteristics associated with each NHDS discharge (e.g. insurance status of the patient).
1.4.3 Cesarean Section Utilization
While I explore a range of treatment utilization rates, I focus the empirical investigation on the
case of cesarean section utilization. Cesarean delivery is one of the most common operative procedures
performed in the United States (AHRQ 2007). Moreover, a cesarean analysis provides methodological
advantages over its counterparts in addressing certain limitations of the NHDS sample. First, as
indicated previously, cesareans allow for the use of a self-contained and well-defined denominator that
facilitates a direct comparison between state and national behavior and that is not itself likely to be
impacted by changes in underlying malpractice law.
Second, the presence of a sub-sample of deliveries within the state-year sample of hospital
discharges also protects against certain sources of sampling variability. The design of the NHDS may
lead to some amount of within-state variability in the set of hospitals included in the NHDS records. In
the case of cesareans, this may lead to variation in the observed propensity to perform cesarean
deliveries by the represented physicians. For some of the remaining treatments (e.g., those involving
intensive cardiovascular care), this may also induce variation in the observed propensity or ability of the
included hospitals to accept the relevant category of patients in the first instance. The cesarean analysis
protects against these latter concerns given that this variability is accounted for by the cesarean
denominator. If a hospital is sampled that does not perform any (or many) deliveries, then the
utilization rate is largely calculated using the deliveries from the remaining hospitals.
Finally, unlike many other medical contexts, the delivery of a child presents a decision-making
situation that invokes a simple binary choice: vaginal delivery vs. cesarean delivery. This choice, in
addition, must be made in the course of an event that virtually always entails hospitalization. Thus, any
change in standard-of-care formulations pertaining to relevant delivery practices should directly impact
the utilization rate of each of these two alternatives and should not, for instance, lead to changes in a
third unobserved alternative that confounds the analysis.
In the aggregated state-year specifications estimated below, I take several approaches to the
calculation of cesarean utilization rates. Primarily, I use cesarean rates that are risk-adjusted for
maternal age and sex (using the indirect method of standardization). 16 Risk-adjusting for these factors
allows for an accounting of the differences between the demographics of a state and of the nation
before constructing a measure of the deviation between state and national cesarean utilization - i.e.,
the dependent variable used in the aggregated state-year specifications considered below. This
approach may alleviate potential concerns over treatment-effect heterogeneity along demographic
dimensions and allow for a more targeted investigation into changes in physician practice styles, as
distinct from changes in physician behavior attributed to varying patient characteristics. In this primary
approach, I also standardize cesarean rates by the incidence of either breech presentation, multiple
delivery or previous cesarean delivery. Cesareans are performed in the vast majority of these situations
(over 76% of the time throughout the sample period). With sample-size limitations in the NHDS, within-
state variation in overall cesarean rates may be too sensitive to within-state variation in the incidence of
these potentially-confounding circumstances. Risk-adjusting cesarean rates for the presence of these
factors may alleviate such concerns.
In the analysis below, I demonstrate the robustness of the convergence findings to the use of
total, non-standardized cesarean rates. I also address the above concerns by calculating a "primary"
cesarean utilization rate inspired by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)'s Inpatient
Quality Indicators (IQI). Under this alternative calculation, I exclude from both the numerator and the
denominator deliveries with any one of the confounding factors identified above (that is, breech /
16 To standardize cesarean rates under the indirect method, I first predict the cesarean rate that a national group
of physicians would be expected to follow if they faced the relevant patient characteristics of each state-year cell,
based on the estimated coefficients from national, annual regressions of cesarean incidence on patient
characteristics (excluding the records associated with the state in question). I then calculate the standardized
state-year cesarean rate by (i) taking the ratio between the observed state-year cesarean rate and this predicted
national cesarean rate and (ii) multiplying this ratio by the observed national cesarean rate. This approach is well
designed for a direct comparison between a regional and a national utilization rate, which is the precise nature of
the comparison employed in this analysis.
abnormal presentation, multiple births, or previous cesarean deliveries). Excluding these instances
allows the cesarean calculation to focus more precisely on the set of discretionary cesareans performed
(AHRQ 2007).17
In the individual-delivery specifications estimated below, I use the incidence of a cesarean
delivery as the relevant dependent variable. Instead of restricting the scope of the cesareans under
investigation (e.g., excluding breech-related cesareans), I account for the above concerns by controlling
directly for the incidence of confounding factors (e.g., breech delivery).
1.4.4 General Utilization Analysis
The results of a cesarean section analysis may provide some insight into how physician behavior
changes in response to the adoption of national-standard laws. However, these results may not
generalize to all treatments and to all aspects of physician behavior. There may be reason to expect that
a change in standard-of-care laws will have a stronger convergence impact in some medical
circumstances relative to others. In Appendix E, I demonstrate the possibility of differential impacts in
varying medical contexts by introducing a simple graphical depiction of the process by which a physician
decides to perform one treatment over another.
Where the potential malpractice damages are high and where the standard-of-care discussions
that arise in the associated malpractice cases emphasize a delineation of those circumstances in which
one treatment should be employed over its alternatives, it may be reasonable to expect a significant
response in physician behavior to a change in malpractice standards. Where standard-of-care
discussions focus instead on more indirect considerations, such as specifying the level of care that
should be taken in the administration of a given procedure, it may be reasonable to expect an entirely
17 Consistent with the AHRQ IQI approach, I also exclude deliveries associated with fetal loss. While cesarean
deliveries may not be the preferred method in such instances, the delivery of a stillborn child (where the fetal loss
occurs before labor) nonetheless presents a situation that implicates fewer malpractice concerns. As such,
excluding these instances further focuses on the analysis on a more discretionary set of cesarean deliveries.
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different physician response altogether. Based on a casual review of malpractice case law, I generally
find that the standard-of-care analyses that occur in connection with the delivery of a child are more
likely, relative to many other medical contexts, to focus directly on a discussion of whether or not the
relevant treatment is indicated under the particular circumstances. Thus, even if an investigation of
cesarean utilization may be methodologically stronger than an investigation into other treatment rates,
it becomes important to conduct separate analyses on additional utilization measures.
1.5 Empirical Methodology
1.5.1 Aggregated State-Year Specifications
I explore whether physician behavior in a state converges towards national behavior levels as
that state amends its malpractice laws to require physicians to follow national standards of care. I
parameterize this convergence mechanism using two alternative approaches. I begin by estimating the
following basic difference-in-difference specification using aggregated state-year cells (weighted
appropriately - e.g., by the number of deliveries in each cell in the cesarean specifications):
Ts,t = c + Ys + A t + /lNSs,t + f 2 NSs,t+2 + s,t (1.1)
where s indexes state and t indexes year; NS,,t represents an indicator for the presence of a malpractice
law requiring that physicians comply with national standards of care. State fixed effects, ys, and year
fixed effects, At, control for fixed differences across states and across years, respectively. fl is the
coefficient of interest, capturing the association between the adoption of a national-standard law and
convergence in physician behavior towards national levels.
In the first approach to testing for convergence in cesarean utilization, I construct the
dependent variable, Ts,t, as follows:
Ts,t = IUtilizations,t - Utilizationtl / Utilizationt (1.2)
where Utilization,, represents the state-year utilization rate for the procedure under investigation,
calculated according to Section 1.4 above. Utilizationt represents the associated national utilization
rate, adjusted accordingly to remove the contribution of the NHDS records from the relevant state-year
cell. This dependent variable captures convergence in physician behavior by measuring how close, in
absolute value, state behavior is to national behavior. I normalize this absolute difference by the
national utilization rate in order to maintain interpretability of this deviation measure in the face of
utilization rate levels that change over time.
A key identification concern in difference-in-difference models of the above nature is posed by
the possibility of underlying trends - in this case, state-specific convergence trends in physician behavior
that pre-date the adoption of national standards. The possibility of pre-adoption trends is of particular
concern in the present study given the reasonable possibility of mean reversion in physician behavior
within a state. Differential levels of mean-reversion between treatment and control states may result in
a spurious estimate of convergence in utilization rates resulting from national-standard adoptions. I test
for the presence of underlying pre-adoption trends by including in the above specification "leads" of the
national-standard indicator variable. NSs,t+2 represents an indicator variable that equals, at time t, the
status of a state's national-standard requirement at time t+2. Under the assumption that no such
confounding trends exist, the coefficient of this two-year lead indicator variable, f2, should not differ
significantly from zero.
I next modify the specification indicated in equation 1.1 by including controls for a range of
demographic, supply and other factors. I illustrate this more inclusive approach using the specification
associated with the cesarean utilization analysis, which represents the focus on the empirical efforts
below. More specifically, I estimate the following specification:
Ts,t = a + Ys + t + ps,t + f/NSs,t + f 2 NSs,t+2 + fl3Xs,t + fl4Zs,t + flsOs,t + Es,t (1.3)
where X,t represents certain mean characteristics of those NHDS records associated with the delivery of
a child: mother's age (15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39 and 40+ years old); mother's race (white, black
and other); mother's insurance status (private, government, no insurance and other); hospital bed size
(0-100, 100-200, 200-300, 300-500 and 500+ beds); and hospital ownership type (proprietary, non-profit
and government). 18 Following Cutler and Sheiner (1999), I continue to include right-hand-side controls
for maternal age and race in those specifications that nonetheless risk-adjust for these factors in
calculating in the relevant left-hand-side variable (though the estimated results are nearly identical
when they are excluded). Z,, represents certain state-year characteristics (OB/GYN concentration rate
and fertility rate). 19 I also include state-specific linear time trends, <Ps,t, to control for slowly-moving
correlations between physician behavior in a state and the adoption of a national-standard law by that
state. State-specific linear trends may also pick up any differential mean-reversion forces between
treatment and control states.
Os,t represents a set of controls for the incidence of additional state-year malpractice provisions:
(1) non-economic damage caps, (2) punitive damage caps, (3) total damage caps, (4) collateral source
181 also consider an alternative approach that calculates mean state-year demographic measures (e.g., percentage
women aged 15-20) using representative estimates from decennial Census files (1969-1999) and American
Community Surveys (ACS) (2000-2005). The results presented below are entirely robust to this alternative
formulation. The approach taken in the primary specification - i.e., using mean characteristics of the state-year
NHDS delivery records to control for patient demographics - is justified in that the composition of this delivery
sub-sample is not likely to be affected by malpractice laws themselves (as indicated in the denominator discussion
above). The same cannot be said, generally, for most of the non-cesarean procedures explored, which lack a self-
contained and non-discretionary denominator - i.e., sample selection concerns may arise from an approach that
takes demographic means from the full set of NHDS records. For those treatments, I use demographic values
representative of the entire state from the Census and ACS. For the same sample-selection reasons, I exclude
mean bed-size, hospital-ownership type and patient insurance status variables from the general treatment
specifications. However, for these general specifications, I include a measure of the hospital bed concentration
rate (hospital beds per population), obtained from the Area Resource File (ARF) and originating from the American
Hospital Association Annual Surveys.
19 The general, non-cesarean specifications replace the OB/GYN concentration rate with a general measure of the
total physician concentration rate. Data on physician population counts are from the American Medical
Association (AMA) administrative records and were obtained from the ARF. Fertility rates are included in the
obstetrical treatment models only. Fertility rates are calculated according to Gruber and Owings (1996) as the
number of births per population. Fertility data is from the Vital Statistics Natality files and was also obtained from
the ARF.
rule reforms, and (5) "indirect" tort reforms. Following Kessler and McClellan (1996), this fifth category
represents reforms that reduce malpractice pressure but that do not directly curtail the expected level
of malpractice liability (unlike the first four provisions). An "indirect" reform is indicated by the
adoption of any one of the following: limits on the applicability of joint and several liability,
requirements of periodic payment of future damages, heightened evidentiary standards for the recovery
of punitive damages, requirements that a percentage of punitive damages be allocated to particular
uses, contingency fee limitations, and provisions for a patients' compensation fund.20 In an influential
study, Kessler and McClellan (1996) find that "direct" reforms - indicated by provisions 1 through 4
above - are associated with a reduction in treatment intensity (consistent with a "defensive medicine"
hypothesis), while "indirect" reforms are associated with a small increase in practice intensity.2 1
Similarly, Currie and MacLeod (2008) estimate the effect of malpractice / tort reforms on the incidence
of cesarean delivery. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that OB/GYN's practice defensive medicine
in deciding whether to perform cesarean deliveries, the authors estimate a positive association between
the adoption of non-economic damage caps and cesarean utilization.
While Kessler and McClellan (1996) and Currie and MacLeod (2008) do not directly concern
differences between state and national treatment levels, they do evidence a more general relationship
between physician behavior and certain elements of malpractice law. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I
consider a set of questions similar to those explored by Currie and MacLeod (2008) and focus on
estimating the relationship between these covariate malpractice provisions (primarily non-economic
damage caps) and various obstetric utilization measures, including cesarean section utilization. The
results from Chapter 3 provide insight into the presence of defensive practices in obstetric behavior,
20 Data on the incidence of each of these various malpractice provisions comes from the Database of State Tort
Law Reforms (2nd Draft), which was compiled by (and graciously provided by) Ronen Avraham.
21 In a subsequent study, Kessler and McClellan (1997) document a reduction in measures of malpractice pressure
(e.g., claims frequency rates) in connection with the adoption of "direct" reforms (while estimating little or no
effect in the case "indirect" reforms).
while at the same time allowing for an assessment of the need to control for other malpractice / tort
measures in the present convergence analysis. I find evidence suggesting that the adoption of various
malpractice reforms has only a minimal impact on cesarean utilization rates. Thus, while I do include
these measures in the more inclusive specifications estimated below, there may be little concern over
their omission from the basic difference-in-difference specifications estimated at the outset.
1.5.2 Individual-Delivery Specifications
The approach considered in Section 1.5.1 above captures convergence in regional cesarean
behavior using a dependent variable specified as a measure of the deviation between state and national
utilization rates. A dependent variable that equals utilization rates themselves would not identify
convergence in behavior over the whole sample, given that the abandonment of the locality rule may be
expected to lead to a reduction in rates in certain regions (i.e., initially high-intensity regions) and an
increase in other regions (i.e., initially low-intensity regions), as suggested by the litigation model
presented in Appendix B. However, I consider an alternative approach that parameterizes the national-
standard indicator in such a way that I can estimate a two-sided convergent effect of this nature while
using a less-parameterized dependent variable specified in terms of utilization rate levels. In this
alternative approach, I define a modified national-standard variable, MOD_NS, that switches (a) from 0
to 1 upon the adoption of a national-standard law for those states that begin the sample with
standardized cesarean rates below the national average (and for which the adoption is expected to lead
to an increase in cesarean utilization rates) and (b) from 1 to 0 upon the adoption of a national-standard
law for those states that begin with above-average standardized cesarean rates (and for which the
adoption is expected to lead to a decrease in cesarean utilization).22
22 With respect to the set of treatment states, I allocate each state to the relevant group - initially-above or
initially-below the national average - based on its relation to the national average in the years leading up to the
adoption of the national-standard law. The sign of the relationship between state and national cesarean rates is
quite stable throughout the sample period and states generally remain either consistently above or consistently
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Under this alternative approach to the identification of convergence in cesarean utilization, I
estimate the following specification among the sample of individual delivery discharges (over all states
in the restricted sample):
Ui,s,t = a + Ys + At + s,t + fllXi,s,t + f 2Zs,t + fl30 s,t + fl4 MOD_NSs,t (1.4)
+ f 5 MOD_NSs,t+2 + Ei,s,t
where Vs, At, qpsxt, Zs, 0,s,, and NS,,t are defined as in (1) above. X,s,t now represents the individual
incidence of the various demographic and supply characteristics indicated above (e.g., maternal age: 15
- 19 years old). U;,,t is an indicator variable for the use of cesarean delivery on individual i in state s and
year t. To address the concerns raised above over small-sample variation in the occurrence of breech
presentations, multiple deliveries (e.g., twins) and previous cesarean-scar deliveries, I control directly for
the incidence of these circumstances. With this alternative approach, a convergent response to the
adoption of a national-standard law is identified by a positive estimate of the relationship between the
modified national-standard indicator and the likelihood of cesarean delivery. I estimate this relationship
using a linear probability model; however, the results from this exercise are robust to an alternative
approach based on the estimation of a logit model.
Each of the approaches indicated above allows for a single test of the convergent effect of
national-standard laws that accounts for convergence from both sides of the utilization distribution.
However, these specifications generate estimates that necessarily assume a response from the top that
equals the response from the bottom. I begin the individual-delivery analysis presented below by first
relaxing the assumption of symmetrical convergence and estimating a separate physician response for
each side of the regional utilization distribution. For these purposes I estimate specifications analogous
below the national average from year to year. In virtually every treatment state, the state cesarean rate remains
consistently on one side of the national average from the beginning of the sample period until the time of
adoption. To provide meaningful comparison groups, I also allocate control groups to one of these two sets of
states based on the sign of the relationship between their cesarean rate and the national average over the first few
years of the sample period, though the results are robust to an approach that includes every control state in each
of these separate samples.
to that indicated in equation 1.4 (using regular national-standard indicators, however) separately for (1)
those states that begin the sample with standardized cesarean utilization rates below the national
average and (2) those states that begin with standardized cesarean rates above the national average.
In the individual-delivery specifications, I exclude those treatment states (i.e., Maryland) that vary
their malpractice standards over the sample period by dropping previously-enacted national-standard
laws. The abandonment of a national-standard rule may lead to a divergence in physician behavior
away from the national mean in light of the fact that impacted physicians may no longer be induced
(through malpractice forces) to consider national sources of information or be expected to comply with
changing national practices. However, unlike the situation with states initially adopting national-
standard laws, there is no firm reason to expect that this divergence is more likely to occur in one
direction over the other (i.e., up or down). In any event, the results presented below remain essentially
unchanged (not shown) when I include such states in the estimation sample under the assumption that,
if a state is practicing at an above (below) average rate prior to the abandonment of a national-standard
law, the behavior of its physicians will diverge in that direction - that is, experience an increase
(decrease) in cesarean utilization - following the abandonment of a national-standard requirement.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Cesarean Section Utilization
1.6.1.1 State-Year Specifications
Table 1.3 presents the estimation results for the basic difference-in-difference specifications
indicated in equations 1.1 and 1.2 above. All regression coefficients and standard errors presented in
Table 1.3 are multiplied by 100. Each observation in this cesarean model is weighted by the appropriate
number of deliveries associated with the relevant state-year cell. Moreover, standard errors are
clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary within-state correlations of the error structure
(Bertrand et al. 2004).
As presented in Column 1 of Table 1.3, I estimate that the absolute percentage deviation
between a state's standardized cesarean rate and the national cesarean rate falls by 4.8 percentage
points in connection with that state's abandonment of a locality rule and adoption of a national-
standard law. This estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level. With an average percentage
deviation between state and national rates over the sample period equal to roughly 9-10%, this estimate
can be interpreted as a nearly 50% reduction in the gap between a state's cesarean rate and the
national rate. In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.3, I sequentially add a set of control variables and state-
specific linear time trends to the estimated specification. The estimated coefficient of the national-
standard law dummy increases slightly (in absolute terms) to -5.9 with the inclusion of various
demographic, supply and other state-year controls. Moreover, the results remain virtually unchanged
with the subsequent addition of state-specific linear trends. In each instance in Columns 2 and 3, the
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The similarity of the findings with and
without the inclusion of control variables demonstrates the robustness of the results to the
consideration of various time-varying factors, while at the same demonstrating that the results are not a
spurious product of large changes in factor(s) that coincide with the adoption of national-standard laws
(Gruber and Hungerman 2008).
Within-state changes in the dependent variable specified in the above regressions are meant to
capture movements in state cesarean rates toward national levels. To the extent that there is any
underlying mean reversion in regional cesarean behavior, however, the data may demonstrate
convergence along these lines for reasons unrelated to malpractice standard-of-care laws, implicating a
potential concern that the results estimated above are confounded by differences in mean-reversion
tendencies between treatment and control states. I test for the presence of potentially confounding
mean reversion by including 2-year lead indicator variables in Columns 1 - 3 of Table 1.3. In each
instance, the estimated coefficient of the 2-year lead indicator variable is statistically insignificant and
close to 0 in magnitude. For instance, the estimated coefficient is 0.05 in the specification including
both controls and state-specific linear trends. Even in the baseline specification without control
variables, there is no evidence that the estimated convergence began to materialize in the years leading
up to the adoption of national-standard laws.
Column 4 of Table 1.3 estimates a more traditional difference-in-difference specification that
drops the 2-year lead dummy. The estimated coefficient of the national-standard dummy in this latter
specification is virtually identical to that estimated in Column 3. Finally, Column 5 of Table 1.3 allows for
a 1-year lag in the implementation of the new national-standard regime. I estimate a coefficient of this
lagged indicator variable that is very close in magnitude (-5.4) to the primary results using
contemporaneous changes in malpractice laws, suggesting that the full impact of national-standard laws
is not felt in the immediate aftermath of their adoptions.
In Panel A of Table 1.4, I take an alternative approach to the investigation of underlying
differential mean-reversion trends in which I focus solely on estimating the pre-adoption lead indicators
using an estimation sample that excludes "treated" state-year cells. That is, I consider a sample that
includes all state-year cells from control states but only state-year cells from treatment states in which
they operated under a local-standard rule. As presented in Column 1, I again estimate a small,
insignificant coefficient for the 2-year lead indicator variable. In Column 2, I take an even richer look at
pre-adoption trends and add a 4-year lead indicator variable for national-standard laws; although this 4-
year lead estimate will not draw on variation in those states that adopt national-standard laws within
the first 4 years of the sample. The 2-year lead coefficient remains close to 0 and statistically
insignificant. The 4-year lead coefficient is estimated at -1.7, suggesting a small negative differential
between treatment and control states in the period between 2 and 4 years prior to the adoption of
national-standard laws. However, this estimate is both statistically insignificant and noticeably smaller
in magnitude than the contemporaneous effects presented in Table 1.3 and the convergence effect in
the 0 - 2 year period following the adoption of national-standard laws that is estimated in the dynamic
specifications presented in Table 1.6 below.
In Panel B of Table 1.4, I consider yet another falsification exercise in which I estimate the
average overall time trend in the percentage absolute deviation between state and national cesarean
rates, again out of a sample of "non-treated" state-year cells. This exercise will allow for an evaluation
of the overall level of underlying mean reversion that exists in the data. For purposes of brevity and to
dampen year-to-year variation, I group sample years into 5-year increments and then estimate a simple
regression of percentage absolute deviation measures on the set of 5-year period dummies. In Panel B, I
present means of the estimated coefficients for the period dummies (excluding standard-deviation
estimates). Each coefficient is evaluated in reference to the percentage absolute deviation level of the
first time period, which I normalize to 0 to simplify the presentation. Between the first and last period
of the sample, the average percentage absolute deviation between state and national cesarean rates
falls by only 3 percentage points, representing a roughly 30% reduction in the average gap between
state and national rates. Thus, the estimated convergence effect stemming from the adoption of a
national-standard law is as large or larger than the underlying level of mean reversion than exists in the
non-treated sample, providing even greater confidence in any conclusion that the estimated impact of
national-standard laws is not likely the result of a spurious mean-reversion differential between
treatment and control states.
In Table 1.5, I demonstrate the robustness of the above results to the use of alternative
cesarean rate calculations. In Columns 1 and 2, I present results of difference-in-difference regressions
(with state-year controls and state-specific linear time trends) using dependent variables based on total,
non-standardized state-year cesarean rates.23 I estimate a coefficient of the national-standard law
dummy between -3.7 (Column 2) and -4.7 (Column 1), which are very close in magnitude to the
coefficients from the above specifications (these non-standardized coefficients are statistically
significant at the 10% level only). In Columns 3 and 4, I base the dependent variable on state-year
"primary" cesarean rates, which exclude from the cesarean-rate calculation deliveries associated with
breech presentation, multiple delivery and previous cesarean delivery. In these "primary" cesarean
specifications, I estimate a coefficient of the national-standard dummy between -8.3 (Column 4) and -
9.2 (Column 3), which suggest a similarly-sized convergent effect in which nearly 60% of the average gap
between state and national "primary" cesarean rates is closed in connection with the adoption of
national-standard laws (considering a mean percentage absolute deviation amount of 15.4% for the case
of "primary" cesarean rates). Moreover, as with the specifications based on standardized cesarean
rates, the coefficients of the 2-year lead indicator variables in Columns 1 and 3 present no evidence to
suggest that the estimated convergent effect began in the period leading up to the adoption of national-
standard laws.
In Column 4 of Table 1.3, as discussed above, I specify the national-standard dummy allowing for
a 1-year lag in its implementation. I consider a richer array of dynamics of Table 1.6, in which I include
both 2- and 5-year lags of the national-standard indicator, along with a 2-year lead indicator to further
allow for an investigation into pre-adoption trends. Each specification estimated in Table 1.6 includes
the full set of control variables and state-specific linear time trends. Columns 1- 3 of Table 1.6 present
results for specifications using standardized cesarean rates, non-standardized cesarean rates and
"primary" cesarean rates, respectively. I continue to estimate small and insignificant effects for the pre-
adoption lead indicators. In each instance, I estimate a large and statistically-significant convergent
23 While these total cesarean rates do not directly adjust for regional differences in the incidence of breech
presentation, multiple delivery or previous cesarean delivery, I nonetheless include additional controls in these
specifications for the mean incidence rates of these potentially confounding factors.
48
effect of national-standard laws in the 2-year period following their adoptions, suggesting a relatively-
quick impact on physician behavior.
In the "primary" cesarean specification estimated in Table 1.6, which essentially focuses the
analysis more closely on the set of discretionary cesarean procedures, I continue to estimate large,
negative coefficients for the 2- and 5-year lagged dummies, suggesting that the percentage absolute
deviation between state and national "primary" cesarean rates falls by 6 percentage points in the 2-year
post-adoption period, an additional 5 percentage points in the subsequent period 2 and 5 years
following adoption and an additional 4 percentage points in the period thereafter (though these latter 2
estimates are not statistically significant). This pattern of results suggests that the convergent forces
resulting from national-standard adoptions may continue to develop over time, as physicians come to
better understand the new expectations being placed upon them and as physicians take time to
assimilate new, malpractice-induced sources of information into their belief structures.
1.6.1.2 Specification Checks
I subject the findings presented above to certain additional specification checks (not shown in
the subsequent tables). First, I find that the full range of results presented above is generally robust to
the systematic, one-by-one exclusion of each treatment state from the sample. Moreover, I estimate
specifications that exclude those treatment states that vary their relevant malpractice laws by repealing
a previously-adopted national-standard requirement (i.e., Maryland in 1994). Physician behavior, after
all, may not diverge following the abandonment of a national-standard rule to the same extent that it
will converge following the abandonment of a locality rule. 24 The above estimates largely remain
unchanged under this more restricted specification. For instance, in the "primary" cesarean
24 For instance, after a region has operated under a national-standard rule for many years, the standard prevailing
in the region may have converged towards some steady state level. Thus, when the law changes to require the use
of local standards of care, there may be little immediate pressure to deviate from prevailing practices. Of course,
there may also be less legal pressure to keep up with changes in national practices. Over time, state and national
practices may begin to diverge.
specification (without the 2-year lead indicator), the estimated coefficient of the national-standard
coefficient is -8.3 with all treatment states and -8.2 excluding Maryland (statistically-significant in each
instance).
The results presented above include controls for various demographic and patient
characteristics using data from within the NHDS records themselves. However, the results presented
above remain virtually unchanged when I add certain mean demographic variables, at the state-year
level, from the Censuses (1969-1999) and the American Community Surveys (2000-2005), including the
percentage of the state-year population that is of Hispanic origin and that fall into various educational-
attainment categories. Moreover, the results remain nearly unchanged when I include certain
additional state-year characteristics including the median household income (inflation-adjusted) and the
percentage of the population living in an urban setting. For instance, including these latter two
characteristics into the standardized cesarean specification, the estimated coefficient of the two-year
lead indicator variable remains nearly identical at 0.04 (falling from 0.05), while the coefficient of the
contemporaneous national-standard indicator falls only slightly from -5.9 to -5.2 (statistically significant
at the 1% level in each instance).
As an additional specification check, I perform hypothesis tests on the estimated national-
standard coefficient using a randomization inference approach (Duflo et al. 2005). After restricting the
sample in the manner discussed in Section 1.4 above, I rely on variation in standard-of-care laws from 10
treatment states (in Appendix D, I present results of other sample-selection approaches that allow for a
greater number of treatment states). A randomization inference approach is valid for any number of
treatment states and thus addresses concerns over the reliability of difference-in-difference
specifications that use a limited set of treatment groups (Conley and Taber 2005). Using only the set of
control states, I randomly generate 5,000 sets of placebo laws and estimate the fully-inclusive
specification set forth in equation 1.2 above on each of these simulated sets of laws. I simulate the
placebo laws so that the expected distribution of placebo law changes over time matches the
distribution of the national-standard law changes that actually took place (Gruber and Hungerman
2008).
I find that the coefficient estimated in Column 4 of Table 1.4, -5.9, is in the 0 .7th percentile of the
empirical distribution of the 5000 estimated coefficient means from the above simulations. This
corresponds to a p-value of 0.014 and thus represents statistical significance at the 5% level. While
these findings base the dependent variable on standardized cesarean rates, I derive nearly identical
findings using the "primary" cesarean-rate specification. While this approach generally has less
statistical power than more parametric methods of inference (assuming that the true deterrent effect is
large), it makes no assumption about the structure of the error term and thus provides a welcome
robustness check (Duflo et al. 2005). Overall, the results of this exercise provide extra confidence in the
conclusion that the observed effect of abandoning the locality rule would likely not be observed if the
true effect were zero.
1.6.1.3 Individual Delivery Specifications
In the analysis to follow, I consider yet another specification check that draws on an individual
sample of deliveries, as distinct from the aggregated state-year specification considered above. The
results presented above assume a symmetrical convergence response between those regions that are
expected to increase their cesarean utilization rates towards national levels and those regions that are
expected to cut back on previously high levels of care. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.7, I relax this
symmetry assumption by estimating difference-in-difference specifications analogous to that indicated
in equation 1.4 above, except using un-modified national-standard law dummies. In Column 1, I
estimate this specification on a sample of individual delivery discharges from those states that began the
sample with standardized cesarean rates below the national average. Consistent with the predictions of
the litigation model presented in Appendix B and discussed further above, I estimate that the adoption
of a national-standard law by an initially below-average state is associated with a 1.1 percentage-point
increase in the incidence of cesarean utilization. Moreover, in Panel B of Table 1.7, I estimate the same
specification but specify the national-standard indicator allowing a 1-year lag in its implementation. I
now estimate a 1.8 percentage-point increase in the likelihood of cesarean delivery in response to a
change in malpractice law.
Also consistent with the predictions of the litigation model considered above, as presented in
Column 2 of Table 1.7, I estimate that the adoption of a national-standard law by an initially above-
average state is associated with a 1.7 percentage-point decrease in the incidence of cesarean utilization.
This estimate increases (in absolute terms) to a 2.1 percentage-point reduction when I specify the
national-standard indicator using a 1-year lag. This estimate is only statistically significant in the 1-year
lag specification, however. The estimates presented in Columns 1 and 2 are indicative of a sizeable
convergence effect, considering that the average absolute difference between state cesarean rates and
national rates over the entire sample is 2.4 percentage points. The results of these separate individual
models confirm that convergence likely arises from both the top and the bottom of the cesarean
utilization distribution.
In Column 3 of Table 1.7, I estimate the specification indicated in equation 1.4 above on the full
set of treatment states (initially above- and below-average). This specification uses a modified
parameterization of the national-standard dummy, in which the national-standard indicator switches
from 1 to 0 upon adoption for those set of states that begin with initially above-average standardized
cesarean rates. An increase from 0 to 1 in this modified dummy variable should be expected to lead to
an increase in the cesarean utilization-rate level if national-standard adoptions do, in fact, induce
convergence in physician behavior (i.e., an expected fall in utilization rates for the upper sub-sample is
manipulated such that it becomes an expected rise in utilization rates). Consistent with these
expectations, I estimate a positive and statistically-significant coefficient for the modified national-
standard indicator. The magnitude of the estimated modified national-standard coefficient (1.1 in the
contemporaneous law-change specification and 1.6 in the 1-year lagged specification) corresponds with
the magnitude of the coefficients estimated in the separate specifications indicated in Columns 1 and 2.
While this model continues to assume a symmetrical response on both sides, it does relax other
parametric elements of the aggregated state-year model, such as the use of a percentage absolute
deviation measure as the dependent variable.
In Table 1.8, I estimate the same alternative convergence specification estimated in Column 3 of
Table 1.7 but include a 2-year lead indicator variable to test for the presence of pre-adoption trends.
Consistent with the findings of the state-year specifications estimated above, I estimate a statistically-
insignificant coefficient of the lead indicator variable that is very close to 0 in magnitude (-0.04), while
the estimated coefficient of the contemporaneous indicator remains at 1.1. These findings also remain
virtually unchanged with the inclusion of various additional state-year controls. For instance, adding
state-year controls for median household income and percent urbanization, I find that the coefficient of
the 2-year lead indicator variable falls (in absolute terms) to 0.00, while the coefficient of the
contemporaneous indicator increases slightly to 1.2 (significant at the 5% level).
Moreover, I also present in Table 1.8 the estimated coefficients for each of the variables
included in the specification, allowing a direct evaluation of the relationship between cesarean
utilization rates and the numerous control variables employed (I exclude these estimates from Table 1.7
for the purposes of brevity). Among other findings, I estimate that cesarean rates are likely to be higher
when (i) OB/GYN concentration rates increase, (ii) patients are black, (iii) cesareans are performed in
proprietary hospitals, and (iv) patients have private health insurance. Likewise, cesareans are less likely
to be performed when (i) cesareans are performed in government-owned hospitals, (ii) patients have
government-funded health insurance and (iii) patients are uninsured. Moreover, consistent with the
induced-demand findings introduced in Gruber and Owings (1996), I find that as fertility rates fall in a
state, physicians within that state perform a greater number of cesarean deliveries. I also find that the
adoption of a non-economic damage cap is associated with an increase in cesarean rates, consistent
with the findings of Currie and MacLeod (2008). I subject this estimate to further testing in Chapter 3 of
this dissertation and find that this positive estimate falls in magnitude (and loses statistical significance)
when I add those states excluded from the present estimation sample.
1.6.2 Falsification Test: Non-Discretionary Medical Events
Certain medical events should not be expected to vary with national-standard adoptions due to
the fact that physicians generally have little or no discretion over their usage or existence. With these
expectations in mind, as an additional check on the cesarean findings above and on the underlying
difference-in-difference specification, I test whether the abandonment of the locality rule leads to
convergence in the following hospitalization rates: (a) acute myocardial infarctions (a.k.a., heart
attacks), (b) gastrointestinal bleedings, (c) strokes, and (d) hip fractures.25 These events represent
situations in which patients will virtually always seek hospitalization and, thus, in which physicians have
little room to exert a discretionary influence (Fisher et al. 2005). As reported in Table 1.9, in each
instance, I find no statistically-significant evidence of convergence of the relevant hospitalization rate
towards national levels in response to the adoption of a national-standard law. Moreover, the average
of the national-standard coefficients estimated in these falsification specifications - both in terms of
average absolute coefficient levels (1.0 in magnitude) and as a percentage of the associated dependent
variable (roughly 10% on average)-are quite small in magnitude relative to the convergence estimates
presented above. Supplementing the underlying mean-reversion falsification exercises presented
25 As discussed above, the denominator used in these utilization rates is a health-index measure that itself equals
the number of state-year discharges associated with acute myocardial infarctions, gastrointestinal bleedings,
strokes, hip fractures, colorectal resections for colorectal cancer and lung resections for lung cancer. Thus, the
utilization rate for each of these specific measures can be interpreted as the percentage of these non-discretionary
events attributable to the specific measure in question. While they are included among the denominator, I
exclude the occurrence rates of the cancer-resection measures from this falsification exercise. These events occur
with significantly less frequency over the sample period and are consequently noisier. In any event, the estimated
regression coefficients for these cancer-measures are also statistically insignificant.
54
above, these findings provide even more confidence that the estimated convergence in state cesarean
utilization rates towards national mean rates is related to the adoption of national-standard laws and is
not attributable to omitted or other confounding factors.
1.6.3 Utilization of Additional Treatments
While the focus of this empirical analysis is on the case of cesarean utilization, I also test for
convergence in physician utilization of a number of other treatments in response to the adoption of
national-standard laws. Frequent subjects in the regional-variations analysis, the treatments explored
represent some of the most common observances in the NHDS sample. Each such treatment is
described in greater detail in Section 1.4 above and in Appendix C below. I present the results from this
general treatment analysis in Table 1.10. Each column presents the estimation results for a different
treatment, with the set of treatments divided equally between Panels A and B. For the purposes of
brevity I do not present the full range of specification tests considered above for the case of these
additional utilization measures. Nonetheless, to demonstrate both pre-adoption effects and lagged
effects, I present the results of a single specification that includes a dummy variable indicating the
adoption of a law requiring physicians to comply with national standards of care, along with a 2-year
lead and a 2-year lag dummy for the adoption of national-standard laws. Each specification includes
state-specific linear time trends and a set of controls for covariate malpractice provisions and certain
characteristics of the patient population and healthcare supply market.
I find statistically-significant evidence of convergence in utilization rates for certain of these
additional treatments. For instance, I find that the percentage absolute deviation between state and
national cardiac catheterization rates falls by nearly 13 percentage points in the two-year period
following the adoption of national-standard laws, representing a convergence effect in which nearly 40%
of the gap between state and national cardiac catheterization rates is closed. Moreover, the coefficient
of the two-year lead indicator variable suggests that this effect did not begin in the pre-adoption period.
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I estimate a similar pattern of results for the utilization of coronary artery bypass grafts (CABG's) and
transurethral resections of the prostate (TURP) for benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH), finding
convergence effects in which roughly 40% of the gap between state and national CABG rates and nearly
50% of the gap between state and national rates of TURP for BPH is closed upon the abandonment of a
locality rule.
Though statistically insignificant, I estimate negative national-standard coefficients consistent
with a convergence effect for various additional treatments, including carotid endarterectomies (with a
2-year lag), prostatectomies, hip replacements and knee replacements (without estimating
corresponding negative effects in the 2-year period prior to adoption). While not shown, I estimate a
statistically-significant national-standard coefficient for the prostatectomy specification that excludes
the lead and lag variables. However, I estimate positive coefficients for certain treatments, including
appendectomies and hysterectomies; though the significance levels of these estimates also fail to rule
out zero effects. In no instance do I find any statistically-significant evidence of divergence in physician
behavior in response to the adoption of national-standard laws.
Similar to the case of cesarean utilization, the denominator used to construct the state-year
episiotomy rates equals the corresponding number of vaginal deliveries in the state-year cell. The state-
year counts for the remaining treatments, on the other hand, are normalized using the state-year health
index discussed above, which equals the number of occurrences of certain medical events, such as hip
fractures, that generally require hospitalization. The presented results are largely robust to an
alternative normalization that uses the total number of discharges in the state-year cell as the necessary
utilization-rate denominator. 26 The results are also robust to the inclusion of certain additional state-
year controls, including mean Hispanic-origin rates, mean incidence rates for certain educational-
attainment categories, median household income and percent urbanization.
26 As discussed in Section 1.4 above, this normalization is necessary to allow for a comparison between state and
national levels and thus to explore convergence in behavior.
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1.7 Discussion
1.7.1 Representativeness of Findings
Perhaps not surprising considering the nature of the denominators used to construct the non-
obstetric utilization rates (and in light of the other limitations of the non-obstetric specifications), the
estimates presented in Table 1.10 are generally noisier than those presented for the cesarean analyses.
Nonetheless, the estimated results are largely supportive of the robust convergence evidence
documented in the cesarean specifications. As such, the collection of results does suggest that regional
variations in physician behavior may perpetuate in part due to the fact that malpractice systems in
certain jurisdictions judge physicians according to the customary practices of local physicians.
At the same time, however, the diversity of the general findings presented in Table 1.10 does
suggest that the abandonment of a locality rule may not lead to systematic convergent forces that span
all facets of physician behavior. This result is sensible considering the various channels by which
malpractice standards may impact physician behavior. As illustrated in Appendix E, it may be reasonable
to expect a wide range of physician responses to a change in the geographical scope of the standard-of-
care process depending on the dimension of physician care implicated by the particular standard-of-care
analysis. In the cesarean example, it is perhaps not surprising that I derive evidence of a substantial
effect. As indicated above, a review of malpractice cases focusing on delivery situations reveals that the
standard-of-care analyses in these cases very often turn directly on the question as to whether a
cesarean should have been employed under the precise set of circumstances.
Of course, by focusing on an exploration into a set of specific inpatient utilization rates, I am not
speaking to a whole range of other medical behaviors. For instance, the standard-of-care analysis in a
given case may focus on requiring that Technique "X" be performed during the administration of
Procedure "Y". Variations in the standard-of-care approach may not lead to significant changes in the
utilization rate for Procedure "Y", but they may lead to large changes in the utilization of Technique "X",
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which is not observed in the data. This point highlights the inability of the above analysis to tell the
complete story as to how physicians will respond. However, the fact remains that the treatments that I
have specifically explored represent a set of treatments that do exhibit regional utilization patterns that
cannot be fully explained by demographic and other factors. Thus, it is still informative to learn that the
adoption of national-standard laws is weakly associated with regional variations in utilization of some of
these treatments (e.g., appendectomies), while strongly associated with utilization rates for other
treatments (e.g., cesarean sections and TURP's for BPH).
1.7.2 Other Implications
An expectation that the adoption of a national-standard law will lead to only a limited
convergent effect for many aspects of physician behavior is reasonable considering that wide variations
in physician practices persist to this day, at a time when most states have embraced the use of national
(or non-geographically-limited) standards-of-care. Some of those states with outlying physician practice
styles continue to maintain some elements of the locality rule. For instance, one such state, Minnesota,
is often identified by the area-variations literature as a region having a low-intensity utilization
philosophy. According to the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, total non-capitated Medicare
reimbursements in Minnesota equaled $5,539 per-capita in 2003, roughly 85% of the national average
and 65% of the highest state's average (New Jersey) (Wennberg and Cooper 1999). However, many
outlying states also reject the application of the locality rule. For instance, two of the highest-intensity
states according to the Dartmouth Atlas, Massachusetts ($8,197 per-capita) and New Jersey ($8,565 per-
capita), have long required that physicians comply with national standards of care.
How can one reconcile the fact that such wide variations persist across regions with the fact that
malpractice rules in most of these regions require physicians to comply with national standards of care?
One possible answer is that the geographical distinctions made in malpractice law do not operate with
much force in all circumstances. National-standard rules generally provide that physicians must exercise
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that standard of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and exercised under similar circumstances by
physicians in good standing. By abandoning the locality rule, jurisdictions no longer demand that
physicians meet this standard on a local level. These legal developments thus remove obstacles to
deviating from local practice patterns. However, many jurisdictions that adopt national-standard laws
still allow juries to consider certain local factors in determining the operable standard of care. These
factors can enter the standard-of-care analysis through the "similar circumstances" prong and generally
focus on local resource availability, as opposed to local opinions regarding the efficacies of particular
medical approaches.2 7
Allowing some consideration of local factors, even if resource-focused and non-conclusive in
nature, may thus dampen the ability of national-standard laws to bring about significant convergence in
physician behavior. However, the results presented in this paper may perhaps serve as a preview of
what additional effects could be achieved by further removing local considerations. That is, while
significant area variations persist in the face of national-standard laws, some level of convergence has
been documented with their adoptions, indicating that the geographical components of malpractice
laws have some bearing on behavior. Pressing further with these geographical measures may generate
even more pronounced levels of convergence.
Other aspects of the standard-setting process in malpractice cases may also limit the force of
these geographical distinctions. For instance, it may be difficult to use malpractice law to induce
convergence in behavior when standards of care are determined using opposing expert witnesses that
offer anecdotal evidence on customary practices. Skeptical of the ability of this process to generate
unbiased outcomes, some malpractice scholars have suggested allowing the use of statistical evidence
of physician behavior to determine standards in malpractice actions (Meadow and Sunstein 2001).
27 For example, § 1-12-601 of the Wyoming Statutes, which establishes a national / non-geographic standard-of-
care for malpractice actions, indicates that "localized circumstances regarding availability of equipment, facilities
or supplies may be shown to contravene proof offered on the applicable standard of care."
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Along these lines, allowing parties to a malpractice action to introduce evidence of regional variations in
physician practices may likely lead to litigation outcomes that push physicians even closer to the
national mean, as juries would likely attach greater weight to the more-concentrated regions of the
utilization distribution.
It is also possible that the puzzle of persistent regional variations in the face of widespread use
of national-standard rules may be partially explained by a weak relationship between regional variations
in utilization and patient health outcomes. Consider the choice between two treatments, Treatment "A"
and Treatment "B", for a given condition. Courts may be more likely to emphasize the use of Treatment
"A" over Treatment "B", for a given set of circumstances, if the choice itself is likely to have an important
effect on the health outcome of the patient. Conversely, if there is evidence to suggest that the
malpractice system places little emphasis on delineating when Treatment "A" is indicated over
Treatment "B", one might infer that this choice implicates few health outcome concerns. This assertion
is purely speculative and assumes much regarding what drives a court's analysis in malpractice actions.
Nonetheless, it is possible that the limited impact of the malpractice system to lessen regional variations
is reflective of the limited association between treatment distinctions and outcome differentials.
1.8 Conclusion
This Chapter contributes to an understanding of the association between the malpractice
system and regional variations in physician behavior. Physicians are generally judged according to the
standards set by customary physician practices, as distinct from standards set according to a more
objective process based on established guidelines or according to a more abstract "reasonable"
physician analysis. Moreover, certain jurisdictions set standards according to the customary practices of
local physicians. The two fundamental elements of such rules - custom and locality - create a potential
foundation by which the malpractice system may perpetuate the divergent practice patterns that persist
across regions over time.
In this Chapter, I have explored this general question by drawing on within-state variation in
laws respecting the geographical nature of malpractice standards of care and asking the more specific
question of whether physician behavior within a state convergences to the mean behavior of physicians
nationally when that state abandons the use of a substantive locality rule and adopts a law requiring
that physicians be judged according to a national (or non-geographically limited) standard. I focus this
investigation on the case of the delivery of a child via cesarean section and find evidence of a
convergence effect in cesarean utilization that is stable across a number of specification checks. I
estimate similar convergence effects in the case of certain additional treatments, including cardiac
catheterization, coronary artery bypass grafts and transurethral resections of the prostate for BPH.
However, I do not find evidence to suggest that these effects extend to the full range of treatments
provided by physicians.
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Table 1.1. Sample Means and Standard Deviations of Utilization Measures
(1) (2)
% Absolute Deviation
Utilization Rate Between State and Nat'l
Utilization Rates
Panel A. Obstetric Procedures (denominator based on
relevant state-year delivery measure)
Cesarean Delivery (Standardized)
Cesarean Delivery (Non-Standardized)
"Primary" Cesarean Delivery
Episiotomy
Panel B. Non-Obstetric Procedures (denominator based
on state-year health index measure)
Carotid Endarterectomy
Cardiac Catheterization
Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG)
Prostatectomy
Transurethral Resection of the Prostate (TURP) for Benign
Prostatic Hyperplasia (BPH)
Cholecystectomy
Hip Replacement
Knee Replacement
Appendectomy
Hysterectomy
Colectomy (non-cancer related)
Panel C. Non-Discretionary Hospitalization Rates
(denominator based on state-year health index measure)
Gastrointestinal Bleeding
22.65
(4.56)
23.02
(4.92)
13.27
(3.39)
39.54
(17.85)
9.11
(7.83)
10.58
(9.27)
15.42
(12.83)
20.82
(14.91)
5.09
(2.25)
49.57
(21.87)
14.08
(7.52)
13.35
(6.24)
8.97
(5.58)
22.24
(6.80)
7.81
(8.04)
10.59
(8.95)
13.71
(4.99)
29.49
(19.42)
6.18
(1.94)
21.32
(3.15)
34.15
(32.03)
32.55
(30.32)
41.07
(36.73)
20.36
(18.96)
25.48
(24.22)
17.71
(14.56)
33.92
(43.60)
37.43
(36.03)
24.86
(20.92)
26.62
(45.32)
20.18
(20.86)
10.34
(8.97)
Hip Fracture 13.41 15.08(2.72) (13.52)
Acute Myocardial Infarction 33.77 9.48(4.40) (7.79)
Stroke 24.02 9.96(3.51) (9.91)
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Utilization data is from a sample of discharge records from the National
Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS). Data on cesarean utilization is from the 1977 - 2005 NHDS files, while data on
the remaining procedures is from the 1979 - 2005 records. Measures of treatment utilization rates and
percentage absolute deviations between national and state utilization rates are calculated at the state-year level.
Reported statistics are then reported based on the resulting sample of state-year cells (785 observations for
those measures using 1977 - 2005 data and 734 observations for those measures using 1979 - 2005 data).
Certain states are excluded from this sample according to the restrictions set forth in Appendix D. Column 1
presents the utilization rates themselves while Column 2 presents a measure of the absolute value of the
deviation between state and national utilization rates, normalized by the national rate. The denominator used to
calculate cesarean rates equals the total number of deliveries in each cell; however, the denominator in the
"primary" measure excludes deliveries associated with breech presentations, multiple deliveries or previous
cesarean deliveries. The denominator used in the episiotomy rates equals the total number of vaginal deliveries.
The denominator used in the remaining, non-obstetric rates is based on a health index level that equals the
number of occurrences in each cell of certain non-discretionary medical events (e.g., strokes). With respect to
the obstetric procedures, reported statistics are weighted by the number of deliveries used to calculate the
relevant denominator. Statistics for the non-obstetric measures are weighted by the total number of discharges
in each state-year cell. Additional details on the utilization measures explored are provided in Appendix C.
Table 1.2. Sample Means and Standard Deviations of Other Selected Variables
(1) (2)
Sample of Individual
Weighted Sample of State- Deliveries
Year Cells (excluding states that drop
national standard laws)
Panel A. Variables from Outside Sources
68.18 68.47
National Standard of Care Dummy (%) (46.60) (46.47)
38.58 35.90
Noneconomic Damage Cap Laws (%) (48.71) (47.97)
36.61 41.27
Punitive Damage Cap Laws (%) (48.20) (49.2(48.20) (49.23)
10.18 10.52
Total Damage Cap Laws (%) (30.26) (30.68)
62.33 68.88Collateral Source Rule Reforms (%) (48.49) (46.30)
73.37 80.74
"Indirect" Malpractice/Tort Laws (%) (44.23) (39.44)(44.23) (39.44)
1.49 1.49
Fertility Rate (births/population X 100) 1.49(0.16) (0.16)
13.53 13.56
OB/GYN's per Population (X 10,000) (4.03) (4.06)(4.03) (4.06)
Panel B. Variables from NHDS: Delivery Sample
Maternal Age Group (omitted category: age 40+):
11.57 11.83
15-19 years old (%) (4.37) (32.29)
24.68 25.1820-24 years old (%) (5.97) (43.40)
28.73 28.78
25-29 years old (%) (3.40) (45.27)
23.08 22.6430-34 years old (%) (5.85) (41.85)
9.97 9.67
35-39 years old (%) (4.32) (29.55)(4.32) (29.55)
Maternal Race (omitted category: other race):
71.42 69.22White (%) (14.18) (46.16)
18.72 19.90
Black (%) (11.92) (39.93)
Hospital Bed Size (omitted category: 0-100 Beds):
19.77 20.43100 to 200 Beds (%)19.77 20.43(18.39) (40.32)
200 to 300 Beds (%)21.94 18.90(20.28) (39.15)
32.69 33.68300 to 500 Beds (%)32.69 33.68(20.27) (47.26)
17.44 18.36500+ Beds (%)17.44) (38.72)(17.44) (38.72)
Hospital Ownership Type (omitted category: Non-
profit)
12.97 13.71Government Hospital (%)12.97 13.71(16.87) (34.39)
4.58 4.87Proprietary Hospital (%) (9.24) (21.52)
(9.24) (21.52)
Patient Insurance Status (omitted category: other
insurance)
29.40 30.05Government insurance (%)29.40 30.05(12.41) (45.85)
59.45 58.64Private insurance (%) (14.72) (49.25)
(14.72) (49.25)
6.08 6.04No insurance (%)6.08 6.04(5.59) (23.82)
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Means and standard deviations are reported for the relevant malpractice
variables and other covariates that are employed in the cesarean-related specifications presented in the tables
below. Panel B presents sample statistics for those demographic and other measures contained in the 1977 -
2005 NHDS data itself, while Panel A presents sample means and standard deviations for those malpractice
provisions and other covariate measures merged with the NHDS records (also for the 1977 - 2005 period). The
measures in Panel A are compiled at the state-year level and then merged with the NHDS by state and year.
Column 1 collapses each measure into state-year cells and reports weighted sample means and standard
deviations, where weights are equal to the number of deliveries associated with each cell. Column 2 presents
means and standard deviations for each measure based on the sample of individual deliveries from the NHDS
records (where the non-NHDS measures are first merged with the NHDS sample of deliveries). Certain states are
excluded from this sample according to the restrictions described in Appendix D.
Table 1.3. State-Year Convergence Specifications: The Relationship between
National-Standard Laws and the Percentage Absolute Deviation between State
and National Cesarean Rates (Standardized)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Basic Diff-in- With Controls and State-Specific Linear Time
Diff With Controls Trends
Specification
Coefficient of National
Standard Law Dummy
-5.40***
1-Year Lag Dummy .0(1.30)
-4.77** -5.87*** -5.92*** -5.90***
(1.94) (2.13) (1.77) (1.43)
0.52 -0.60 0.05
2-Year Lead Dummy (4.40) (3.60) (2.67)
R2  0.33 0.39 0.49 0.49 0.49
N 785 785 785 785 785
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state
correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients in Column 1 are from a basic
difference-in-difference regression of the absolute deviation between state and national cesarean rates
(normalized by national) on a dummy variable for the presence of a law requiring physicians to comply with
national standards of care, along with a 2-year lead indicator variable that indicates at time t the status of a
state's standard-of-care requirements at time t+2. Column 2 modifies this basic specification to include a set of
state-year controls (indicated in Section 1.5 above). Columns 3, 4 and 5 include state-year controls and a set of
state-specific linear time trends. State-year cesarean rates are standardized for age and race, along with the
incidence of breech presentation, multiple delivery or previous cesarean delivery. Regressions are weighted by
the number of deliveries used to form the utilization rate denominators. Data on cesarean utilization is from the
NH DS.
Table 1.4. Underlying Mean-Reversion Analysis: Convergence in Standardized
Cesarean Rates in Non-Treated Sample
(1) (2)
Panel A. Relative Mean-Reversion Analysis: Difference-in-Difference Estimates with Pre-Adoption Leads
Coefficient of National Standard Dummy: 0-2 Years Prior to Adoption
Coefficient of National Standard Dummy: 2-4 Years Prior to Adoption
-0.70
(5.70)
0.26
(4.30)
-1.58
(4.65)
Panel B. Absolute Mean-Reversion Analysis: Estimates of Overall Time Trends in the % Absolute Deviation
Between State and National Cesarean Rates
Years Following Commencement of Sample Period Average Period Effects Relative to
0-5 Year Period (normalized to 0)
0-5
5 - 10
10 - 15
15 - 20
20 - 25
25 - 30
0
-1.39
-2.96
-0.4
-1.72
-2.93
601
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are from a sample that excludes those
state-year cells from treatment states during which national-standard laws are in place. In Panel A, robust
standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported
coefficients in Panel A are from difference-in-difference regression of the absolute deviation between state and
national cesarean rates (normalized by national) on lead dummy variable representing, at time t, whether the
state has a national-standard law in place at time t+2 and time t+4 (in Column 2 only). Panel B presents
estimated mean coefficients (excluding estimated standard deviations) from a regression of the absolute
percentage deviation between state and national cesarean rates on a set of period dummies (where sample years
are grouped into 5-year periods). Estimated mean period effects are interpreted in relation to the first period,
where the first period effect is normalized to 0. All regressions are weighted by the number of deliveries used to form
the utilization rate denominators. Data on cesarean utilization is from the NHDS.
Table 1.5. The Relationship between National-Standard Laws and Convergence in
Overall Cesarean Rates (Non-Standardized) and "Primary" Cesarean Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Cesarean Rate (Non-
"Primary" Cesarean RateStandardized)
Coefficient of National Standard Law
Dummy
-4.68* -3.67* -9.22*** -8.34***
(2.41) (1.81) (2.29) (2.06)
2.34 2.07
2-Year Lead Dummy (333) (2.79)(3.33) (2.79)
Include controls and state-specific YES YES YES YES
linear time trends?
R2 0.52 0.52 0.48 0.48
N 785 785 785 785
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state
correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference
regression of the absolute deviation between state and national cesarean rates (normalized by national) on a
dummy variable for the presence of a law requiring physicians to comply with national standards of care.
Columns 1 and 3 also include a 2-year lead indicator variable that indicates at time t the status of a state's
standard-of-care requirements at time t+2. Each specification includes a set of state-year controls (indicated in
Section 1.5 above) and state-specific linear time trends. Columns 1 and 2 base the dependent variable on the
overall, unadjusted cesarean rate, while Columns 3 and 4 use the "primary" cesarean rate, which excludes
instances of breech presentation, previous cesarean delivery and multiple delivery from the cesarean-rate
calculation. Regressions are weighted by the number of deliveries used to form the utilization-rate
denominators. Data on cesarean utilization is from the NHDS.
Table 1.6. Dynamic Convergence Specifications
(1) (2) (3)
Overall CesareanStandardized "Primary"
Cesarean Rate Rate (Non- Cesarean RateStandardized)
Years Since Adoption of National-Standard Law
-0.44 2.07 -0.24
(2.68) (3.12) (2.92)
-5.02** -4.08* -5.89*
(2.16) (2.24) (2.94)
2 to 5 Years -1.59 -1.01 -5.45(1.91) (1.73) (3.29)
5+ Years -0.56 -0.45 -4.10(1.97) (1.60) (2.89)
Include controls and state-specific linear time
trends? YES YES YES
R2  0.49 0.52 0.48
N 785 785 785
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state
correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference
regressions of the absolute deviation between state and national cesarean rates (normalized by national) on a
dummy variable for the presence of a law requiring physicians to comply with national standards of care. Each
regression also includes certain state-year controls (indicated in Section 1.5 above), state-specific linear time
trends and a set of 2-year lead, 2-year lag and 5-year lag lead indicator variables, which represent at time t
whether the state has a national-standard law in place at time t+2, t-2 and t-5, respectively. Cesarean rates used
in Column 1 are standardized for age and race, along with the incidence of breech presentation, multiple delivery
or previous cesarean delivery. The specification estimated in Column 2 uses total, unadjusted state-year
cesarean rates. Column 3 uses "Primary" cesarean rates, which exclude instances of breech presentation,
previous cesarean delivery and multiple delivery from the cesarean-rate calculation. Regressions are weighted by
the number of deliveries used to form the utilization rate denominators. Data on cesarean utilization is from the
NHDS.
Table 1.7. Individual-Delivery Specifications: The Relationship between National-
Standard Laws and the Likelihood of Cesarean Delivery
(1) (2) (3)
BELOW NAT'L ABOVE NAT'L WHOLE
AVG. SAMPLE AVG. SAMPLE SAMPLE
Panel A. Using Contemporaneous Changes in
National-Standard Laws
1.05** -1.69
National Standard Law Dummy (NS) (0.47) (1.18)
Modified National Standard Law Dummy 1.09*
(= 1 - NS, for above nat'l avg. states) (0.55)
Panel B. Using 1-Year Lagged Changes in
National-Standard Laws
1.79** -2.09**
National Standard Law Dummy 1.79* -2.09**(0.64) (0.77)
Modified National Standard Law Dummy 1.58**(0.70)
R 0.31 0.30 0.30
N 169,901 303,537 473,438
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-
state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from individual-
delivery difference-in-difference regressions of the incidence of cesarean delivery on a dummy variable for
the presence of a national standard-of-care law and a set of individual controls, state-year controls and state-
specific linear time trends. Column 1 includes only those states with cesarean utilization rates at the
beginning of the sample that were below the national average. Column 2 includes only those states with
cesarean utilization rates that began above the national average. Column 3 includes the entire sample of
states, but modifies the national-standard dummy variable such that it equals the regular national-standard
dummy for those initially below-average states and 1 minus the regular national-standard dummy for those
initially above-average states (i.e., for these latter states, this modified dummy variable is set to 1 for those
years prior to the law change and 0 thereafter). Panel B specifies national-standard laws assuming a 1-year
lag in their implementation, while Panel A specified national-standard laws using their contemporaneous
statuses. Data on cesarean utilization is from the NHDS.
Table 1.8. Individual Delivery Specification with Pre-Adoption Lead Indicator
Variable (Presenting All Covariate Coefficient Estimates)
1.10*Modified National Standard Law Dummy: Contemporaneous (0.56)
(0.56)
-0.04Modified National Standard Law Dummy: 2-Year Lead -0.04(0.68)
Other State-Year Measures
1.60***Non-economic Damage Cap Dummy (0.44)
-0.60Punitive Damage Cap Dummy -0.60(0.46)
Total Damage Cap Dummy -3.39***(0.93)
Collateral Source Rule Reform Dummy 
-0.15(0.47)
"Indirect" Tort Law Dummy 0.46(0.59)
0.77***OB/GYNs per Population 0.77***
(0.21)
Fertility Rate -5.64**(2.34)
Individual Discharge Measures
White 0.53*
(0.27)
Black 1.36***
Omitted = Other Race (0.34)
Age < 20 -6.87***Age < 20 (0.64)
-7.17***Age 20-24 (0.69)
-6.58***Age 24-29 (0.69)
Age 30-34 (0.59)
Age 35-39 
-3.63***
Omitted = Age > 40 (0.63)
Hospital Bed Size: 100 to 200 Beds 0.06(0.64)
Hospital Bed Size: 200 to 300 Beds 0.42(0.74)
0.97Hospital Bed Size: 300 to 500 Beds (0.69)
Hospital Bed Size: 500+ Beds 0.49
Omitted = 0 to 100 Beds (0.73)
Hospital Ownership: Government 1.59(0.71)
Hospital Ownership: Proprietary 2.15***
Omitted = Non-profit hospital (0.63)
Patient Insurance Status: Government -1.02*(0.54)
1.49***Patient Insurance Status: Private (0.40)
Patient Insurance Status: No insurance -2.42***
Omitted = Other insurance (0.50)
Breech Presentation 62.36***(0.85)
61.15***Previous Cesarean Section 61.15**
(0.98)
Multiple delivery (and certain other complications) 30.58***(0.92)
R2  0.30
N 470,976
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-
state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from an individual-
delivery difference-in-difference regression of the incidence of cesarean delivery on a dummy variable for
the presence of a national standard-of-care law and a set of individual controls, state-year controls and state-
specific linear time trends. The estimated regression also includes a 2-year lead indicator variable that
indicates at time t the status of a state's standard-of-care requirements at time t+2. That national standard
dummy is modified such that it equals the regular national-standard dummy for those states that begin with
initially below-average cesarean rates and 1 minus the regular national-standard dummy for those initially
above-average states (i.e., for these latter states, this modified dummy variable is set to 1 for those years
prior to the law change and 0 thereafter). Data on cesarean utilization is from the NHDS.
Table 1.9. Falsification Tests: The Relationship between National-Standard Laws
and Convergence in the Occurrence Rates of Non-Discretionary Medical Events
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gastrointestinal
Hip FractureBleeding Discharge AMI Discharge Stroke DischargeDischargDischarge
Coefficient of National Standard 1.04 -0.80 -0.78 -1.46
Law Dummy (3.59) (4.13) (2.34) (2.04)
N 734 734 734 734
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state
correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference
regressions of the absolute deviation between state and national occurrence rates for certain medical events
(normalized by the national rate) on a dummy variable for the presence of a law requiring physicians to comply
with national standards of care. More specifically, the medical events examined include discharges associated
with the following: gastrointestinal bleeding (Column 1), hip fracture (Column 2), acute myocardial infarction
(Column 3) and stroke (Column 4). All regressions include state-specific linear time trends and state-year controls
for certain malpractice, demographic and health-care supply factors (as indicated in Section 1.5 above).
Regressions are weighted by the number of discharges associated with each NHDS state-year cell. The
denominator used in calculating the relevant occurrence rates is based on a health index level that equals the
number of occurrences in each cell of certain non-discretionary medical events (including discharges associated
with gastrointestinal bleeding, hip fracture, AMI and stroke). Discharge data is from the NHDS.
Table 1.10. General Convergence Analysis: The Relationship between National-Standard Laws and
Convergence in Utilization Rates of Various Treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. 1 st Set of Carotid Cardiac CABG Prostatectomy TURP for BPH CholecystectomyUtilization Measures: Endarterectomy Catheterization
Coefficient of National
Standard Law Dummy
1.25 -1.96 5.70 -0.79 6.45 -10.24
(7.86) (6.89) (10.27) (5.29) (6.40) (7.94)
Contemporaneous 8.23 -12.52* -16.92* -5.97 -13.85*** -2.41
Dummy (9.26) (6.19) (9.57) (3.82) (3.91) (5.76)
-16.45 -0.53 -4.07 -2.70 -0.73 5.61
(9.82) (11.36) (14.56) (4.52) (5.67) (11.52)
Panel B. 2"d Set of Hip Knee Colectomy (non-Appendectomy Hysterectomy EpisiotomyUtilization Measures: Replacement Replacement cancer)
Coefficient of National
Standard Law Dummy
1.73 17.23 -7.15 6.37 1.69 3.97
(12.94) (16.71) (5.27) (14.43) (6.34) (2.75)
Contemporaneous -4.88 -11.99 2.30 10.15 3.92 0.14
Dummy (9.04) (10.17) (4.45) (14.64) (6.91) (4.80)
-7.17 3.95 5.08 0.14 4.80 -1.78
(7.20) (5.84) (6.38) (16.75) (6.05) (5.46)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are
reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference regressions of the absolute percentage deviation between state and
national utilization rates of various treatments (as indicated) on a dummy variable for the presence of a national-standard law, along with a 2-year lead
and a 2-year lag indicator variable for national-standard laws. All regressions include state-specific linear time trends and state-year controls for certain
malpractice, demographic and health-care supply factors (as indicated in Section 1.5 above). Regressions are weighted by the number of discharges
associated with each NHDS state-year cell. The denominator used in calculating the relevant utilization rates is based on a health index level that equals
the number of occurrences in each cell of certain non-discretionary medical events. Utilization data is from the NHDS.
Appendix A Developments in Malpractice Standard-of-Care Laws
The table presented below illustrates the year in which the indicated state adopted a law
requiring physicians to comply with national standards of care, along with information regarding the
source of this change in law. For those states marked with an asterisk(*), the indicated legal variation
represents the abandonment of a previously-adopted national-standard requirement and the adoption
of a law requiring physicians to follow either a state-wide standard of care (Washington and Arizona) or
a same-or-similar standard of care (Maryland). The table provides information for treatment states only
and does not indicate the legal status of those states that did not amend their relevant standard-of-care
laws over the sample period (at least along the national vs. non-national dimension). I include all legal
variation in (or immediately around) the 1977 - 2005 time period. The table does not include legal
variation within the set of local standard classifications (i.e., strictly-local, same-or-similar or statewide
standards).
A small minority of states (e.g., Pennsylvania) take varying approaches to their standard-of-care
requirements depending on whether the physician in question is a general practitioner or a specialist.
Given the nature of the procedures explored above (i.e., largely inpatient, surgical treatments) and to
allow for a consistent empirical approach, I specify national-standard requirements using laws that apply
to specialists only or laws that take symmetrical approaches between both general practitioners and
specialists.
I exclude states from the specification where there is substantial uncertainty in the nature of
their standard-of-care requirements over time (e.g., conflicting case law within the state). This occurs
rarely, however, over the sample years and only affects two states: Texas and Hawaii.
Table 1-11. Adoptions and Repeals of National Standard-of-Care Requirements
State Year Source(s)
Alabama 1980 Zellis v. Brown, 382 So. 2d 528
(Mar. 1980).28
Alaska 1976 Alaska Stat §09.55.540
(amendment effective May
1976).
Arizona* 1976 Ariz Rev Stat § 12-563 (effective
Feb. 1976).29
Colorado 1983 Green v. Thomas, 662 P.2d 491
(November 1982); Short v.
Kinkade, 685 P.2d 210
(December 1983).30
28 The Zellis decision was decided by a plurality and did not bear directly on this geographical distinction.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Zellis provided a strong, direct indication of their intention to
abandon the use of a locality rule in Alabama. This stance was subsequently strengthened by the Court's decision
in Bryant v. Otts, 412 So. 2d 254 (1982). The results are robust to the use of 1982 as the relevant date of adoption.
29Arizona had operated under a national-standard requirement for specialists prior to the adoption of this statute.
30 It was not until Jordan v. Bogner, 844 P.2d 664 (Jan. 1993) when the Supreme Court of Colorado spoke
definitively on the geographical scope of the standard of care owed by a specialist physician. However, several
appellate-level cases in the early 1980's in Colorado, including those indicating above, adopted standard of care
Connecticut 1984 Logan v. Greenwich Hospital
Association, 191 Conn. 282
(September 1983).31
Delaware 1999 18 Del.C. § 6801 (amendment
effective July 1998).
D.C. 1980 Morrison v. Macnamara, 407
A.2d 555 (October 1979).
Florida 1977 Fla. Stat. § 766.102 (effective
July 1976).
Indiana 1992 Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E. 2d 185
(June 1992).
Louisiana 1976 La. R.S. 9:2794 (effective Sept.
1975)
Maryland* 1994 Md Code Ann, [Cts&Jud Proc]
§3-2A-02(c) (effective July
1993).32
Mississippi 1983 King v. Murphy, 424 So. 2d 547
(November 1982); Hall v. Hilbun,
466 So. 2d 856 (Feb. 1985). 33
Montana 1985 Aasheim v. Humberger, 215
Mont. 127 (Feb. 1985).
Nevada 1979 Orcutt v. Miller, 595 P2d 1191
(June 1979).
New Mexico 1978 Pharmaseal Lab., Inc. v. Goffe, 90
N.M. 753 (Sept. 1977).
Ohio 1976 Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St. 2d
127 (May 1976).
Oklahoma 1984 76 O.S. Supp. 1983 § 20.1
(effective September 1983).
Rhode Island 1998 Sheeley v. Memorial Hospital,
requirements that specialist physicians are to be judged by a standard commensurate with that of a reasonable
physician practicing in that specialty. This approach did not limit the standard to particular geographical bounds, a
fact emphasized by subsequent case law. In describing the standard to be applied to non-specialist physicians,
Colorado case law continued to refer to the use of a community standard. As such, in indicating that specialists are
not subject to a locality rule, the Supreme Court in the 1993 Bogner decision cited one of these earlier Colorado
rulings (Kinkade) as the applicable state of the law and did not indicate that it was adopting a new approach. For
these reasons, I use these earlier rulings, Green and Kinkade, as the turning point in Colorado's national-standard
requirement for specialist physicians. The findings presented however are robust to the alternative use of 1993 as
the year of adoption and to the exclusion of Colorado entirely.
31 This position was subsequently codified in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-184c. Prior to the Logan case, Connecticut
practice under a statewide standard of care requirement.
32 Maryland had, prior to this time, adopted in a national-standard requirement in Shilkret v. The Annapolis
Emergency Hospital Association, 276 Md. 187 (October 1975).
33 King expanded the geographical scope of the standard-of-care requirements to include at least the entire state
of Mississippi plus "a reasonable distance adjacent to state boundaries." For the purposes of this empirical
analysis (structured around state-year cells) I consider this breaking of state boundaries as an abandonment of the
locality rule. However, the findings are robust to the use of 1985 as the relevant national-standard adoption year,
at which time the court fully embraced a national standard in Hilbun.
710 A. 2d 161 (April 1998).
South Carolina 1981 King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478
(June 1981).
South Dakota 1988 Shamburger v. Behrens, 418
N.W.2d 299 (Jan. 1988).
Vermont 1976 12 V.S.A. § 1908 (effective April
1976).
Washington* 1976 Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) §
7.70.040 (effective June 1976).
West Virginia 1986 Paintiff v. City of Parkersburg,
176 W. Va. 469 (Mar. 1986); W.
Va. Code § 55-7B-3 (effective
1986) .34
Wyoming 1981 Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768
(March 1981).35
34 With respect to specialists, the abolition of the substantive components of the locality rule in West Virginia may
have begun years before, however, with the West Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Hundley v Martinez, 151 W.
Va. 977 (1967). The presented results are robust to the exclusion of West Virginia.
35 In Vassos, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated that "a physician or surgeon must exercise the skill, diligence and
knowledge, and must apply the means and methods, which would reasonably be exercised and applied under
similar circumstances by members of his profession in good standing and in the same line of practice... The skill,
diligence, knowledge, means and methods are not those 'ordinarily' or 'generally' or 'customarily' exercised or
applied, but are those that are 'reasonably' exercised or applied." Subsequent case law viewed this 1981 decision
as the turning point in the abandonment of the locality rule. Wyoming subsequently codified the use of a national
standard in 1986.
Appendix B Model of Standard-of-Care Determination Process
In this appendix, I introduce a simple, informal model of the process by which standards of care
are determined in medical malpractice actions. This exercise is meant to illustrate the direction in which
malpractice forces will likely push physician behavior following the abandonment of the locality rule and
the adoption of a law requiring physicians to comply with national standards of care.
To illustrate the standard-setting process, I consider the treatment decisions that physicians
make in the delivery of a child. Deliveries provide for a clean example of the forces at play given that
patients will virtually always seek hospital care to bring about the delivery (i.e., "no treatment" is not an
option) and that the treatment decision is essentially binary in nature: vaginal delivery versus cesarean
delivery. This binary decision itself is directly determined by the underlying decision as to how much
care should be taken during the delivery of a child. Generally, when the complications of delivery have
reached a certain threshold, physicians will elect to perform a cesarean delivery. Thus, on average, it is
the decision over where to place this threshold that will determine cesarean utilization rates.
Figure 1-1 presents a hypothetical distribution of the complications that arise during a delivery.
I assume that complications follow a uniform distribution, normalized to range from 0 to 1. The vertical
line in this figure, crossing the distribution at point A, represents a physician's belief as to when the
complication level has reached a point where the delivery should be performed via cesarean section
(i.e., the physician's care level). Taking a large sample of deliveries from this physician, the area to the
right of this line (1-A) represents the physician's cesarean utilization rate. This cesarean rate can
accordingly be viewed as a metric for the level of care that physicians elect to take in the delivery a
child.
Figure 1-1: Distribution of Delivery Complications
0 A 1
Figurel- 2 similarly illustrates a hypothetical distribution of cesarean utilization rates observed
across different regions of the United States. I assume that cesarean rates follow a standard normal
distribution. As above, this figure can also be seen as describing the distribution of the level of care
taken by these different regions. Consider the case of a region that abandons the use of the locality rule
and adopts a law requiring that physicians be held to a national standard. Prior to the adoption of the
national standard law, physicians in this region performed cesareans at a rate indicated by point X along
the horizontal axis in Figure 1-2, which lies below the national average cesarean rate (0). Point X
represents the standard of care that was expected of physicians when this region applied the locality
rule.
Figure 1-2: Frequency Distribution of Regional Cesarean Rates (assumed to be "N(0,1))
X 0 Z
In a given malpractice case, both the plaintiff/patient (P) and the defendant/physician (D) will
hire respective expert witnesses to testify as to the level of care that physicians should maintain in the
delivery of a child. For the reasons indicated above, even though the testimony in a given case will
concern the treatment that should have been employed in the precise set of circumstances presented in
that case, I assume that each witness will testify as to the proper cesarean utilization rate that
physicians should generally employ. This characterization of the expert testimony is intuitive when
considering the outcome of a sample of numerous malpractice actions. Under a national-standard rule,
experts are not expected to present evidence concerning regional variations in physician practices and
ultimately demonstrate the mean of such distribution. Rather, they are only expected to identify one
point in the cesarean distribution that represents their opinion as to how physicians should behave,
irrespective of their locality.
For situations in which the level of care is initially below the national average, I assume that
physicians will attempt to maintain this level of care following the change in law and that this behavior
will accordingly be challenged in court. In this situation, I assume that P will hire an expert to testify as
to a standard of care that is as far to the right in the cesarean distribution as possible, in order to make
the best possible case that D's actions fell below the operable standard of care. Similarly, D will hire an
expert to testify as to a standard of care that is at least as far to the left in the cesarean distribution as
the level of care that they actually took in delivering the child in question (i.e., point X). Moreover, I
assume that D's expert will testify as to a standard of care that is as far to the left of that point as
possible - i.e., that D even took more care than was necessary. For the immediate purposes, I assume
no constraints on this testimony and allow P's expert and D's expert to opine on standards that are at
the far right end and the far left end of the cesarean distribution, respectively.
Juries will set the standard of care to be applied by weighing the testimony of each expert. I
model this decision process by viewing it as the outcome of a simple Nash bargaining game between D
and P's respective experts. Assuming equal bargaining power between each expert (which is reasonable
when considering an average over numerous malpractice cases) and given the testimonies indicated
above, the court will select a standard of care at the national mean of the cesarean distribution. In this
case, the adoption of a national-standard law will lead to a malpractice outcome that places pressure on
physicians that previously practiced at point X to increase their cesarean utilization rates to a point
closer to the national average (0). The direction of this pressure will be the same for most reasonable
allocations of bargaining power. However, if too much weight is allocated to either expert, it is possible
that the court will set a standard of care that is at a point (in absolute value) that is actually farther away
from the national average than the initial difference.
The same general conclusion holds when I constrain the ability of an expert to testify as to
outlying standards. In one such constraint, I assume that the credibility of each expert's opinion is
proportional to the empirical frequency of that opinion. That is, opinions as to cesarean rates that are
more commonly found throughout the U.S. will garner more weight in the minds of the jurors. In the
case of a physician that attempts to maintain a level of care at Point X, P will again hire an expert to
establish a standard as far to the right as possible; however, as a result of these credibility weights, P's
expert will only select a position that is 1 standard deviation greater than the national mean (as can be
readily shown considering a maximization of a function equal to the product of a variable, x, and its
frequency distribution - i.e., the standard normal). Likewise, D's expert will select a position that is
equal to the lesser of (1) the level of care actually taken (i.e., D will not maintain that he or she failed to
take the necessary care) or (2) 1 standard deviation to the left of the national mean.
The standard of care determined by the outcome of the bargaining process in this credibility-
constrained model will either be at the national mean or to the left of the national mean, depending on
the precise standard selected by D's expert. However, in every circumstance (assuming equal bargaining
weight), this outcome will again be at a point requiring a higher level of care than Point X.3 6 Essentially,
even though expert witnesses can come from any one of a number of very different regions following
the adoption of a national-standard law, courts will likely set standards close to the middle of the
cesarean distribution (which in turn will generate convergence pressure) given that each side will
endeavor to find expert witnesses who will opine on standards that are on opposing ends of the
cesarean distribution.
Thus far, I have considered the outcome of malpractice actions that arise following the adoption
of national-standard laws by regions that practice at below-average levels of care. The model works
slightly differently for regions that initially practice at above-average levels. Consider a region with
physicians that practice at Point Z in the cesarean distribution, as illustrated in Figure 1-2. Using the
above model, it is unlikely (without exceptionally strong bargaining power) that P will be able to
convince a court to adopt a standard of care that is at a level higher than that already maintained by
physicians, given that D, in turn, will now be able to argue that the true standard is at very low levels.
Thus, divergence in physician behavior is unlikely. Moreover, any convergence in physician behavior will
not arise from a change in direct malpractice forces given that P will not attempt to argue for a standard
of care that is below that actually taken by D.
Convergence toward national levels will arise from the voluntary decision by physicians in such
regions to lower their levels of care. I assume that a physician's desired level of care is below Point Z.
Under the application of a locality rule, however, individual physicians are unable to change their
behavior. With the adoption of a national-standard law, physicians will no longer face this constraint
and some of them may change their behavior accordingly. Moreover, provided that D does not reduce
his or her level of care too much (i.e., below the national mean), P will face difficulty in arguing that the
reduction in D's selected level of care falls below the required standard of care, given that D will be able
to call a witness to testify as to a standard of care at the low end of the cesarean distribution and
thereby justify his or her actions.
36 If each side selects the 1-standard-deviation-away care level, then the outcome of the bargaining process will
again be at the distribution mean. If D selects anything to the left of the 1-standard-deviation line, it will be at its
actual level of care line, X, in which event the outcome of the bargaining process should, at the least, be to the
right of this point.
Appendix C Background on Treatments
The table below provides a brief definition of each of the procedures / events explored in the
analysis above. Unless otherwise indicated, the utilization of each procedure is identified by the
presence of either a primary or secondary procedure code associated with the treatment.
Table 1-12. Treatments
Procedure / event Definition Notes (if applicable)
Cesarean section (c- A cesarean section is a surgical procedure used To identify cesarean deliveries in
section) to deliver a child through an incision in the the NHDS records, I first select a
mother's abdomen. sample of individual deliveries using
primary diagnosis codes for
childbirth (among maternal
records). Then, using both primary
and secondary procedure codes, I
identify whether the delivery is
associated with a cesarean
procedure.
To identify "primary" cesarean
deliveries, I follow the above steps
but exclude deliveries with
diagnosis codes indicating (a)
breech/abnormal presentation, (b)
fetal death, (c) multiple gestation,
or (d) previous cesarean deliveries.
I also exclude deliveries with
procedure codes indicating breech
delivery.
Episiotomy An episiotomy is an incision made in the tissue To identify episiotomy utilization, I
between the vagina and anus (perineum) during first select a sample of vaginal
a vaginal delivery. deliveries using primary diagnosis
codes to identify instances of
childbirth and using primary and
secondary procedure codes to
exclude deliveries performed via
cesarean section. I then use
procedure codes to identify
instances of episiotomy utilization.
Cholecystectomy A cholecystectomy is a surgical procedure to
remove the gallbladder.
Prostatectomy A prostatectomy is a surgical procedure to
remove all or part of the prostate gland.
Transurethral resection BPH refers to an enlargement of the prostate I first identify patients with BPH
of the prostate (TURP) gland as a man ages. TURP is a common surgical using primary and secondary
for treatment of Benign treatment for BPH in which part of the prostate diagnosis codes. I then determine
Prostatic Hypertrophy gland is removed with an instrument inserted which of these patients receive
(BPH) through the urethra. TURP using primary and secondary
procedure codes.
Hysterectomy A hysterectomy is a surgical procedure to
remove the uterus.
Appendectomy An appendectomy is a surgical procedure to
remove the appendix.
Coronary artery bypass A CABG is a surgical procedure in which a
graft surgery (CABG) healthy blood vessel is taken from the patient's
leg, arm, chest or abdomen and connected to
the other arteries in the patient's heart so that
blood is bypassed around a diseased or blocked
area.
Cardiac catheterization Cardiac catheterization is a procedure in which a
catheter is inserted in an artery or a vein in the
patient's groin, neck or arm and threaded
through the patient's blood vessels to the heart,
allowing for the performance of certain
treatments and diagnostic tests.
Colectomy (non-cancer) A colectomy is a surgical procedure to remove all Primary and secondary procedure
or part of the colon. Colectomies are performed codes are used to identify
to treat colorectal cancer and other conditions colectomy utilization. Primary and
affecting the colon. To focus on a more secondary diagnosis codes are used
discretionary utilization measure, cancer-related to exclude colectomies performed
colectomies are excluded. on patients with colorectal cancer.
Hip replacement Hip replacement, also called hip arthroplasty, is Primary and secondary procedure
a surgical procedure in which the hip joint is codes are used to identify hip
replaced with artificial materials. To focus on a replacement utilization. Primary
more discretionary utilization measure, hip and secondary diagnosis codes are
replacements associated with hospitalizations used to exclude hip replacements
for hip fractures are excluded. Both total and performed on patients admitted
partial replacements are included. with hip fractures.
Knee replacement Knee replacement, also called knee arthroplasty,
is a surgical procedure in which the knee joint is
replaced with artificial materials. Both total and
partial replacements are included.
Carotid endarterectomy A carotid endarterectomy is a surgical procedure
in which plaque is removed from the inner lining
of the carotid artery (i.e., an artery that supplies
the head and neck with oxygenated blood).
Pacemaker surgery Pacemaker surgeries refer to the implantation of I identify instances of pacemaker
a small, artificial device under the skin of a surgery using primary and
patient's chest. The pacemaker then delivers secondary procedure codes for the
electrical impulses to help control the patient's insertion, revision, replacement and
heartbeat. removal of pacemaker leads or
pacemaker devices; the insertion of
a temporary transvenous
pacemaker system; or the revision
or relocation of cardiac device
pocket.
Gastrointestinal Gastrointestinal bleeding (or hemorrhage) refers I identify discharges associated with
bleeding (general generally to instances of bleeding along the gastrointestinal bleeding using
discharge event) gastrointestinal tract (upper and lower). primary diagnosis codes only.
Diagnosing coding of
gastrointestinal bleeding changes in
a sharp manner with the transition
between ICD-8 and ICD-9-CM
coding. In order to generate a
consistent set of discharge rates, I
identify gastrointestinal bleeding
discharges in the post-1979 period
only.
Acute myocardial An acute myocardial infarcation (AMI), also I identify AMI's using primary
infarction (general known as a heart attack, refers to the death or diagnosis codes only.
discharge event) necrosis of heart/myocardial cells. A heart
attack usually occurs when a blood clot blocks
the flow of blood through a coronary artery.
Stroke discharge A stroke represents an event in which the blood Strokes are difficult events to
(general discharge supply to a part of the brain is interrupted or diagnose. For the purposes of this
event) severely reduced, depriving brain tissue of analysis, I identify strokes using a
oxygen and nutrients. There are two general primary diagnosis code for one of
types of stroke: (a) ischemic stroke, in which a the following diagnoses:
blood clot blocks a blood vessel in the brain and subarachnoid hemorrhage;
(b) hemorrhagic stroke, in which a blood vessel intracerebral hemorrhage; other
breaks and bleeds into the brain, and unspecified intracranial
hemorrhage; or occlusion of
cerebral arteries; acute, but ill-
defined, cerebrovascular disease.
Hip fracture (general A hip fracture refers to a broken bone in the hip. I identify hip fractures using primary
discharge event) More specifically, I specify a hip fracture as diagnosis codes only.
occurring when there is a fracture of the neck of
the femur, in addition to a fracture of the
trochanteric, intertrochanteric and
subtrochanteric sections of the femur.
Colorectal resection for Colorectal resection for colon cancer represents Primary and secondary procedure
colon cancer the surgical removal of a section of the large codes are used to identify
intestines or rectum, in order to remove a tumor resections of the colon or rectum.
associated with colorectal cancer. Primary and secondary diagnosis
codes are then used to identify
those procedures that are
performed on patients with
colorectal cancer.
Resection of lung tissue A resection of the lung for lung cancer refers to Primary and secondary procedure
for lung cancer the surgical excision of lung tissue for the codes are used to identify
treatment of lung cancer. resections of the lung. Primary and
secondary diagnosis codes are then
used to identify those procedures
that are performed on patients with
lung cancer.
Appendix D NHDS Sample Selection
For the reasons indicated in Section 1.4 above, the primary empirical analysis focuses on a
restricted NHDS sample that includes only those states that maintain consistently large sample sizes
(i.e., at least 700 discharges per state-year cell) throughout the sample period. However, where a
treatment state maintains consistently large sample sizes over a subset of years (during which time it
adopts a national-standard requirement) but has no records in other years, I include it in the restricted
sample and necessarily drop the missing years (rare). Similarly, where a state maintains consistently
large sample sizes over all but a few isolated years (in which it has only a minimal number of records), I
simply drop the affected years (also rare).
The results presented above, however, are robust to each of these specific assumptions and
persist using alternative approaches to ensuring consistency over the sample period, including
approaches that include only those cells that maintain a minimal number of cesarean deliveries, overall
deliveries or overall number of discharges (not shown). Moreover, the results are robust to the
imposition of any restrictions in the first instance and persist using a sample that includes records from
each state-year cell, as demonstrated by the following table.
Table 1-13. Unrestricted NHDS Sample: The Relationship between National-
Standard Laws and Convergence in Cesarean Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standardized Cesarean Overall Cesarean Rate "Primary" Cesarean Rate
"Primary" Cesarean RateRate (Non-Standardized)
Coefficient of National
Standard Law Dummy
Contemporaneous -4.55*** -4.57*** -2.62 -3.69 -7.00*** -7.96***
Dummy (1.68) (2.05) (1.89) (2.58) (2.07) (2.48)
0.03 2.55 2.28
2-Year Lead Dummy (2.44) (3.25) (3.09)
R 0.49 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.48 0.48
N 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-
state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-
difference regressions of the percentage absolute deviation between state and national cesarean rates on a
dummy variable for the presence of a national-standard law, along with a 2-year lead indicator variable that
indicates at time t the status of a state's standard-of-care requirements at time t+2 (Columns 2, 4 and 6). Each
specification includes a set of state-year controls and state-specific linear time trends. State-year cesarean rates
in Columns 1 and 2 are standardized for age and race, along with the incidence of breech presentation, multiple
delivery or previous cesarean delivery. Columns 2 and 4 use non-standardized cesarean rates, while Columns 5
and 6 use "primary" cesarean rates. Regressions are weighted by the number of deliveries used to form the
utilization rate denominators. Data on cesarean utilization is from the NHDS.
Appendix E Illustration of Physician Treatment Decisions and the
Impact of Shifts in Malpractice Standards of Care
In setting the standards to which physicians should be held, malpractice cases focus on different
aspects of physician behavior depending on the medical circumstances under review. To demonstrate
how physicians may respond differently to a shift in malpractice standards depending on the nature of
the standard-of-care analysis, I introduce a simple graphical illustration of the decision by a physician to
perform one of two alternative treatments. For these purposes, I focus on the decision between a
cesarean delivery and a vaginal delivery of a child. I model the relative benefits of the respective
treatments as depending on the complication level of the given delivery.
The horizontal axis in Figure 1-3 below represents a measure of the degree of complications that
occur in the course of the delivery of a child, normalized to range from 0 to 1. The vertical axis
represents the benefits (or costs) of cesarean delivery minus the benefits (or costs) of vaginal delivery.
Thus, for a given set of complications, a relative benefit level of 0 in the vertical axis describes a situation
in which the benefits of cesarean section equal the benefits of vaginal delivery. Curve B indicates the
relative benefits of cesarean delivery as a function of the delivery complications. This curve crosses 0 on
the vertical axis at complication level X. Thus, absent any relative costs of performing cesareans,
physicians would elect to perform cesarean sections for those complications to the right of X and vaginal
deliveries for those complications to the left of X.
Figure 1-3: Benefits and Costs of Cesarean Delivery as a Function of Delivery Complications
B
C
Benefits (or costs)
of cesarean sections 0
relative to vaginal delivery
C
0 X 1
Delivery complications
Consider the case of a physician practicing in a region that sets complication level X as the
operable standard of care. Malpractice costs will be imposed to the extent that physicians deviate from
this standard. Thus, to the left of X, the expected malpractice costs from performing a cesarean section
relative to a vaginal delivery are positive (since the law expects that physicians perform a vaginal
delivery), while to the right of X, the expected malpractice costs from performing a cesarean relative to
vaginal delivery turns negative. Thus, there is a discontinuity in malpractice costs at level X.37 The
intersection of the relative benefits curve, B, with the relative malpractice cost curve, indicated by curve
C in Figure 1-3, represents the point along the distribution of delivery circumstances in which a physician
will switch from performing a vaginal delivery to performing a cesarean delivery.3 8 This intersection also
occurs at level X in this particular illustration, which coincides with the point of separation that would
have been selected absent malpractice pressure. Malpractice pressure nonetheless operates to keep
errant physicians in check. Those who would attempt to deviate from level X would find it costly to do
so.
Now, consider the impact of a change in malpractice law in the relevant jurisdiction, such as that
caused by the abandonment of the locality rule, leading to a shift in the operable standard of care.
Considering the extent of the regional variations that persist across the United States, it would not be
unreasonable to illustrate the case of a relatively sizeable shift. Figure 1-4 presents a situation in which
the jurisdiction now expects that its physicians perform a cesarean to the right of complication level Y. If
physicians perceive the same relative benefits of cesarean delivery,39 then the point of intersection now
moves to complication level Z, to the left of the initial intersection at level X. In this specific example,
the change in cesarean utilization rates moves almost one-for-one with the large shift in malpractice
standards. The cesarean utilization rate will generally change by a greater amount in response to a shift
in the standard of care if the expected malpractice costs associated with a deviation from the standard
of care are larger, as evidenced by a comparison between the intersection of the relative benefits curve,
B, with each of the two alternative cost curves, C' and C2, presented in Figure 1-4.
37 An alternative illustration could assume that the standard of care transitions over a range of delivery
circumstances, in which case, this shift would not be so sharp. This could occur, for instance, as a result of
uncertainty over the standard to be set in court. The implications of this analysis, however, would remain largely
unchanged with such a modification.
38 For the purposes of this illustration, I assume that the likelihood of a harm occurring that leads to a malpractice
action is constant across all levels of complications. Relaxing this assumption may lead to a change in the shape of
the cost curve to the right and left of this discontinuity, but these changes do not change the simple nature of this
illustration.
39 Of course, a change in the standard of care expected of physicians may also cause this perception to change.
Figure 1-4: Shift in Malpractice Standards (Associated with Complications)
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Consider a situation, however, in which the relevant standard-of-care discussion does not focus
on drawing a line between those complications indicating one treatment and those complications
indicating another treatment. Instead, using the cesarean example, the standard-of-care discussion may
focus on specifying the techniques and the level of care that must be performed in executing any given
vaginal delivery. I assume that a physician will avoid liability by performing these techniques in the
course of a vaginal delivery. However, the physician will need to incur certain costs in performing these
malpractice-required techniques that the physician would not have to incur in performing a cesarean
section. Thus, these forces push the relative cost curve, C1, below 0, as illustrated by Figure 1-5.40
Figure 1-5: Shift in Malpractice Standards (Not Associated with Complications)
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40 In this illustration, I assume that these costs are equal across all complication levels. However, I could also
assume that the costs increase as the complication levels rise. Again, this assumption would not change the nature
of this illustration.
Now consider the implications of a change in malpractice standards that leads to higher level-of-
care requirements in the execution of a vaginal delivery. Physicians will exert extra costs to comply with
these additional requirements further pushing the new relative cost curve, C2, downwards. As shown in
Figure 1- 5, the new point of intersection will be to the left of the initial intersection, corresponding to
an increase in the cesarean utilization rate. Of course, the new malpractice regime may also change the
level of care required in the execution of a cesarean section, which may lead to an offsetting decrease in
the cesarean rate. The end result may depend on a number of factors, including the cost of the
additional burdens imposed and the shape of the relative benefits curve. However, the new relative
burdens required of vaginal deliveries over cesarean deliveries must be large enough in magnitude to
generate a significant change in the cesarean utilization rate.
This informal graphical analysis implies that we would expect to see different responses to the
abandonment of the locality rule depending on the type of treatment considered and the nature of the
malpractice discussions that take place in connection with such treatments. I do not introduce this
illustration in order to predict how specific treatments will respond to the abandonment of the locality
rule. Rather, in a relatively informal fashion, I only wish to demonstrate the possibility of varying
responses to the adoption of national standard-laws and thus to argue that it would be unwise to
consider the results from one type of treatment as representative of the general physician response.
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Chapter 2 The Returns to Regional Intensity in Cesarean Utilization
2.1 Introduction
A large literature in health economics and medical science has devoted itself to the study of
regional variations in physician behavior. Such studies document striking and persistent disparities in
physician practices that cannot be fully explained by regional characteristics of the patient population or
the medical marketplace, leaving many scholars to attribute residual variations to regional "schools of
thought." Practice-style variations that reflect differing opinions as to optimal treatment strategies lead
to the possibility of potentially-huge welfare losses. A proper evaluation of these potential welfare costs
requires an understanding of the differences in health outcomes that are achieved across regions. In
this paper, rather than attempting to calculate precise welfare costs that arise from both over-utilization
in some regions and under-utilization in others, I approach this evaluation by simply determining
whether regions with higher (lower) practice intensities generate superior (inferior) returns to patient
health.
In many contexts, medical research (e.g., clinical trials) has documented evidence of significant
medical benefits ensuing from intensive surgical treatments. While this evidence may prove insightful
regarding the average benefits of a particular treatment, it is important to observe the gains that are
achieved in practice by marginal increases in treatment intensity (Chandra and Staiger 2007; Skinner et
al. 2005). After all, physicians in a particular region may exhaust the returns to a given medical
approach by continuing to employ the relevant treatment on patients that are less and less appropriate
for its use. It would not be unreasonable to expect that these marginal patients would benefit less from
the intervention than their more-appropriate counterparts (which are often the focus of clinical trials).
Estimating the association between regional behavior and health outcomes is not a
straightforward endeavor given that health care utilization itself is likely to be a function of regional
health outcomes. To approach this question, I draw on an arguably exogenous source of variation in
regional practice patterns. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I estimate the association between regional
variations in physician behavior and the geographical scope of the standards of care employed in
malpractice actions, focusing on the case of cesarean utilization. Between the 1970's and 1990's, a
significant number of states modified their malpractice laws to abandon the use of local standards of
care - i.e., where physicians were held to standards determined according to customary local practices.
In their place, the relevant states adopted laws requiring that physicians be judged according to national
standards (or standards not subject to any geographical limitations). I find robust evidence that the
adoption of a national-standard law by a given state leads to a significant reduction in the gap between
that state's cesarean rate and the national rate.
In this paper, I again focus on the decision faced by obstetricians between cesarean or vaginal
delivery of a child and test for the presence of "flat-of-the-curve" medicine in cesarean practices. Using
data from both the Natality Detail Files (1989-2004) and the National Hospital Discharge Survey (1979-
2005), I explore whether the within-state changes in cesarean utilization documented in Chapter 1 are
associated with corresponding changes in health outcomes.
Before turning to an estimation of changes in actual outcome measures, however, I first test for
evidence of triage in cesarean deliveries within states. Consistent with the expectations of a flat-of-the-
curve model (in which physicians exhaust the returns to a treatment within an area), I find evidence that
physicians perform cesareans on relatively less appropriate mothers as they increase their regional
utilization rates and, likewise, relatively more appropriate mothers as they decrease their cesarean
rates. Specifically, I estimate, via a selection effect, a negative association between increases in state
cesarean levels (instrumented with the proper parameterization of the national standard-of-care law)
and the average appropriateness of the cesareans performed in that state, parameterizing the case mix
of a given delivery by a mother's predicted probability of cesarean delivery (PPC). To assist in the
interpretation of these findings, I estimate a structural equation inspired by Gruber, Levine and Staiger
(1999) and find that the PPC of the marginal cesarean is 38 percentage points lower than the PPC of the
average cesarean delivery.
The above findings, however, do not preclude the possibility of better delivery outcomes, on
average, among states with higher cesarean rates. Accordingly, I turn to an exploration of the
relationship between regional cesarean rates and average neonatal health outcomes, as proxied by 5-
minute infant Apgar scores. I approach this investigation by testing for independent evidence of
convergence in state Apgar rates towards national levels as states adopt laws requiring physicians to
comply with national standards of care. While I find in Chapter 1 that the adoption of a national-
standard law is associated with a sizeable convergence effect in regional cesarean rates, I find no
corresponding evidence of any significant shift in state neonatal outcomes.
While the above results suggest that reductions in area cesarean rates may lead to cost savings
without any significant sacrifice in average health outcomes, it remains possible that higher cesarean
rates lead to positive spillover effects that nonetheless increase outcomes for those mothers most
appropriate for cesarean delivery (while, at the same time, reducing outcomes for those least
appropriate). As demonstrated by Chandra and Staiger (2007), the presence of positive spillover effects
may create a situation in which utility gains could actually be achieved with greater regional
specialization in cesarean (or vaginal) deliveries.
Accordingly, using the predictions of the Chandra and Staiger (2007) model, I test for evidence
of certain key markers of positive spillover effects. In particular, a positive spillover model would predict
that a given mother is more likely to deliver via cesarean section when she is in a region with a greater
number of women appropriate for cesarean delivery, controlling for her individual risk factors.
However, I find that the opposite is true, suggesting that, if anything, some level of congestion or
crowding-out is present among obstetric practices. This finding further supports the claim that welfare
gains could be achieved by reducing the number of cesareans performed in high-intensity regions.
This Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on regional variations in
physician behavior and the corresponding health outcomes. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical
methodology and data. Section 2.4 presents the results. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Numerous empirical studies have explored the extent to which variations in regional health care
practices can be explained by variations in regional factors, including characteristics of the patient
population and of the medical marketplace. While these studies generally take different methodological
approaches and derive a range of results concerning the amount of regional variations that can be
explained by such factors, one common thread that generally emerges throughout each study is the
inability to explain a substantial portion of the variation in practices.1 Accounting for regional
differences in certain socioeconomic, patient and other factors, Baicker, Buckles and Chandra (2006), for
instance, are unable to explain about 40% of the variation in cesarean utilization rates for normal birth-
weight babies across the largest 198 U.S. counties. Faced with a large residual of unexplained variations,
empiricists often conclude that much of the regional differences observed across regions are likely
attributable to regional practice-styles or regional "schools of thought." 2
The existence of regional variations in physician behavior that arise from practice-style
variations implicates a number of important concerns. Primarily, to the extent that these variations
represent over- or under-use of particular treatments in certain regions, they may be associated with
large social welfare costs (Phelps 2000). Over- or under-utilization may arise, for instance, from a
situation in which physicians look only to a small sample of local observations to construct their belief
1 Prominent examples include Wennberg and Cooper (1999) and Cutler and Sheiner (1999).
2 See Wennberg (1984), Phelps and Mooney (1993) and Phelps (2000) for a more comprehensive discussion
regarding a practice-style explanation for the observed variations.
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structures regarding optimal treatment methods. Phelps and Mooney (1993) attempt to quantify the
potential welfare losses attributed to regional differences in beliefs over treatment efficacies. Drawing
on underlying valuation information from demand studies and using a "fully-informed" demand curve as
a benchmark for the welfare analysis (derived assuming that the national rate represents the correct
treatment rate), they estimate total welfare losses that are comparable to those arising from the
traditionally-emphasized deadweight losses ensuing from insurance-related disincentives (e.g., moral
hazard).
Other scholars have approached this welfare question from a different perspective and have
explored whether the residual variations in physician practices across regions, which are presumably
unrelated to other regional characteristics, translate into regional differences in health outcomes - i.e.,
treating unexplained residuals as a source of natural randomization. In one such study, Skinner, Fisher
and Wennberg (2005) use regional spending on end-of-life care as an instrument to evaluate the survival
benefits ensuing from regional spending on chronic-care patients. By construction, regional measures
regarding end-of-life care allows for the comparison of groups across regions that are similar in their
health statuses. Skinner et al. (2005) find that greater spending on end-of-life care is not associated
with improvements in overall survival rates among the Medicare population. They interpret this finding
as evidence of "flat-of-the-curve" medicine.3 Moreover, they conclude that the Medicare system could
cut as much as 20% of its budget by reducing spending in high-intensity areas, without experiencing any
detriment to patient survival rates.
Doyle (2008) looks to a different source of exogenous spending in assessing the returns to high-
intensity practices: the amount of care spent on those who are far away from home (i.e., visitors) when
health emergencies strike. A simple exploration into the relationship between regional treatment
intensities and health outcomes is complicated by the fact that regional utilization measures are likely a
3 Similar results are derived in other regional-variations studies, including Fisher et al. (1994), Fisher et al. (2003),
Baicker and Chandra (2004), and Stukel et al. (2006).
function of regional needs and regional health conditions. Such visitors, however, seek care in regions
that were not designed for them, in which event a comparison of health outcomes for otherwise similar
visitors across regions can be used to identify the returns to health-care spending. Contrary to the
implications of the Skinner, Fisher and Wennberg (2005) analysis, Doyle estimates that patients who
experience a health emergency in a high-spending area are found to have lower inpatient mortality
rates.
While not focusing on the phenomenon of regional variations in physician practices, certain
other studies have estimated the health benefits to marginal increases in treatment intensity within a
region. For instance, Currie and Gruber (1996) find that expansions in Medicaid eligibility during 1979-
1992 led to reductions in the incidence of infant mortality and low birth weight. McClellan, McNeil and
Newhouse (1994) use patients' differential distances to certain types of hospitals (which are found to be
strong, arguably exogenous, predictors of treatment intensity) to estimate the marginal health benefits
of more intense treatment of elderly patients with acute myocardial infarction. They document only
minimal survival benefits to marginal increases in the use of invasive procedures. If anything, they
document greater returns to treatments performed within the first 24 hours of admission, which are
less likely to be of an invasive nature.
The mixed findings derived from the above studies suggest, among other things, that the
relationship between spending / intensity and outcomes is likely to be context specific. Nonetheless,
many of these studies do provide evidence consistent with a "flat-of-the-curve" story, in which
physicians in a region exhaust the returns to a given treatment. Chandra and Staiger (2007)
demonstrate, however, that the evidence generally presented by such studies may also be consistent
with a competing model in which increases in utilization intensity levels within a region lead to
productivity spillovers. Positive spillovers may increase the returns to intensive treatments, while, at
the same time, decrease the returns to the non-invasive, medical alternatives. Such a model predicts
that increased utilization levels within a region may lead to health benefits among those most
appropriate for the relevant treatment. However, the observed average effect of the intensity
expansion may nonetheless be close to zero considering that the decreased efficiency of the non-
invasive delivery methods leads to worse outcomes for those least appropriate for treatment.
The possibility of spillovers in the Chandra and Staiger (2007) model significantly alters the
welfare analysis. Since spillover effects entail that externalities follow from any given patient's
treatment choice, the resulting equilibrium in physician behavior is likely to be sub-optimal. Even
though some scholars have claimed that substantial savings could be achieved by reducing utilization
levels in high-intensity regions, Chandra and Staiger demonstrate that social welfare may actually be
enhanced in some circumstances with increased regional specialization.
In this paper, I explore these welfare considerations in the case of cesarean versus vaginal
delivery of children. As with many other elements of medical care, cesarean utilization rates vary in a
striking fashion across different regions. Even among normal birth-weight babies, cesarean rates varied
in the 1995 - 1998 period from 6.7% to 28.9% across the largest 198 counties in the United States
(Baicker et al. 2006). Rather than attempting to calculate the welfare costs that arise from deviating
either above or below some "optimal" cesarean rate, I follow the approach taken by many of the studies
discussed above and focus the analysis on whether regions with higher cesarean intensity levels
generate superior returns, where higher cesarean intensities are likely associated with higher physician
reimbursement costs (Gruber, Kim and Mayzlin 1999).
In a recent study, Baicker, Buckles and Chandra (2006) address substantially the same set of
questions (absent the spillover analysis). Using linked birth and death data from 1995-1998, they
demonstrate a negative correlation between regional cesarean rates and the average case mix of
cesarean deliveries, suggesting that high-intensity regions perform cesareans on a greater number of
mothers less in need of cesareans. They also estimate a small, statistically-insignificant relationship
between higher regional cesarean intensities and regional neonatal and maternal mortality rates. In the
analysis below, I build on the work begun by Baicker, Buckles and Chandra (2006). However, instead of
observing cross-sectional differences in utilization and outcomes, I explore these relationships by
drawing on within-state variation in cesarean rates driven by arguably exogenous shifts in malpractice
standard-of-care laws. Among other things, this latter approach controls for unobserved heterogeneity
across regions and allows for a more natural and direct test of the nature of the triage process among
the mothers of a given region.
2.3 Empirical Methodology and Data
I evaluate the welfare consequences of regional variations in cesarean utilization rates by
phrasing the analysis in terms of the benefits that ensue, if any, from higher cesarean intensities within a
region. More specifically, to determine whether welfare gains could be achieved by reducing the use of
cesarean sections in high-intensity cesarean regions, I explore the following three questions:
(1) As a region increases its cesarean utilization rate, are the marginal mothers receiving
cesareans relatively less appropriate for cesarean delivery? That is, do regions triage
mothers into cesarean or vaginal deliveries based on the case mix of the respective
mothers?
(2) Does a region experience any incremental health benefits, among the full sample of vaginal
and cesarean deliveries, as that region increases its cesarean utilization rate?
(3) Do increases in regional cesarean utilization rates lead to spillover effects that increase the
returns to cesarean utilization, though at the cost of decreased returns to vaginal deliveries?
The first two inquiries alone may suggest that substantial costs could be avoided by reducing
cesarean utilization rates in high-intensity regions with perhaps little average health consequences.
However, as illustrated by Chandra and Staiger (2007), a more complete analysis also requires a
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resolution of this third question, given that the suggested prescription - i.e., reduced cesarean
utilization - may conceivably reduce social welfare in the face of productivity spillovers.
2.3.1 Data
To explore these questions, I consider two primary sources of data: the 1979-2005 National
Hospital Discharge Survey files (NHDS) and the 1978-2004 Natality Detail files.
2.3.1.1 NHDS
The NHDS is a nationally representative survey of inpatient records from short-stay, non-federal
hospitals conducted annually by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). For approximately
260,000 inpatient records per year (on average), the NHDS contains information on, among other things:
(a) primary and secondary diagnosis and procedure codes associated with the relevant discharge, (b)
certain demographic characteristics of the patient, and (c) certain characteristics of the hospital. I
supplement the public NHDS files with geographic identifiers (restricted-use variables) received from the
Research Data Center at the NCHS. The resulting sample covers the years 1979 to 2005. All empirical
work using the NHDS records was conducted onsite at the NCHS headquarters.
The NHDS is relatively well suited for an analysis of obstetric behavior given that it necessarily
contains a large subsample of deliveries, out of which one can readily derive a range of utilization and
event rates. Moreover, the denominator for these utilization/event rates - i.e., a count of the number
of deliveries - represents a medical event for which hospitalization is almost universally sought and thus
represents an event that is not likely to be impacted itself by those malpractice forces used to identify
changes in physician behavior. For each delivery, I begin by generating indicator variables for the
incidence of cesarean utilization, along with the incidence of each of the following complications and
other risk factors: breech presentation, multiple deliveries (e.g., twins), previous cesarean delivery,
placenta previa, placenta abruption, dysfunctional labor, cephalopelvic disproportion, fetal distress,
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precipitous labor, postpartum hemorrhage, prolonged labor, premature rupture of the membranes,
cord prolapse, maternal hypertension, maternal diabetes, and maternal anemia. I use these identified
events and treatments in various ways throughout the analysis, as I explain in greater detail below.
Data on cesarean utilization is available over the entire 1977 - 2005 sample period considered in
Chapter 1. However, as a result of a shift in classification standards between 1978 and 1979 (from the
Eighth to the Ninth Revision of the International Classification of Diseases), it is not possible to generate
risk factor incidence rates in the 1977 - 1978 period that would be consistent with the full set of factors
considered in the post-1979 period. Accordingly, the specifications estimated below are confined to the
1979 - 2005 period.
2.3.1.2 Vital Statistics
For the purposes of certain of the specifications estimated in this outcomes analysis, I draw on
the 1978-2004 Natality Data from the National Vital Statistics System of the NCHS. Based on
information extracted from birth certificates, the Natality files provide demographic and health data for
a 100% sample of all births occurring in the post-1985 period and either a 50% or a 100% sample,
depending on the state, of all births occurring in the pre-1985 period. Delivery-related health data
available throughout the entire sample include such items as birth weight, gestation and 5-minute Apgar
score. Following a revision in the birth certificate in 1989, a much richer array of health and utilization
data is available in the post-1989 period, including the incidence of cesarean delivery and a range of
delivery complications and maternal risk factors.
While much of the data available in the Natality data is also contained in the NHDS data (e.g.,
cesarean utilization, delivery complications and maternal risk factors), this overlap largely occurs in the
post-1989 period, after which time a much smaller number of states modified their malpractice laws to
adopt national-standard requirements. With respect to each of the three dimensions to the welfare
analysis identified above, and that are explained in greater detail in Sections 2.3.2 - 2.3.4 below, I use
102
the data set that is most appropriate to the analysis involved. First, I base the empirical analysis
specified in Section 2.3.2 on the use of NHDS data given that the corresponding triage analysis requires
data on variation in standard-of-care laws (necessitating a long sample) along with data on cesarean
utilization and/or maternal risk factors. On the other hand, I base the Apgar-convergence analysis
specified in Section 2.3.3 below on the use of 1978-2004 Natality data given that the necessary analysis
relies only on individual Apgar scores and malpractice provisions (not cesarean utilization or maternal
risk factors). Finally, I base the spillover analysis specified in Section 2.3.4 below primarily on the use of
the 1989-2004 Natality data given that the analysis does not draw on within-state variations in
malpractice standard-of-care laws.
Descriptive statistics for the key variables employed in the empirical analysis below are
presented in Table 2.1. Panel A summarizes the key variables from the NHDS records, while Panel B
summarizes those from the Natality Detail records.
2.3.2 Cesarean Triage: Appropriateness of Marginal Mothers
2.3.2.1 Reduced-Form Estimates
To determine whether states triage mothers based on their appropriateness for cesarean
delivery, I estimate the relationship between a state's cesarean utilization rate and the average case mix
of mothers receiving cesarean deliveries within that state. This approach identifies the characteristics of
those mothers receiving the marginal cesarean deliveries through a selection effect. That is, if an
increase in mothers receiving cesarean delivery within a region leads to a reduction in the average
appropriateness level among mothers receiving cesarean delivery in that region, the implication is that
the marginal mothers now receiving cesarean delivery have a below-average case mix for that region.
To avoid omitted-variables and reverse-causality concerns, I estimate this relationship drawing
on an arguably exogenous source of variation in state cesarean utilization: the adoption of malpractice
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laws that require physicians to comply with national standards of care and the contemporaneous
abandonment of laws that require physicians to comply with the standards set by customary local
practices. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I document robust evidence of a relationship between this
geographical distinction in malpractice standard-of-care laws (i.e., whether physicians are expected to
follow the practices of local or national physicians) and regional variations in cesarean utilization.
Specifically, I find that as much as 40 - 60% of the gap between state and national cesarean rates is
closed following the adoption of a national standard-of-care law. Moreover, I find in Chapter 1 that this
convergence in state cesarean behavior towards national levels occurs from both the top and the
bottom of the regional cesarean distribution.
To explore the triage specification suggested above, I instrument the area cesarean rate with
the appropriate parameterization of the national-standard law dummy. I focus first on estimating a
reduced-form specification of the relationship between national-standard laws and the average case mix
of mothers delivering via cesarean section. To capture the two-sided relationship between national-
standard laws and cesarean utilization rates (that is, the convergent effect of national-standard laws), I
estimate this reduced-form specification separately on two sets of states: (1) those that begin the
sample period with below-average cesarean rates and that thus experience an increase in cesarean
rates following national-standard adoptions and (2) those that begin the sample period with above-
average rates and thus experience a decrease in cesarean rates following national-standard adoptions.
For each such set of states, I use a sample of cesarean deliveries (as opposed to a sample of all
deliveries) from the 1979-2005 NHDS files to estimate the following specification:
PPCi,s,t = a + Ys + At + (ps,t + lNSs,t + fl 2Xi,s,t + fl 3Zs,t + fl40 s,t + flsRFs,t + Es,t (2.1)
where s indexes state, t indexes year, and i indexes an individual cesarean delivery; X,,,t represents
certain characteristics of the individual cesarean delivery (mother's age, race and insurance status;
hospital bed size; and hospital ownership type); Zs,t represents certain state-year characteristics
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(OB/GYN concentration rate and fertility rate); 0 s,t represents a set of indicator variables for the
incidence of certain malpractice / tort laws: (a) non-economic damage caps, (b) punitive damage caps,
(c) total damage caps, (d) collateral source rule reforms and (e) "indirect" tort provisions;4 and NS,t
represents an indicator variable for the presence of a malpractice law requiring that physicians comply
with national standards of care. State fixed effects, yv, and year fixed effects, At, control for fixed
differences across states and across years, respectively. As in Chapter 1, I include state-specific linear
time trends, <P,t, to control for slowly-moving correlations between the case mix of cesarean deliveries
in a state and the adoption of a national-standard law by that state.
Serving as a parameterization of an individual delivery's case mix, PPC,,,tstands for the
"predicted probability of cesarean delivery" and represents the general likelihood that the mother in
question would receive a cesarean delivery based on her individual risk factors. Taking the full national
sample of deliveries (cesarean and vaginal) from the NHDS data, I derive these cesarean likelihoods
using fitted values of a logit model of the incidence of cesarean delivery on the set of individual risk
factors and delivery complications indicated in Section 2.3.1.1 above (e.g., breech presentation, multiple
births, etc.).5 I estimate separate logit models of this nature for each year in the sample. While I
exclude maternal age from this PPC calculation, the estimation results presented below (not shown) are
nearly identical when I consider an alternative approach that includes additional risk factors for the
incidence of the maternal age categories included as controls in the primary specification.
The coefficient of interest in the above specification is represented by 31, capturing the effect of
a state's adoption of a national-standard law on the average case mix (PPC) of cesarean deliveries within
4 See Chapter 1 of this dissertation for a more complete description of each of the controls included in X, Z and 0,
along with information on the data source for those variables (fertility rates, OB/GYN concentration rates and
covariate malpractice provisions) that are not contained in the NHDS records.
s This approach follows Baicker, Buckles and Chandra (2006) and Chandra and Staiger (2007). The results
presented below are robust to the alternative use of probit and linear probability models in forming the PPC
values. One concern that arises generally when using discharge data to explore the relationship between physician
behavior and the incidence of certain complications or risk factors is that physicians may indicate the presence of a
complication in order to justify the decision to perform the given treatment. This concern is alleviated, however,
by the fact that I already limit the sample to the set of cesareans performed.
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that state. For the subsample of states that experience an increase in cesarean utilization in connection
with the adoption of national-standard laws, a negative value for 3P indicates evidence of a selection
effect consistent with patient triage. In such an event, the marginal mothers now receiving cesarean
deliveries in a state are less appropriate for cesarean delivery relative to the average mother receiving a
cesarean delivery in that state. Similarly, for the sample of states that experience a reduction in
cesarean rates following national-standard adoptions, a positive value of P1 also indicates selection
evidence consistent with patient triage. In this latter case, the marginal patients no longer receiving a
cesarean delivery are relatively less appropriate than those mothers continuing to receive cesareans.
I also explore an alternative parameterization of the NS indicator that allows for an estimation
of equation 2.1 on the full delivery sample (including both subsamples indicated above), while capturing
the fact that national-standard adoptions lead to reductions in cesarean rates in some states and
increases in others. In this alternative approach, following Chapter 1, I define a modified NS indicator
variable that switches (a) from 0 to 1 upon the adoption of a national-standard law for those states that
begin the sample period with cesarean rates below the national average (and for which the adoption
leads to an increase in cesarean utilization rates) and (b) from 1 to 0 upon the adoption of a national-
standard law for those states that begin with above-average cesarean rates (and for which the adoption
leads to a decrease in cesarean utilization).6 With this parameterization, a negative estimate of the
coefficient of the modified national-standard dummy is indicative of triage in cesarean delivery.
The average case mix of those deliveries performed via cesarean section, however, may change
for reasons other than the changing composition of the cesarean sample, confounding this selection
analysis. The state-year cells may also experience shocks, among the full delivery sample, in the
incidence of the various risk factors comprising the PPC values. For instance, an increase in the
incidence of breech presentation in a state will likely result in an increased cesarean rate within that
6 Chapter 1 provides further details on the division of states into these two groups.
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state, while at the same time lead to an increase in the average PPC among the cesarean sample. To
isolate the selection component of the dependent variable, I include controls for the state-year
incidence rates (based on cesarean and vaginal deliveries) for each of the factors included in the PPC
calculation, as represented by matrix RFs,t.
2.3.2.2 Instrumental Variables Estimates
While the above specification may allow one to identify the direction of the relative
appropriateness of the marginal cesarean within a region, the results of that specification do not provide
an easily-interpretable indication of the magnitude of the deviation in the marginal case mix from the
average case mix. To facilitate this interpretation, I estimate the structural equation suggested by
Gruber, Levine and Staiger (1999). I define PPCs,t/CSs,tto be average predicted cesarean probability
among the CSs, t cesareans performed in state s in year t. Taking the partial derivative of this average
with respect to the natural log of the number of area cesareans performed yields the following
relationship:
(PPCs,t (2.2)
CSs,t) _ PPCst  PPCs,t
aln(CSs,t) a CSs, t CSs,t
That is, this derivative yields the difference between the marginal PPC and the average PPC within a
given state-year cell. Accordingly, following Gruber, Levine and Staiger (1999), I identify this difference
by estimating the following specification:
PPCs,t (2.3)PCS't = a + Ys + At + VPs,t + (In (CS_RATEs,t) + fl1Xs,t + f 2 Zs,t + f3 0 s,t + Es,tCSs,t
where y,, At, P,t, Z,t and 0 ,,t are defined as in specification (1) above. Xs,t includes controls for the overall
state-year incidence (out of the full delivery sample) of those factors included in X,s,tabove.7 CS_RATE,t
7 1 derive similar results, however, when I base the calculation of the state-year controls included in Xs,t out of the
cesarean sample (as opposed to the full delivery sample) to be consistent with the approach taken in the reduced-
form model estimated above.
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represents the cesarean rate for the state-year cell (i.e., the number of cesareans performed divided by
the associated number of deliveries). As suggested above, provides an estimate of the gap between
marginal and average PPC among cesarean deliveries in a state. In an alternative specification that
replaces PPCs,t/CSs, with In(PPC
,
,t/CS,t) as the dependent variable, an estimate of 'can be interpreted
as the marginal-average gap in percentage terms.8
To alleviate concerns over state-year shocks in the risk factors and complications comprising the
PPC calculation, I follow Chandra and Staiger (2007) and risk-adjust CS_RATE,tfor state-year differences
in the incidence of the risks factors and delivery complications included in the PPC calculation.9 To be
consistent with the standardization approach taken in Chapter 1, I also risk adjust the area cesarean
rates for differences in maternal age and race. I estimate results of similar magnitude and significance,
however, when I use actual, rather than standardized, area cesarean rates and account for the above
concerns by including controls for the state-year incidence rates of each individual risk factor.
Of course, accounting for state-year shocks in the incidence of various risk factors and delivery
complications does not address all possible omitted-variables concerns. For instance, there may be a
shock in the incidence of a particular risk factor among a subset of patients that are otherwise more or
less inclined to deliver via cesarean delivery. To address residual omitted-variables and reverse-
causality concerns, I estimate the above specification using two-stage least squares (2SLS),
instrumenting the state-year cesarean rate with the appropriate parameterization of the national
standard-of-care law (Gruber et al. 1999).
8 While I estimate the reduced-form model above on an individual level (allowing for control of individual
covariates), I estimate equation 2.3 using aggregated state-year cells (weighting the regression by the appropriate
number of cesarean deliveries associated with each cell). This aggregated approach follows directly from the
structural marginal-average relationship indicated above and allows for the simplest interpretation of the
structural coefficient, . The same interpretation could be attached, however, to an individual-level version of
equation 2.3 that is estimated on a sample of cesarean deliveries. The results presented below are robust to the
use of this alternative formulation (not shown).
9 1 risk-adjust area cesarean rates using the indirect-method of standardization discussed in Chapter 1 above.
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2.3.3 Relationship between Regional Cesarean Rates and Regional Health
Outcomes
The above results are consistent with the predictions of a "flat-of-the-curve" model of regional
physician behavior in which physicians exhaust the returns to a given treatment in an area. However,
even assuming that a "flat-of-the-curve" model is an accurate description of prevailing behavior,
evidence of triage alone does not indicate that regions are operating on the flat segments of the
cesarean-returns curve. As such, I next explore whether the regional convergence in cesarean utilization
resulting from the adoption of a national standard-of-care law leads to corresponding changes in the
average delivery outcomes.1 ° To achieve this end, I conduct an independent convergence analysis that
explores whether the adoption of laws requiring physicians to comply with national standards of care
are associated with a convergence in observed state-year Apgar rates towards national averages. As
such, I explore whether the separately-estimated convergence in cesarean utilization rates are
accompanied by a corresponding convergence in neonatal outcomes, using the methodology presented
in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
This independent convergence approach contrasts with the instrumental-variables (IV) approach
taken in the triage analysis presented above, in which the estimated change in cesarean case mix is tied
directly to changes in cesarean utilization. That is, in the triage analysis, I look directly at the effect that
a malpractice-induced increase (or decrease) in cesarean rates has on the observed average case mix.
An IV framework of that nature facilitates an interpretation of the triage effect in terms of the difference
between the average and marginal level of cesarean appropriateness. I am unable to take such an
approach in the present analysis, however, given the lack of a single data source that provides data on
10 An estimation of the relationship between cesarean rates and health outcomes on the full sample of deliveries is
meant to identify the return that the marginal cesareans (i.e., those that would have otherwise been vaginal
deliveries) receive as a result of delivering via cesarean section, relative to what they would have received via
vaginal delivery. However, this estimation will also pick up the effect any productivity spillovers (or similar effects)
that ensue from increases in regional cesarean rates.
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individual Apgar scores and cesarean utilization over a long enough period to take advantage of the
variation in national-standard laws that occurred throughout the late 1970s and 1980s.
The 1978 - 2004 Natality files, however, do facilitate an investigation into whether the adoption
of a national-standard law results in convergence in state health outcomes. To the extent that cesarean
rates are, in fact, associated with average health outcomes, it would be reasonable to expect that a
significant convergence effect in cesarean utilization would be accompanied by a regional convergence
effect in neonatal outcomes. This framework is analogous to that taken in various malpractice studies,
such as Kessler and McClellan (1996), which test for evidence of defensive medicine by determining
whether estimated decreases in utilization levels following the adoption of damage caps (and similar
laws) are accompanied by corresponding decreases in average health outcomes.
For the purposes of this health-outcomes analysis, I measure neonatal health outcomes using 5-
minute infant Apgar scores. Given at 1 minute after birth and 5 minutes after birth, Apgar tests are
designed to assess the health of a newborn infant and to determine the need for resuscitative efforts.
Scores are given on a scale from 0 to 10 and assess a newborn's activity, pulse, reflex irritation,
appearance and respiration. While Apgar scores arguably remain inappropriate as predictors of certain
long-term outcomes, 5-Minute scores nonetheless remain valid predictors of neonatal mortality (Casey
et al. 2001).
I first calculate a dependent variable, T,,, equal to the absolute value of the deviation between
the average state Apgar score and the average national Apgar score, normalized by the national
average. Following Chapter 1, I then estimate the following specification:
Ts,t = a + Ys + At + Ps,t + flXs,t + f 2Zs,t + fl3 0 s,t + fl4 NSs,t + Es,t (2.4)
where V,, At, <p,t, and Os,t are defined as above. NS,t is an unmodified indicator variable for the presence
of a national-standard law. X,t and Z,t include various demographic and other characteristics of the
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state-year cell.1 ' 34 is the coefficient of interest capturing the association between the adoption of laws
requiring physicians to comply with national standards of care and a measure of the closeness between
a state's average Apgar score and the national average Apgar score.
The deviation between state and national Apgar scores is likely to be rather dependent on the
demographics of the state-year cell, perhaps more so than in the case of utilization measures. This
dependence leads to a concern that the observed deviation between state and national Apgar rates
does not correspond well with the observed deviation in cesarean rates, even if a true relationship does
exist.1 2 In the base specification presented above, I include state-year controls for various demographic
and other state-year factors. In the alternative, I attempt to avoid these concerns before constructing
the dependent variable itself by calculating standardized state-year Apgar means, risk-adjusted for
maternal age, race and education and for differences in the following state-year measures: median
household income and the percent of the population from Hispanic origin. By standardizing the Apgar
scores for this wide range of factors, the resulting state-national deviation measure should be more
closely associated with characteristics of the regional health care supply market, including the behavior
of the regional physicians. Despite the concerns motivating this standardization approach, the results
presented below are nearly identical between the standardized and non-standardized models.
11 1 control for the following supply and demand characteristics of the state-year cells: age (females 15-19, 20-24,
25-29, 30-34, 35-39 and 40+ years old), race (percent white, black and other), education (percent with schooling
under 9 years, 9-11 years, 12 years and 12+ years), median household income, Hispanic origin (percent), fertility
rate, OB/GYN concentration rate, and average hospital bed-sizes per population.
12 For instance, consider two states, State A and B, both of which begin with below-average cesarean rates. The
demographics of each state however differ enough such that State A has an above-average Apgar mean while
State B has a below-average Apgar mean, even though both states may experience an increase in cesarean
utilization and a corresponding increase in Apgar scores following a national-standard adoption. This increase will
contribute to an estimated convergence effect in one state while an estimated divergence effect in the other,
confounding any effort to identify the relationship between within-state changes in cesarean rates and neonatal
outcomes.
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2.3.4 Spillovers in State Cesarean Utilization
Increases in cesarean rates within a region could have a possible impact on the health outcomes
of the marginal cesareans - i.e., those deliveries that are now performed via cesarean section, but that
would have previously delivered vaginally. However, increases in cesarean intensity may also result in
productivity spillovers that alter the outcomes of all deliveries, including those that continue to receive
the same type of delivery that they otherwise would have received prior to the change in intensity.
Productivity spillovers may be of a positive or negative nature. Chandra and Staiger (2007) largely
discuss the case of positive spillovers, in which increases in the intensity of invasive procedures may lead
physicians to became relatively more efficient with those procedures, while, at the same time, relatively
less efficient at the non-invasive alternative. However, with already high utilization rates within a
region, further increases in cesarean utilization may lead to congestion or crowd-out effects that limit
the returns to mothers receiving cesarean deliveries.
I test for evidence of spillover effects in regional cesarean utilization using a key prediction of
the Chandra and Staiger (2007) model that depends on the presence of spillover effects themselves and
that would not result from mere productivity differences across regions. This prediction is as follows: a
given mother is more likely to delivery via cesarean section when she lives in a region with a greater
number of mothers appropriate for cesarean delivery, controlling for that mother's given risk factors
(i.e., controlling for her individual need for cesarean delivery). The intuition is simple: mothers are more
likely to deliver via cesarean when they are more in need of cesarean delivery (based on their risk
factors), and the more mothers that deliver via cesarean in a region, the better are the returns to
cesarean delivery for all mothers in that region. Therefore, when a mother is surrounded by many
others indicating a need for cesarean, she will likely face a higher return to cesarean delivery and would,
in turn, be more likely to receive one. Of course, the opposite effect could ensue in the face of negative
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spillovers resulting from congestion in cesarean behavior - e.g., resulting from capacity and other
constraints.
I test for the presence of positive or negative spillovers using data on cesarean utilization and
individual risk factors from the 1989-2004 Natality Detail files. Out of a sample of vaginal and cesarean
deliveries, I estimate the following specification:
CSi,s,t = ac + Ys + At + Ps,t + fllPPCs,t + l2RFi,s,t + 3Xi,s,t + fl 4Zs,t + Ei,s,t (2.5)
where y,, At, and Ps, t are defined as above. Xi,,t and Zs,t include controls for various demographic and
other factors. 13 CS,,,t is a dummy variable representing the incidence of cesarean delivery for mother i.
PPC,t in this specification refers to the average predicted probability of cesarean section for all deliveries
(cesarean and vaginal) in state s and year t. It is simply a parameterization of the average need for a
cesarean in each state-year cell. PPC's are calculated for each mother based on predicted values of logit
models of cesarean utilization on the full range of pregnancy complications and risk factors included in
the 1989-2004 Natality files (estimated annually on a national sample).14 The matrix RF,,s,t contains
indicator variables for a mother's incidence of each of the pregnancy complications and risk factors
included in the PPC calculation.
31 is the coefficient of interest, representing the relationship between a mother's likelihood of
delivering via cesarean section and the extent of the need for cesarean delivery by the other mothers in
her region, controlling for those factors driving the individual mother's need for cesarean delivery.
13 In particular, I control for the following characteristics of the individual mothers: age (under 15, 15-19, 20-24, 25-
29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, and 45-49 years old), race (white, black and other) and education (under 9 years, 9-11
years, 12 years and 12+ years of schooling). I also control for the following state-year factors: fertility rate, OBGYN
concentration rate and hospital bed-sizes per population.
14 These factors include certain delivery complications: multiple deliveries (e.g., twins), previous cesarean delivery,
febrile (fever), meconium (moderate/heavy), premature rupture of the membrane, abruption placenta, placenta
previa, excessive bleeding, precipitous labor, prolonged labor, dysfunctional labor, cephalopelvic disproportion,
cord prolapsed, anesthetic complications and fetal distress. These factors also including the following maternal
conditions: anemia, cardiac disease, lung disease, diabetes, herpes, hydramnios, hemoglobinopathy, chronic
hypertension, pregnancy-associated hypertension, eclampsia, incompetent cervix, previous infant 4000+ grams,
previous per-term infant, renal disease, rh sensitization and uterine bleeding.
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Positive estimates of 3i indicate evidence of positive spillovers in cesarean behavior. Negative estimates
may, on the other hand, indicate evidence of congestion in cesarean practices.
I use Natality data for this investigation in light of the rich set of risk factors available in birth
certificate records and in light of the fact that this specification does not draw on variation in national-
standard laws (necessitating data from the 1980's). However, I also estimate the same specification
using the NHDS files and the risk factors and delivery complication considered in the NHDS analysis.
Moreover, the above specification identifies spillover effects using within-state changes in regional
cesarean need. I also estimate similar specifications that identify spillover effects using only cross-
sectional variation (estimated separately for each year in the sample).
2.4 Results
Tables 2.2 - 2.5 present estimation results for the three lines of inquiry identified in Section 2.3
above. Each coefficient reported in Tables 2.2 - 2.5 is multiplied by 100. Moreover, the standard errors
in each regression are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary within-state correlations of the
error structure (Bertrand et al. 2004).
2.4.1 Appropriateness of Marginal Cesarean Deliveries
In Table 2.2, I present results from the reduced-form specification indicated in equation 2.1
above, exploring the association between national-standard laws and the average case mix of the state-
year sample of cesarean deliveries. In Column 1, I estimate this reduced form specification on the
sample of states that begin with cesarean rates below the national average. As demonstrated by
Chapter 1 of this dissertation, the adoption of a law requiring that physicians comply with national
standards of care leads to an increase in cesarean utilization in this initially-below-average sample of
states. I estimate that the average predicted cesarean probability among the sample of cesarean
deliveries in a state (from this selected sample of states) falls by 3.0 percentage points as the relevant
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state adopts a national-standard law and subsequently experiences an increase in cesarean utilization
(with a p-value of 0.11, however). I estimate a corresponding reduction of 3.8 percentage points in the
average predicted cesarean probability of the cesarean sample when I specify the national-standard
variable assuming a 1-year lag in its implementation, as presented in Panel B of Table 2.2 (significant at
the 10% level). A reduction in average PPC levels of this nature is suggestive of a negative selection
effect in which the increase in cesarean utilization in the state leads to the performance of cesarean
deliveries on an additional set of mothers who are less in need of a cesarean delivery, relative to the
average mother receiving a cesarean section.
Likewise, in Column 2 of Table 2.2, I estimate the reduced-form specification of equation 2.1 on
the sample of states that begin with cesarean rates above the national average and that experience a
decrease in cesarean rates following the adoption of a law requiring that physicians comply with
national standards. I find that the adoption of a national-standard law by a state from this group leads
to a 7.3 percentage-point increase in the average PPC level among the sample of cesarean deliveries in
that state (6.9 percentage points in the 1-year lagged specification). Significant at the 10% level (and 5%
level in the lagged case), this estimate is also suggestive of a selection effect of the same direction, in
which the marginal cesarean no longer being performed is marginally less appropriate than the average
cesarean that continues to be performed.
Following the methodology introduced in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I include the full sample
of states in Column 3 of Table 2.2, but capture the convergent relationship between cesarean rates and
national-standard laws by parameterizing the national-standard indicator such that it switches from 0 to
1 upon the adoption of a national-standard law in those states that begin with below-average rates and
from 1 to 0 upon the national-standard adoption in those remaining states that begin with above-
average rates. A negative estimate for the coefficient of the modified national-standard indicator in this
reduced-form appropriateness specification can be interpreted as evidence of the above-identified
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selection effect - that is, where the marginal cesarean is less appropriate for cesarean delivery than the
average cesarean. Consistent with the separate findings in Columns 1 and 2, I estimate a statistically-
significant negative coefficient of comparable magnitude in the more complete (though necessary
symmetrical) specification estimated in Column 3.
To test whether the selection effect identified in the above specification evidences a differential
trend between treatment and control states that pre-dates the adoption of national-standard laws, I
include in Column 4 a two-year lead indicator variable for the adoption of a national-standard law. The
estimated coefficient for the contemporaneous law change is nearly identical to the estimate presented
in Column 3. Moreover, I estimate a statistically-insignificant coefficient for the two-year lead indicator
variable. This coefficient is also of the opposite sign and smaller in magnitude than the
contemporaneous effect, providing greater confidence in any inference that the change in the average
cesarean case mix follows from the malpractice-induced changes in cesarean rates.
As shown in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, the adoption of a national-standard law is associated
with an average absolute change in state cesarean rates of roughly 1.1 - 1.6 percentage points. The
results presented in this section suggest that a national-standard law adoption by a state is also
associated with a 4 - 5 percentage point absolute change in the average predicted cesarean probability
among that state's cesarean sample (or a roughly 7% change relative to the sample mean). To assist in
the interpretation of these results, I next estimate the specification indicated in equation 2.3 above. The
coefficient of the natural log of the area cesarean rate in this specification provides an estimate of the
difference between the appropriateness (as proxied by PPC scores) of the average cesarean delivery and
the marginal cesarean delivery. I present the results of this exercise in Table 2.3.
I begin in Panel A of Table 2.3 with a first-stage analysis of the effect of national-standard laws
on the area cesarean rate. I capture the two-sided convergent relationship between these measures in
a single linear model by using the modified indicator for the adoption of a national standard law (i.e.,
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where the switch from 0 to 1 is reversed for those states that begin with above-average cesarean rates).
I estimate a coefficient for the modified national-standard indicator of 14.0, suggesting the adoption of a
national-standard law, on average, leads to an approximately 14% increase in the cesarean rate in
initially-below-average cesarean states and a 14% decrease in the cesarean rate in initially-above-
average cesarean states (significant at 1%). In Column 2 of Panel A, I estimate a dynamic model that
includes a 2-year lead indicator for the modified national-standard law. I again estimate a statistically-
significant coefficient for the contemporaneous indicator and a small, statistically-insignificant
coefficient for the two-year lead indicator, suggesting, as in Chapter 1, that the estimated convergence
effect likely does not arise in the pre-adoption period.
This first-stage convergence finding confirms those presented in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
Instead of using the incidence of cesarean delivery as the dependent variable in an individual-delivery-
based specification, however, the present analysis focuses on area cesarean rates in an aggregated
state-year level (weighted by the number of deliveries in each state-year cell). Moreover, while the
results presented in Chapter 1 account for state-year fluctuations in the incidence of multiple deliveries,
breech presentations and previous cesarean deliveries, the first-stage findings presented in this Chapter
use cesarean rates risk-adjusted for a range of delivery complications and other factors. As such, these
findings confirm the robustness of the convergence effect to an even richer standardization process.
Finally, while the specifications estimated in Chapter 1 use 1977 - 2005 NHDS data, the findings
presented here rely only on data from the 1979 - 2005 period. Due to a switch in disease classification
systems between 1978 and 1979, I cannot identify certain of the risk factors and delivery complications
required for this analysis in the 1977 and 1978 NHDS files.
In Column 1 of Table 2.3, Panel B, I estimate an OLS specification of the relationship between
the log of the area cesarean rate (standardized) and the average PPC level observed among the state-
year sample of cesarean deliveries (weighing each observation by the number of cesarean deliveries
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performed in each state-year cell). I estimate a coefficient of -17.4 for the log-cesarean rate, which can
be interpreted as an approximately 17 percentage-point lower PPC level for the marginal cesarean
delivery relative to the average cesarean delivery. To put this difference in terms of the percentage
difference between average and marginal appropriateness, I modify the dependent variable in the OLS
specification to be the natural log of the cesarean sample's average PPC level. As presented in Column 2
of Panel B, I estimate a coefficient of -27.5 in this log-log specification, suggesting that the marginal
cesarean's PPC level is lower than the average cesarean PPC by an amount equal to 28% of that average
amount. In Panel C, I instrument the area cesarean rate (logged and standardized) with the modified
national-standard law indicator. In this specification, I estimate that the marginal cesarean has a PPC
level that is 38 percentage points below that of the average cesarean (or 58% lower than the average
cesarean's PPC).
These findings evidence a meaningful level of triage in cesarean utilization within regions.
Cesarean rates are at a high enough level that the marginal mothers receiving cesarean delivery are
considerably less appropriate for this intensive delivery method. Of course, it remains possible that
these marginal mothers nonetheless benefit from this intensive alternative, leading to gains in average
health outcomes. I turn next to an evaluation of these outcome considerations.
2.4.2 Convergence in Health Outcomes
Table 2.4 presents estimation results for the specification indicated in equation 2.4 above,
testing whether the adoption of laws requiring physicians to comply with national standards of care
leads to convergence in state Apgar scores towards national levels. The dependent variable specified in
Panel A equals the absolute value of the deviation between a state's average Apgar score and the
national average Apgar score (normalized by the national average). The dependent variable specified in
Panel B equals an analogous deviation measure that is based on the average incidence of a "good" 5-
minute Apgar score - that is, a score that meets or exceeds 7 (which occurs roughly 98% of the time
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over the sample). Each regression estimated in Table 2.4 is weighted by the number of births associated
with each state-year cell.
I begin in Column 1 by presenting the results from a basic difference-in-difference regression
that includes only the national-standard law indicator and a set of state and year fixed effects. I
estimate that the adoption of a national-standard law is associated with a small and statistically-
insignificant increase of 0.2 percentage points in the absolute deviation between the average state
Apgar score and the national average Apgar score (as a percentage of the national score). As such, while
I estimate a nearly 5 - 6 percentage-point reduction in the absolute percentage deviation between a
state's cesarean rate and the national rate, as presented in Chapter 1, I find no evidence of a
corresponding convergence effect in average neonatal outcomes, as proxied by 5-minute Apgar scores.
The magnitude and sign of these findings are robust to the inclusion of additional state-year
controls and state-specific linear time trends (Columns 2 and 4) and to the construction of the
dependent variable based on Apgar scores that are risk-adjusted for regional differences in various
demographic factors (Columns 3 and 4), though the significance of the positive estimates does vary
across specifications. Moreover, while not presented in Table 2.4, I estimate the same pattern of results
when I divide the sample into two sets of states - those that start the sample with below-average Apgar
scores and those that begin with above-average Apgar scores - and estimate the effect of national-
standard laws on individual Apgar score levels.
As presented in Panel B, I also estimate a very small positive coefficient for the national-
standard indicator in those specifications that test for convergence in the incidence of "good" Apgar
scores. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant in the non-standardized specifications. If
anything, these results suggest that national-standard adoptions are associated with a nearly negligible
amount of divergence (at a magnitude of 0.03 - 0.08 percentage points) in a state's incidence of "good"
Apgar scores.
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The observed disconnect between state cesarean rates and average state neonatal outcomes
that is suggested by Table 2.4 is perhaps not surprising considering the extent of regional variations that
persist in cesarean utilization relative to the extent of regional variations that are observed in average
Apgar scores. While the coefficient-of-variation (COV) in state cesarean rates (based on 2003 Natality
Data) is 0.13, the COV in state Apgar means is only 0.01.
2.4.3 Productivity Spillovers
In Table 2.5, I present regression estimates of the relationship between a given mother's
likelihood of delivering via cesarean section and the average appropriateness level among all other
mother's in her region, controlling for the individual mother's own risk factors. In Columns 1 and 2, I
present results of this analysis using 1989-2004 data from a 5% random sample of the Natality Detail
files. Column 1 controls only for the individual mother's risk factors, while Column 2 also includes state-
specific linear time trends and a set of additional maternal control variables and other state-year
controls. In each case, I estimate a negative coefficient for the average state-year PPC variable. The
estimated coefficient of the area PPC level (-37.3) from the full-control specification estimated in
Column 2 suggests that as the average PPC level among all mothers in a state increases by 10
percentage points, the likelihood that an individual mother will receive a cesarean delivery in that state
falls by 3.7 percentage points.
The above specifications use within-state variation in the average maternal need for cesarean
delivery to identify the relationship between this average level of cesarean need and the likelihood of a
given mother receiving a cesarean section. However, the estimated negative relationship persists (not
shown) when I estimate separate annual specifications of the above nature (of course, excluding state
and year fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends). With each such separate regression, I
estimate a statistically-significant negative coefficient of the average state-year PPC variable (with an
average magnitude of -70).
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In Column 3, I present results from a specification analogous to that estimated in Column 2 of
Table 2.5 (with state-specific linear trends and a set of maternal and state-year controls), using data on
cesarean behavior and maternal risk factors from the 1979-2005 NHDS files. While the estimated
relationship is smaller in magnitude with this alternative data source (i.e., a 10% increase in average
state-year PPC level is associated with a 1.3 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of cesarean
delivery), I continue to document a negative relationship between the average maternal need for a
cesarean in a region and an individual mother's likelihood of receiving a cesarean.
This evidence is inconsistent with a positive spillover story in which physicians become more
effective at cesarean delivery and generate efficiency gains as the cesarean rate increases in a region.
On the contrary, this evidence is more consistent with a story of congestion or crowd-out in cesarean
delivery, in which physicians are less able to provide a cesarean to a given mother when they are called
upon to perform a significant number of cesareans on other mothers. A crowd-out finding of this nature
reinforces any argument that welfare gains could be achieved by reducing regional cesarean rates.
2.5 Conclusion
While cesarean sections remain an important element of obstetric practices and may provide
benefits to a significant number of mothers, they may be utilized to such a great extent within regions
that they offer few benefits to those on the margin. The approaches taken by clinical studies and
related investigations are generally unable to identify a finding of this nature. In this Chapter, I
contribute to an understanding of the marginal returns to cesarean utilization within regions using
hospital discharge records.
With data on observed physician practices within a region (i.e., non-controlled behavior), I can
evaluate the characteristics of those mothers actually receiving cesarean deliveries. I estimate that the
predicted cesarean probability of the marginal mother (i.e., a parameterization of her case mix) is lower
than that of the average mother by an amount that is nearly 60% of that average level, suggesting that
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physicians are performing so many cesareans within regions that they may ultimately be drawing on a
set of mothers in substantially little need of cesarean delivery and for which few returns are likely to be
generated. Perhaps not surprising considering these triage findings, I also find no evidence indeed to
suggest that an increase in regional cesarean rates leads to an increase in average neonatal outcomes.
In further support of the contention that physicians are over-utilizing cesarean deliveries within
regions, I find evidence consistent with a story of crowd-out in regional cesarean practices whereby
mothers are less likely to receive cesarean delivery, regardless of their need, when they are surrounded
by a large number of women also in need of cesarean delivery. These three sets of findings collectively
support the contention that welfare gains can be achieved by reducing regional cesarean levels.
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Table 2.1. Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables
Weighted Sample of Sample of Individual
State-Year Cells Deliveries
Panel A: NHDS Variables (1979-2005)a
67.96 67.96National Standard Law 67.96 67.96(46.70) (46.66)
61.40 61.26Predicted Cesarean Probability: Cesarean Delivery Sample (6.53) (33.42)
23.39 23.38Predicted Cesarean Probability: Full Delivery Sample (4.00) (4.00)
23.33 23.31Cesarean Section Rate (1979-2005) 23.33 23.31(4.73) (42.28)
N 706 594,920
Panel B: Natality Variablesb
57.8 62.6National Standard Law: lagged 1 year (1978-2004) (49.4) (48.4)
8.9 9.05-Minute Apgar Score (1978-2004) 8.9 9.0(0.1) (0.86)
98.3 98.4
"Good" 5-Minute Apgar Score (1978-2004) (0.4) (12.7)
(0.4) (12.7)
Predicted Cesarean Probability: Full Delivery Sample (1989- 23.1 22.7
2004) (3.1) (29.1)
22.2 23.1Cesarean Section Rate (1989-2004) (3.9) (42.1(3.9) (42.1)
N (1978-2004) 769 4,646,115
N (1989-2004) 1297 3,210,159
a. Standard deviations are in parentheses. As indicated, the reported statistics are from separate
samples contained in the 1979-2005 NHDS records. Predicted Cesarean Probabilities are
calculated for each delivery based on the predicted values from annual logit models of cesarean
incidence on a range of delivery complications and risk factors. Following Chapter 1 of this
dissertation, the NHDS analysis only includes records from those states that maintain
consistently large sample sizes throughout the NHDS sample years.
b. Reported statistics are from a random 5% sample of all records from the 1978-2004 Natality
Detail files. Information on cesarean utilization and delivery risk factors/complications (used in
the Predicted Cesarean Probability calculation) are only available in the 1989-2004 period.
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Table 2.2. Reduced-Form Estimates of the Relationship between National-
Standard Law Adoptions and Average Predicted Cesarean Probabilities (among
Sample of Cesarean Deliveries)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
STATES WITH STATES WITH
ENTIRE SAMPLE OF STATESBELOW-AVERAGE ABOVE-AVERAGE
CESAREAN RATES CESAREAN RATES
Panel A. Using Contemporaneous
Changes in National-Standard Laws
National Standard Law Dummy (NS): -2.97 7.25*
contemporaneous (1.82) (3.51)
-4.31** -4.84***Modified NS Dummy: contemporaneous -4.31* -4.84***
(1.71) (1.35)
1.49
Modified NS Dummy: 2-Year Lead
(1.76)
Panel B. Using 1-Year Lagged Changes
in National-Standard Laws
National Standard Law Dummy (NS): -3.78* 6.91**
Lagged 1 Year (2.05) (2.66)
-4.80***Modified NS Dummy: Lagged 1-Year
(1.48)
N 36,048 70,988 107,036 107,036
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors
corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-
in-difference regressions of individual predicted probabilities of cesarean delivery (PPC) on a dummy variable for the presence
of a national standard-of-care law, out of a sample of individual cesarean deliveries. All regressions include state-specific linear
time trends, along with individual controls for race, age, insurance status, hospital bed size and hospital type and state/year
controls for fertility rates, OBGYN concentration rates and additional tort measures. Moreover, to facilitate the estimation of
selection effects, all regressions also include average state-year incidence rates (out of the full delivery sample) for each of the
individual risk factors used in the PPC calculation. Column 1 includes only those states with cesarean utilization rates that begin
the sample period below the national average. Column 2 includes only those states with cesarean utilization rates that began
above the national average. Columns 3 and 4 include the entire sample of states, but modify the national-standard dummy
such that it switches from 0 to 1 upon a law change for those initially below-average states and from 1 to 0 upon a law change
for those initially above-average states. Column 4 includes a two-year indicator variable that switches two years prior to the
change in malpractice law. Panel A specifies national laws according to their actual year of adoptions, while Panel B specifies
national-standard laws allowing for a 1-year lag in their implementation. Individual cesarean delivery data is from the 1979-
2005 NHDS files.
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Table 2.3. Relationship between Average and Marginal Predicted Cesarean
Probabilities
(1) (2)
Panel A: First-Stage Results: Effect of National-
Standard Laws on Ln(Area Cesarean Rate)
14.03*** 12.83***Coefficient of Modified NS Dummy: contemporaneous
(5.04) (3.28)
3.30Coefficient of Modified NS Dummy: 2-Year Lead 3.30
(5.64)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE (PPC) DEPENDENT VARIABLE (PPC)
NOT LOGGED LOGGED
Panel B: OLS Estimates: Effect of Ln(Area Cesarean
Rate) on Average PPC (among cesarean deliveries)
Coefficient of Ln(Cesarean Rate) -17.44* -27.45***(3.68) (5.69)
Panel C: 2SLS Results: Instrumenting Ln(Area Cesarean
Rate) with Modified NS Dummy
Coefficient of Ln(Cesarean Rate) -37.89*** -57.66***(9.24) (14.07)
N 702 702
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses (corrected for within-state correlation in the error term in the case of the first-stage and
OLS regressions). Reported coefficients in Panel A are from difference-in-difference regressions of standardized state-year
cesarean rates (risk-adjusted for age, sex and the incidence of reach of the individual risk factors included in the PPC
calculation) on the modified national-standard law dummy (weighted by the number of deliveries in each state-year cell).
First-stage regressions include state-specific linear time trends and state-year controls for fertility rates, OBGYN
concentration rates, additional tort measures and the incidence rates (among mothers in the NHDS sample) for certain
categories of insurance status, hospital bed size and hospital type. Reported coefficients in Panel B are from regressions of
average PPC levels among state-year samples of cesarean deliveries on standardized area cesarean rates (logged), along
with state-specific linear time trends and the same set of state-year controls. Finally, reported coefficients in Panel C are
from instrumental variables regressions of average PPC levels among cesarean deliveries on standardized cesarean rates,
instrumented with the modified national-standard law dummy. Regressions in Panels B and C are weighted by the number
of cesarean deliveries in each state-year cell. Column 2 in Panels B and C specify the dependent variable as the natural log
of the average PPC level among state-year cesarean deliveries. Individual cesarean delivery data is from the 1979-2005
NHDS files.
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Table 2.4. Relationship between National-Standard Laws and the Percentage
Absolute Deviation between State and National APGAR Means
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NON-STANDARDIZED APGAR SCORES STANDARDIZED APGAR SCORES
5-Minute Apgar Score
0.24 0.28* 0.21 0.34National Standard Law Dummy: lagged 1 year 0.15) (0.16) (0.21 0.26)(0.15) (0.16) (0.21) (0.26)
"Good" 5-Minute Apgar Score ( >= 7)
0.08** 0.06* 0.07 0.03National Standard Law Dummy: lagged 1 year 0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.0(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Include Controls and State-Specific Linear
TimeTrendsNO YES NO YES
Time Trends?
N 1257 1257 1237 1237
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses (corrected for within-state correlation in the error term). Reported coefficients are from state-year
difference-in-difference regressions of the percentage absolute deviation between state and national average Apgar scores
(and average rates of "good" Apgar scores) on a dummy variable for the presence of a national standard-of-care law. In
Columns 3 and 4, state-year Apgar scores and "good" Apgar-score incidences are risk-adjusted for regional differences in age,
race, Hispanic origin, education status, and median household income. Columns 1 and 2 present results based on non-
standardized Apgar scores. Columns 1 and 3 present results from basic difference-in-difference regressions that include only
state and year fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4, however, add state-specific linear time trends and a set of other state-year
controls. The dependent variable in each specification, more specifically, equals the absolute value of the difference between
the state and national average Apgar score (or "good" Apgar score incidence), as a percentage of the national rate. Regressions
are weighted by the number of deliveries associated with each state-year cell. Data on Apgar scores is from the 1978 - 2004
Natality Detail Files.
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Table 2.5. Relationship between Average Cesarean Appropriateness in a State
and the Incidence of Cesarean Delivery (among all Deliveries)
(1) (2) (3)
NATIONAL HOSPITAL
NATALITY DETAIL (5% SAMPLE)
DISCHARGE SURVEY (1979-(1989-2004)
2005)
Average State/Year PPC (among -41.41*** -37.25*** -13.78**
all cesarean and vaginal
deliveries)(8.06) (5.12) (6.49)
Include controls for individual
risk factors?
Include additional maternal and
state-year controls and state- NO YES YES
specific linear time trends?
N 2,740,846 2,693,061 493,364
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses (corrected for within-state correlation in the error term). Reported coefficients are from regressions of
the individual incidence of cesarean delivery on the average aggregated PPC level among all deliveries in the relevant state and
year. Column 2 additionally includes state-specific linear time trends, individual controls for age, race and education and state-
year controls for OBGYN concentration rates, fertility rates and hospital bed-sizes. Each regression also controls for each
individual delivery's set of risk factors and delivery complications. Data on cesarean utilization and delivery risk factors used in
Columns 1 and 2 is from the 1989-2004 Natality Detail files. Analogous data used in Column 3 is from the National Hospital
Discharge Survey 1979-2005 files.
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Chapter 3 Defensive Medicine and Obstetric Practices
3.1 Introduction
A number of empirical studies to date have attempted to explore the relationship between
physician behavior and measures of malpractice pressure. Of course, the existence of any such
relationship need not signify a problem with the malpractice system itself. It may simply indicate that
malpractice liability is working in the intended manner - that is, by deterring physicians from acting in
an otherwise undesirable manner. The intent of these empirical investigations, on the other hand, is
generally to identify situations in which an imperfectly-designed system of malpractice liability causes
physicians to produce a sub- or supra-optimal level of care, often referred to as "defensive medicine."
Defensive-medicine discussions often focus on the contribution that malpractice pressure makes
to aggregate health care costs. In this regard, the concern is largely over so-called "positive" defensive
medicine, in which physicians perform additional procedures and order extraneous tests in order to
reduce their potential malpractice exposure. However, malpractice forces need not operate in this
direction in all occasions. The threat of malpractice liability may also induce physicians to avoid
performing high-risk procedures or accepting high-risk patients, leading to a reduction in aggregate
expenditures. In the context of certain procedures, positive and negative forces may even offset each
other leaving no resulting impact on physician behavior.
In this Chapter, I explore the role that malpractice pressure plays in shaping certain obstetric
practices. Acknowledging that the threat of malpractice liability may have different effects on different
components of obstetric care, I estimate the relationship between malpractice pressure and each of the
following individual utilization measures: (1) episiotomy utilization during vaginal delivery, (2) hospital
lengths of stay during delivery admissions and (3) cesarean section utilization. Certain of these
utilization measures are more likely than others to implicate positive-defensive-medicine concerns given
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the nature of the medical circumstances in which they arise (e.g., the risks involved in their
implementation, the conditions they are intended to treat, etc.). For instance, while some risk is
involved in the performance of an episiotomy, such risks pale in comparison to those more general risks
involved in the vaginal delivery itself. As such, malpractice fears may induce an obstetrician to perform
an otherwise-unnecessary episiotomy during a vaginal delivery
This analysis should serve as a valuable complement to the investigation presented in Chapter 1
of this dissertation concerning the relationship between regional variations in physician practices
(primarily regarding cesarean utilization) and the geographical component of laws respecting
malpractice standards of care. Understanding the impact that these tort provisions have on observed
utilization measures should provide insight into the need to account for covariate malpractice provisions
in the convergence analysis considered in Chapter 1.
Consistent with much of the malpractice literature, I identify variations in prevailing malpractice
pressure using adoptions of various tort provisions, the effect of which is largely to reduce the
probability that malpractice suits are filed. While physicians are generally insured against losses in
malpractice cases (and typically are not experience-rated), they may nonetheless be quite sensitive to
the threat of a potential malpractice suit in light of the significant reputational and non-pecuniary costs
that are associated with malpractice liability (Currie and MacLeod 2008). The adoption of malpractice
laws and other tort reforms may operate to reduce the expected levels of damages imposed in the
event that a physician has been found liable. This reduction in expected liability may leave plaintiffs less
inclined to bring suit, thereby lessening the level of pressure placed on otherwise-insured physicians.
The reforms that I emphasize in this analysis, and that have received the most attention by the
malpractice literature to date, are caps on non-economic damage awards (i.e., caps on pain and
suffering awards).
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A large body of related literature has explored the relationship between tort reforms and
various outcomes of the malpractice marketplace: claims frequency, claims severity, insurance
premiums, and physician location.1 These studies suggest that non-economic damage caps are perhaps
the most relevant and most influential tort reform measures (Mello 2006). Twenty-eight states
currently have non-economic damage cap provisions in place, most of which were adopted during the
malpractice crisis of the mid-1980's. Accordingly, those studies relying on post-1980's data to evaluate
the association between non-economic damage caps and physician behavior, such as Currie and
MacLeod (2008), are unable to draw on the most relevant sources of variation in malpractice law. In this
study, I explore questions regarding defensive practices using data on physician behavior from the 1979-
2005 National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS) files. The NHDS data, supplemented with geographic
identifier codes, provides inpatient discharge records from a broad enough span of states and covering a
long enough period of time to allow for a defensive medicine analysis that draws on an extensive set of
legislative variations.
Consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the relevant medical circumstances, I find
evidence that malpractice pressure, as identified by adoptions of various tort reforms, is associated with
increased utilization of episiotomies during vaginal deliveries and with the number of days spent in the
hospital in connection with the delivery of a child. At the same time, however, such pressure is not
associated with any improvements in neonatal outcomes, as proxied by infant Apgar scores, suggesting
that the malpractice-induced changes in episiotomy and length-of-stay measures may likely be
defensive in nature. Confirming the findings of Currie and Macleod (2008), I also find no evidence to
support the conventional wisdom that malpractice pressure induces obstetricians to perform
unnecessary cesarean sections.
1 See Mello (2006) for an extensive review of this literature.
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This Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a review of related literature concerning
defensive physician practices. Section 3.3 offers a simple framework by which to evaluate a physician's
response to malpractice pressure. Section 3.4 describes the data and empirical methodology, while
Section 3.5 presents results from the relevant regression analyses. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
While malpractice scholars and analysts are often inconsistent in their definition of "defensive
medicine," the type of behavior that I hope to identify as being "defensive" in nature is that in which
malpractice liability causes physicians to take sub- or supra-optimal levels of care, where optimality is
determined according to an appropriate weighing of the costs and benefits of care. This behavior is, of
course, inherently difficult to identify. In the alternative, I follow Kessler and McClellan (1996) and
related studies and classify observed behavior as being of a positive defensive nature when malpractice
pressure induces physicians to provide extra levels of care without leading to corresponding health
benefits. Negative defensive behavior, on the other hand, is identified by situations in which
malpractice pressure induces physicians to avoid otherwise beneficial care.
While most of the literature exploring the effects of malpractice / tort reforms has focused on
first-stage litigation- and insurance-related outcomes (e.g., claims frequency and malpractice
premiums), a smaller, yet significant, literature has explored the second-stage effects of tort reform on
physician behavior. In perhaps the seminal study on the defensive nature of physician practices, Kessler
and McClellan (1996) found that malpractice reforms that directly reduce malpractice pressure ("direct"
reforms) are associated with a 5-9% decrease in total hospital expenditures incurred for patients in the
1-year period following an acute myocardial infarction or new ischemic heart disease, without
substantial reductions in mortality rates or complications. Direct reforms include caps on damages
awards (non-economic, punitive, and total) and reforms of the collateral source rule.
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Currie and Macleod (2008) consider an empirical approach similar to that taken by Kessler and
McClellan (1996), but focus on the case of cesarean deliveries, a treatment that is often implicated in
popular discussions of defensive medicine and that is perhaps the most common target of scholarly
defensive medicine investigations. Using data from the Vital Statistics Natality files from 1989-2001,
Currie and Macleod test the conventional wisdom that malpractice fears over improperly-performed
vaginal deliveries induce obstetricians to perform excessive numbers of cesarean sections. Contrary to
these expectations, they actually find that the adoption of non-economic damage caps (representing a
reduction in malpractice pressure) leads to an increase in cesarean utilization.
Currie and Macleod (2008) contend that this finding is consistent with a model of physician
behavior that provides for variations in patient conditions. Significant risks do occur during the
commission of a vaginal delivery, which would otherwise induce physicians to opt for cesarean delivery.
However, if the marginal patient receiving a cesarean delivery is relatively inappropriate for that
delivery, then the risks to performing a cesarean section on this marginal patient may outweigh the
general risks of a vaginal delivery. The inappropriateness of the marginal cesarean in most regions may
be a reasonable assumption considering the evidence of triage in regional cesarean utilization presented
in Chapter 2 of this dissertation2 and considering that other financial incentives may operate to push
regional cesarean rates to inappropriately high levels. Given the possibility that the marginal cesarean
patient is relatively less in need of this invasive delivery approach, it may be reasonable to expect that
malpractice pressure, on the margin, pushes the cesarean rate downwards (not upwards). It follows
then that the reduction in malpractice risks associated with the adoption of a non-economic damage cap
alleviates these downward pressures on cesarean rates, leading to an increase in cesarean utilization, as
estimated.
2 See also Baicker, Buckles and Chandra (2006) for evidence of triage in cesarean utilization within regions.
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The findings of Currie and MacLeod stand in contrast to certain other studies that have explored
the relationship between malpractice pressure and cesarean utilization, though from different
methodological frameworks. For instance, using 1990-1992 Natality data, Dubay, Kaistner, and
Waidmann (1999) estimate a county fixed-effects specification and find a positive association between
cesarean utilization and malpractice insurance premiums. Finding no corresponding evidence of a
positive association between premiums and health outcomes (as indicated by the incidence of a low
Apgar score), they conclude that the observed behavior is defensive in nature. Similarly, using discharge
data from acute care hospitals in New York State in 1984, Localio et al. (1993) find a positive association
between cesarean utilization rates and malpractice premiums and claims frequency (controlling for
patient severity and other factors). Other studies, however, confirm the results of Currie and Macleod
to the extent that they document no evidence of positive defensive medicine in cesarean utilization.
Baldwin et al. (1995), for instance, find no association between cesarean utilization and physicians'
claims exposure, as measured by both personal physician claims experience and the prevailing practice
environment (i.e., county claims per physician).
Using variations in certain characteristics of the malpractice marketplace (e.g., claims frequency)
to identify defensive behavior, these additional studies implicate general concerns over unobserved
heterogeneity that may be correlated with the outcome of interest. The approach taken by Currie and
Macleod (2008), however, draws on within-state variation of an arguably exogenous nature: the
adoption of tort laws that are, for the most part, applicable to torts generally and that were largely
adopted in response to broader crises in commercial casualty insurance - i.e., not in response to more
specific crises in medical malpractice lines (Matsa 2006).
In the analysis below, I also identify defensive behavior using the adoption of various tort
reforms. However, I build on Currie and Macleod (2008) by additionally exploring physician behavior
from the 1980's, a decade during which the heart of the non-economic damage-cap adoptions occurred.
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By focusing on 1989-2001 data, Currie and MacLeod only consider the adoption of non-economic
damage caps by 4 states, 2 of which repealed the relevant statute within several years. They also
consider variation in non-economic damage caps for 4 other states that repealed caps previously
adopted in the pre-1989 period. However, there may be good reason to exclude from the specification
those states that repeal damage caps over the sample period. Drawing on variations in the repeal
direction may lead to less precise estimates given the possibility that physicians may respond weakly to
a law that has a high probability of being stricken down (Matsa 2006). Limiting specifications in this
manner would only leave 2 states from which to identify defensive behavior during the 1989 - 2001
period, implicating concerns over the consistency of the estimated results (Conley and Taber 2005).
Drawing on data over a longer time frame, the analysis below includes nearly 20 states with
pure non-economic damage cap adoptions (i.e., where such states did not also repeal the relevant
statutes). With a greater number of treatment states, it is more likely that state-year shocks that are
uncorrelated with damage-cap laws will cancel each other out, leaving consistent estimates of the effect
of such reforms (Conley and Taber 2005). Building on the above studies, I use this rich set of legislative
variation to test for evidence of defensive behavior in cesarean utilization. However, I also explore for
defensive behavior in two related obstetric practices / measures: episiotomy utilization and the number
of days that mothers spend in the hospital in connection with the delivery of their children. I am aware
of no defensive medicine study in the health economics literature that has explored these additional
measures.
3.3 Malpractice Pressure and Obstetric Practices
While defensive medicine discussions often focus on the role that malpractice pressure plays in
driving up total expenditures, malpractice fears are likely to impact physician behavior in a highly
context-specific manner. In many situations, this fear may indeed be expected to induce physicians to
perform additional procedures and order extra tests. In other situations, however, this fear may result
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in the avoidance of particular behaviors. To understand how liability can lead to such opposite results, it
helps to begin with a consideration of the context in which a medical procedure is performed.
In a given medical context, the threat of malpractice liability may generally arise from two
fundamental directions: (1) fear over improperly treating (or diagnosing) an underlying disease or
medical condition and/or (2) fear over improperly performing a treatment meant to resolve or alleviate
that underlying disease or condition. These risks inherently find themselves in tension with other, in
that a physician risks exposing herself to liability from this first direction by capitulating to the fears
arising from the second direction. That is, if a physician avoids performing a particular high-risk
treatment over fear of committing an error in the process, she exposes herself to potential liability from
failing to properly treat the condition/disease itself. Thus, the relationship between the underlying
level or extent of malpractice pressure and the utilization rate for the treatment in question will depend
on which of these two risks dominates under the circumstances.
This simple framework is similar to that taken in Currie and Macleod's (2008) model of physician
behavior in the face of potential malpractice liability. A fundamental implication of their model is that
(a) a physician's choice between performing a procedure and not performing a procedure depends upon
the relative malpractice (and other) risks of each such choice and (b) accordingly, a legal-induced
increase in expected malpractice liability decreases procedure utilization if and only if the prevailing risks
associated with the procedure itself exceed those that prevail in the absence of its utilization. A key
feature of their model is that these calculations vary depending upon the condition or health status of
the patients. Consider a situation in which the marginal patient receiving the procedure (i.e., the patient
just indifferent between receiving and not receiving the treatment) is in relatively little need of the
procedure. The no-procedure option for this patient may pose little risk relative to the risk of treatment
itself, leading to the possibility of negative defensive behavior.
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Ultimately, the effect of a reduction in potential malpractice liability (e.g., that resulting from
tort reform) on the utilization of a given procedure is an empirical question that depends on the risks
ensuing from the execution of the procedure versus the risks relating to the failure to treat the
underlying condition, evaluated with respect to the marginal patient. With these considerations in
mind, I consider the effect of various tort reforms on the utilization rate of several procedures (or
medical decisions) that are likely to present different risk-risk tradeoffs.
Episiotomy Utilization
An episiotomy is a surgical incision made in the tissue between the vagina and the perineum
during a vaginal delivery. Extremely common procedures, episiotomies were performed in nearly 40%
of the vaginal delivery sample considered below; though their rates have declined considerably over
time. While some of the traditional justifications for episiotomy utilization are no longer widely held
(e.g., the belief that controlled incisions heal better than natural tears), episiotomies are still indicated in
the event of certain complications of birth, such as abnormal presentation or fetal distress, or in
instances in which an expedited delivery is necessary.3
The circumstances surrounding episiotomy utilization are supportive of a possible positive
defensive response to malpractice pressure. Though there are some morbidity risks to the performance
of an episiotomy, including an increased risk of fecal incontinence, the expected harm from such risks
arguably pale in comparison to the potential mortality and morbidity risks that are generally faced
during the vaginal delivery of a child. Moreover, even if the benefits of episiotomy are minimal in most
instances, as long as there is some legitimate belief that episiotomies are indicated in certain high-risk
situations, this imbalance of risks may lead some risk-adverse physicians to utilize episiotomies on a
relatively common basis. If anything, physicians may be inclined to perform arguably unnecessary
episiotomies for purely "optical" reasons - that is, to enhance the appearance that they took every step
3 For a recent discussion of the risks and benefits of episiotomy utilization, see Hartmann et al. (2005) and
American College of Obstetricians-Gynecologists (2006).
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possible to prevent harm to the mother and child. Moreover, for much of the sample period, many of
the risks associated with the performance of an episiotomy were not well documented4 and it was not
until 2006 when the American College of Obstetricians-Gynecologists issued guidelines recommending
restricted, as opposed to routine, use of episiotomies.
Delivery Bed Days
During the course of an inpatient delivery admission, physicians are also faced with the decision
of how long the mother and child should stay in the hospital (aside from the separate but related
decision of whether to perform a cesarean section). The risk of an additional day in the hospital itself
poses minimal inherent risk to the mother and child (conceivable risks would include hospital-acquired
infections). However, the additional monitoring provided by an extra inpatient day may alleviate
general risks faced during the neonatal period. The tradeoff in these risks suggests that physicians may
respond in a positive defensive manner to threat of malpractice liability. Moreover, even if an
additional bed day does not significantly reduce neonatal risks, physicians may be inclined to keep
certain high-risk mothers longer purely to bolster appearances in potential malpractice suits.
Cesarean Utilization
Considering the evidence of triage in cesarean utilization within regions presented in Chapter 2
of this dissertation, and in light of the high cesarean rates prevailing in regions, it may be reasonable to
expect that the marginal cesarean delivery is not, in an absolute sense, truly in need of cesarean
delivery. Thus, with respect to the marginal cesarean patient, the risks posed by cesarean delivery may
actually be high enough relative to those posed by a standard vaginal delivery that defensive cesarean
behavior, though popularly expected, fails to hold in practice (Currie and Macleod 2008).
4 Beginning in the mid-1980s and continuing to the present, a number of clinical trials have analyzed the risks of
routine versus restricted use of episiotomies (Hartmann et al. 2005).
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Tort Reform Type
In the analysis presented below, I focus on estimating the impact of reforms that place caps on
the amount of non-economic damages (i.e., damages for pain and suffering) that plaintiffs can be
awarded. Non-economic damages represent a significant portion of the typical malpractice damages
award. Using a dataset of 326 closed claims in Texas for the 1988-2004 period (each with at least a
$25,000 payout), Hyman et al. (2008) document an average non-economic damages award of $681,000
(in 1988 dollars, compared with $542,000 for economic damages), occurring in 272 (or 83%) of the
closed claims included in the sample. Non-economic damage caps represent the tort-reform measure
that has been most commonly associated with an observed change in certain malpractice outcomes:
claims severity, physician supply and malpractice premiums.5 Twenty-eight states currently have in
place laws that cap non-economic damage awards.6 Seventeen states adopted such laws during the
mid-1980's (5 of which subsequently repealed the relevant provisions). Table 3.1 lists those states that
modified their non-economic damage cap laws over the sample period considered in the empirical
analysis below.
In most of the specifications estimated below, I also explore the association between physician
behavior and certain additional types of malpractice / tort reforms, including caps on punitive-damages
awards, reforms of the collateral source rule and other "indirect" tort reforms. Punitive damages are
awarded on a much rarer basis in malpractice actions than are non-economic damages awards (without
a correspondingly large increase in average awards / payouts).7 Thus, relative to non-economic
s See Mello (2006) for a comprehensive review of relevant studies.
The vast majority of these states (23) have laws that are specific to non-economic damage awards. However, for
the purposes of this analysis, I also classify states as having non-economic damages provisions if they have laws
that place caps on total damages awards that necessarily cap non-economic damages as well. Accordingly, I do not
identify any separate impact of caps on total-damages. However, only one such state, Texas, varies in the
incidence of a total-damages provision of this nature over the sample period and thus contributes to the
identification of the effect of non-economic damage caps.
7 For evidence of this claim, see Cohen (2005) and Hyman et al. (2008).
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damages, it is less likely that the threat of liability for punitive damages will have a considerable impact
on physician behavior.
Similar to caps on non-economic and punitive damages, amendments to the traditional
collateral-source rule represent malpractice reforms that operate to directly reduce the expected level
of damages awarded in malpractice actions (Kessler and McClellan 1996). Traditional collateral-source
rules generally prohibited defendants from introducing evidence of compensatory payments made to
plaintiffs from outside sources (e.g., payments from insurance companies). Thirty-three states currently
have laws in place that eliminate this traditional rule, effectively reducing the compensatory damage
awards that plaintiffs can obtain by amounts received from such outside sources. Many of these
amendments also occurred during the mid-1980's, often contemporaneously with the adoption of non-
economic damage cap laws. Nonetheless, there are a substantial amount of independent reforms of
each type to allow for identification of the effect of these separate provisions.
Finally, following the classification of malpractice reforms introduced by Kessler and McClellan
(1996), I estimate the general impact associated with a set of reforms that more indirectly (relative to
damage caps and collateral-source rule reforms) reduce the expected level of damages imposed in
malpractice actions. Included in this set of "indirect" reforms are contingency fee limitations,
requirements of periodic payment of future damages, joint and several liability reforms, and provisions
for a patients' compensation fund. In their seminal study on defensive medicine, Kessler and McClellan
(1996) document a small positive effect of "indirect" reforms on malpractice intensity, as proxied by the
total expenditures associated with the care provided to a patient in the 1-year period following the new
incidence of a serious heart condition.
Even though each of these malpractice reforms operates in some fashion to reduce expected
liability levels, each reform may have a unique impact on physician behavior depending on the precise
medical circumstances involved. For instance, where the harm caused by a medical error can be treated
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by subsequent remedial treatments (which may be reimbursed from third-party insurers) and where
pain and suffering consequences are relatively minor, a reform of the collateral source rule may be the
provision more associated with a change in physician behavior. On the other hand, where the potential
damage caused by a given course of action is of a more serious and irreversible nature, the effects of
non-economic damage caps may be more significant in magnitude.
3.4 Data and Empirical Methodology
Data on the history of each state's tort laws over this sample period comes from the Database of
State Tort Law Reforms (2 nd Draft), compiled by Ronen Avraham. Likewise, data on physician behavior is
from the National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS), a nationally representative survey of inpatient
records from short-stay, non-federal hospitals conducted annually by the National Center for Health
Statistics (NCHS). As in Chapter 1, I supplement the public NHDS files with geographic identifiers
received pursuant to an agreement with the Research Data Center at the NCHS and conduct all empirical
work concerning the NHDS onsite at the NCHS headquarters. The sample considered in this utilization
analysis covers the years 1979 to 2005.8 Additional details on the NHDS are provided in Chapter 1 of
this dissertation. The defensive-medicine analysis presented below serves as a counterpart to the
empirical investigation presented in Chapter 1, which uses these various tort provisions as covariates in
an investigation into the relationship between regional variations in cesarean utilization and the
geographical components of malpractice standard-of-care laws.
Using the diagnosis codes and other information provided in the NHDS records, I determine
whether an episiotomy or cesarean was performed in connection with each individual discharge, in
8 The convergence analysis presented in Chapter 1 also draws on data in the 1977-1978 period. Data on
episiotomy utilization is only available beginning in 1979, however. Moreover, in most specifications estimated
below, I include controls for the case mix of the individual delivery. Most of the risk-factors necessary to calculate
the complete case-mix measure are also only available in the post-1979 period. This more-restricted time period
should not significantly impact the present analysis considering that the relevant legal variation generally does not
begin until the mid-1980s.
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addition to determining the length of the stay associated with each discharge. I then evaluate these
utilization measures on the proper subsample of individual discharges, as follows:
(1) Cesarean Utilization and Number of Bed Days. To evaluate cesarean behavior and delivery
lengths of stay, I consider the subsample of all deliveries contained in the NHDS files,
determined using the appropriate diagnosis codes. This subsample is well protected against
sample selection concerns considering that virtually all deliveries occur in inpatient settings
- that is, the malpractice variables of interest should not impact the denominator used in
the utilization rate analysis.
(2) Episiotomy Utilization. To evaluate episiotomy utilization, I consider the subsample of
vaginal deliveries, which differs from the above subsample by excluding those deliveries
performed via cesarean section. This subsample, however, is more prone to sample
selection issues given that malpractice forces may impact the number of cesareans
performed in the relevant states and potentially impact the composition of the resulting
vaginal sample. To alleviate these concerns, I include controls for the case mix of the
individual vaginal delivery, which I parameterize using the delivery's predicted probability of
cesarean delivery, calculated according to Chapter 2 above.
Descriptive statistics for the key utilization, legal and outcome variables discussed in the analysis
below are provided in Table 3.2. Episiotomies are performed on roughly 40% of the vaginal delivery
sample, while cesareans are performed on nearly 24% of the total delivery sample. The average mother
spends 2.8 days at the hospital during each delivery stay.
With respect to each of the above utilization measures, I first test for evidence of defensive
behavior by estimating the following basic difference-in-difference specification:
Ui,s,t = + s y t+  + fl 1CAPs,t + Es,t (3.1)
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where s indexes state, t indexes year, and i indexes an individual discharge from the appropriate sub-
sample; CAP,t represents an indicator variable for the presence of a cap on non-economic damages in
state s and year t; State fixed effects, Vs, and year fixed effects, At, control for fixed differences across
states and across years, respectively. In the episiotomy and cesarean specifications, Ui,,t is an indicator
variable for the incidence of the relevant utilization measure. In the delivery length-of-stay
specification, Ui,,t equals the log of the number of days that the mother spends in the hospital during
the delivery admission. The coefficient of interest in each specification is P1, representing the
relationship between the relevant utilization measure and the adoption of non-economic damage caps.
I then test the robustness of the above findings to the inclusion of a range of individual and
state-year factors by estimating the following specification
Ui,s,t = a + Ys + At + Ps,t + flCAPs,t + fl 2Xi,s,t + fl 3Zs,t + fl 4 0 s,t + Ei,s,t (3.2)
where X,,, t represents certain characteristics of the individual discharge: mother's age (15-19, 20-24, 25-
29, 30-34, 35-39 and 40+ years old); mother's race (white, black and other); mother's insurance status
(private, government, no insurance and other); hospital bed size (0-100, 100-200, 200-300, 300-500 and
500+ beds); and hospital ownership type (proprietary, non-profit and government). Z,,t represents
certain state-year characteristics (OB/GYN concentration rate, fertility rate and median household
income). 0 ,,t is a matrix representing a set of indicator variables for the incidence of the following tort /
malpractice provisions: (a) collateral source rule reforms, (b) caps on punitive damages, and (c)
"indirect" tort provisions. I include state-specific linear time trends, Ps,t, to control for slowly-moving
correlations between the relevant utilization rates in a state and the adoption of tort reforms by that
state.
I also include controls in Xi,,t to account for the case mix of the relevant delivery. I parameterize
the delivery case mix using the predicted probability of cesarean section (PPC) for the relevant delivery,
calculated according to Chapter 2. Each delivery's PPC value is simply a single parameterization of a
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much richer set of risk factors and delivery complications. The results are generally robust to the
inclusion of a set of individual indicator variables for each risk factor and to the exclusion of these risk-
factor controls entirely. In the episiotomy specification, the inclusion of this case-mix control will
alleviate the sample selection concerns identified in Section 3 above. In the delivery bed-days
specification, to target the investigation on the length-of-stay decision itself (as distinct from the
procedures performed during the stay), I also include a control for the incidence of cesarean delivery.
I estimate the above models on the full NHDS sample. This approach contrasts with Chapter 1,
which focuses on the sample of states that maintain consistently large sample sizes in order to facilitate
a well-behaved convergence analysis. For these reasons and in light of the fact that two of the damage-
cap treatment states used in the defensive-medicine analysis below (Hawaii and Texas) were dropped
from the specifications estimated in Chapter 1 (due to an inability to classify the full history of their
standard-of-care laws), I exclude controls for national-standard laws in the specifications estimated
below and focus instead on damage caps and related provisions. However, the results presented below
are robust to the inclusion of controls for national-standard laws and to the use of the restricted sample
estimated in Chapter 1 (not shown).
As discussed in Chapter 1, a key identification concern in difference-in-difference models of the
above nature is posed by the possibility of underlying trends - for example, state-specific trends in
utilization rates that pre-date the adoption of the tort reforms in question. The primary results
presented above partially account for this concern by including state-specific linear time tends. As a
falsification test, I also check for the presence of underlying trends by modifying the above specifications
to include "leads" of the relevant tort variables - that is, indicator variables that switch from 0 to 1 in
the year(s) prior to the actual adoption of the reforms. Under the assumption that no such confounding
trends exist, the coefficients of the lead indicator variables should not differ significantly from zero.
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While most of the variation in damage cap laws throughout the sample derives from the initial
adoption of the relevant provision, a number of states also repealed previously-adopted damage caps (8
states) throughout the sample. Following Matsa (2006), I also estimate specifications that drop these
adopt-then-repeal states. This more-restricted approach accounts for the possibility that physicians will
be less responsive to the relevant sources of malpractice pressure in those states that face a high
probability of repealing damage caps (which I identify by the actual act of repeal). 9
Finally, to complete the defensive-medicine analysis, I estimate the above specifications using 5-
minute Apgar scores as the relevant dependent variable. Data on individual Apgar scores is from the
1978-2004 Natality files, compiled as part of the National Vital Statistics System of the National Center
for Health Statistics. The Natality files provide demographic and health data for a 100% sample of all
births occurring in the post-1985 period and either a 50% or a 100% sample, depending on the state, of
all births occurring in the pre-1985 period. Included in the delivery-related data available throughout
the entire sample are 5-minute Apgar scores. Given immediately after birth, Apgar tests are designed to
assess the health of a newborn infant and to determine the need for resuscitative efforts. Scores are
given on a scale from 0 to 10 and assess a newborn's activity, pulse, reflex irritation, appearance and
respiration. While Apgar scores arguably remain inappropriate as predictors of certain long-term
outcomes, 5-Minute scores nonetheless remain valid predictors of neonatal mortality (Casey et al.
2001).
3.5 Results
Tables 3.3 - 3.5 present the primary estimation results for this defensive medicine analysis,
demonstrating the relationship between various tort reform adoptions and (a) episiotomy utilization, (b)
delivery length-of-stay decisions, and (c) cesarean utilization, respectively. Table 3.6 likewise presents
9 In such states, physicians may indeed alter their behavior with this constitutional uncertainty in mind, considering
that any such repeal will likely have retroactive effect (Currie and Macleod 2008).
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estimation results for the effect of the relevant tort-reforms on neonatal health outcomes. All
regression coefficients and standard errors presented in Tables 3.3 - 3.6 are multiplied by 100.
Moreover, standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary within-state correlations
of the error structure (Bertrand et al. 2004).
3.5.1 Episiotomy Utilization
I begin with an exploration into whether malpractice pressure induces physicians to perform
additional episiotomies during vaginal deliveries, consistent with a positive defensive medicine story.
Specifically, I identify any such effect by determining whether the adoption of malpractice reforms that
reduce expected liability amounts (primarily, caps on non-economic damages) lead to a reduction in
episiotomy utilization rates. Column 1 of Table 3.3 presents estimates of a basic difference-in-difference
(DD) specification that excludes the set of control variables and state-specific linear time trends.
Consistent with the expectations indicated in Section 3.3 above, I find that the adoption of a law capping
non-economic damage awards by a state is associated with a 4.6 percentage-point reduction in the
episiotomy utilization rate of that state, representing an 11% reduction in the average state episiotomy
rate over the sample period.
In Columns 2 - 4 of Table 3.3, I demonstrate the sensitivity of these basic results to the inclusion
of various control variables and state-specific linear time trends (Columns 2 and 4), along with the
addition of lead dummy variables for the non-economic damage cap laws (that switch 2 years prior to an
amendment in non-economic damage cap provisions), which allow for a test of trends in episiotomy
rates that pre-date the adoption of non-economic damage caps (Columns 3 and 4). As demonstrated by
Column 2, the estimated relationship between non-economic damage caps and episiotomy utilization
does not change substantially in magnitude with the addition of both state-specific linear time trends
and a set of controls for various patient, hospital and state-year factors (from a 4.6 percentage-point
reduction to a 5.7 percentage-point reduction). However, while the p-value from the basic DD
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specification is only 0.07, the estimated relationship does become statistically significant at the 5% level
with the inclusion of these additional factors.
A concern arises, however, from the pattern of results presented in the dynamic specifications
estimated in Columns 3 and 4. The coefficients of the 2-year lead indicator variables are negative in
both specifications and large enough in magnitude to suggest that the differential in episiotomy rates
between treatment and controls states may have materialized in the period prior to the adoption of
non-economic damage cap laws. However, this finding may be due to the fact that a substantial portion
of the variation in non-economic damage caps over the sample period arises from the repeal of
previously-adopted caps (affecting 8 states), often as a result of a finding of unconstitutionality by the
relevant state's highest court. Because a physician's behavior in the pre-repeal period may be judged
according to the post-repeal law in such situations, physicians in states that face a high probability of an
unconstitutionality ruling may alter their behavior in anticipation of such a ruling (Currie and MacLeod
2008; Matsa 2006).
In their investigation of cesarean practices, Currie and MacLeod (2008) find evidence consistent
with an anticipation story and estimate a statistically significant coefficient for the 12-month lead
indicator for damage caps that turn "off" (at a magnitude close to that of the contemporaneous law
change coefficient); however, they estimate no such lead effect for damage caps that turn "on." With
these concerns in mind, Matsa (2006) excludes those states that repealed previously-adopted non-
economic damage caps in his investigation of the relationship between tort reforms and physician
location.
In Column 5 of Table 3.3, I follow the approach taken by Matsa (2006) and estimate a dynamic
specification with lead indicator variables that excludes those states that have repealed non-economic
damage caps at some point over the sample period. Focusing only on the initial adoption of damage-cap
provisions, I continue to estimate a negative relationship between damage caps and episiotomy
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utilization rates, though now at a slightly higher magnitude (-7.7 percentage-point reduction). However,
I now estimate a positive, statistically-insignificant coefficient for the 2-year lead indicator (with a
magnitude of 3.5), strengthening any argument of a causal connection between damage cap adoptions
and reduced episiotomy utilization.
The results presented in Table 3.3 also suggest a negative relationship between episiotomy
utilization rates and the incidence of an "indirect" tort reform, though these estimates are statistically
insignificant in the general full-state specifications. While I find evidence that non-economic damage
cap adoptions lead to a reduction in episiotomy utilization, I estimate an opposite-signed coefficient (of
similar, but smaller magnitude) for the collateral source rule reform dummy; however, this estimate is
not significantly different from 0.
Though similar in nature, collateral source rule reforms and non-economic damage caps may
have divergent impacts on episiotomy utilization as a result of the context in which marginal
episiotomies arise. Considering the possibility of triage in episiotomy utilization, it may be reasonable to
believe that the marginal mother will not benefit much from an episiotomy. Physicians may nonetheless
respond to the threat of liability for non-economic damages by performing an episiotomy on the
marginal mother for the simple purpose of improving the optics of a potential malpractice suit. For
similar reasons, physicians may elect to perform an episiotomy on the marginal mother in order to avoid
liability for economic damages - e.g., those imposed under a traditional formulation of the collateral
source rule. However, the costs involved in the performance of an episiotomy, along with any follow-up
or revisionary care associated with the episiotomy, could be a component of the economic damages
award that the physician is attempting to avoid. While this component may be small it magnitude, it
may be large enough to outweigh any small optical benefit that would be provided by the performance
of an arguably-unnecessary episiotomy. As such, with few benefits extending to the marginal mother in
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the performance of an episiotomy, it is possible that the resulting impact of a non-economic damage
cap adoption may differ in sign from that of a reform of the collateral-source rule.
3.5.2 Delivery Length of Stay
In Table 3.4, I test for evidence of positive defensive behavior in a physician's decision
concerning the number of days that a mother should spend at the hospital during her delivery stay. I
again identify any such effect by observing the physician response to tort reforms that reduce expected
liability amounts. In Column 1, I begin by estimating a simple DD specification, without controls or state-
specific linear time trends, identifying the relationship between non-economic damage-cap adoptions
and the log of the number of bed days associated with the mother's hospitalization. Consistent with the
expectations of positive defensive behavior in the length-of-stay decision, I find that the adoption of a
law capping non-economic damage awards by a state is associated with an approximately 3.8%
reduction in the average maternal length of stay in that state (with a p-value of 0.09).
In Columns 2 - 4 of Table 3.4, I again demonstrate the sensitivity of these basic results to the
inclusion of various control variables and state-specific linear time trends (Columns 2 and 4), along with
the addition of lead dummy variables for the non-economic damage cap laws (Columns 3 and 4). As
demonstrated by Column 2, the estimated relationship between non-economic damage caps and
delivery bed days remains virtually identical in magnitude with the addition of both control variables
and state-specific linear time trends. However, as with the case of episiotomy utilization, the inclusion
of these additional factors reduces the estimated standard error of the damage cap coefficient and
thereby reduces the associated p-value (from a test of no relationship) to 0.04.
I estimate negative coefficients for the two-year lead indicator variables in each of the
specifications estimated in Columns 3 - 5 of Table 3.4, the last of which drops those states that repeal
previously-adopted damage caps over the sample period. However, the lead coefficients in each
instance are statistically-insignificant and of relatively modest magnitude, providing only weak evidence
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to suggest that the negative differential in episiotomy rates between treatment and control states may
have begun in the period prior to the adoption of non-economic damage cap laws.
As in the case of episiotomy utilization, I estimate a negative association between the duration
of a mother's hospital stay and the adoption of an "indirect" tort reform, providing further evidence of a
positive defensive response in a physician's length-of-stay decision to the threat of possible malpractice
liability. Also consistent with the findings of the episiotomy specifications, I estimate that a reform of
the collateral source rule is associated with a 4-6% increase in the number of delivery bed days
(statistically significant in each specification). This opposite-signed finding (relative to non-economic
damage caps) may result, however, from the fact that under a traditional / non-reformed collateral-
source rule, the physician may be directly liable to the patient for the cost of additional hospital bed
days that result from a complication or error committed in the course of the delivery. All else equal, this
fact may lead physicians to limit the duration of delivery stays. Considering the possibility that an
additional day in the hospital may not significantly reduce any risks of further harm to the marginal
mother/newborn, this direct cost-reducing incentive may outweigh any expected decreases in
economic-damage amounts that might result from a longer delivery stay.
3.5.3 Cesarean Utilization
In Table 3.5, I test for evidence of defensive behavior in a physician's decision to perform a
cesarean delivery. Table 3.5 follows the same structure as Tables 3.3 and 3.4 discussed above. In each
specification, I estimate small and statistically-insignificant coefficients for each of the malpractice
provisions explored, including caps on non-economic damages. These results generally provide no
evidence in support of the popular perception that malpractice pressures induce physicians to perform a
greater number of cesarean deliveries. In the specification that includes both state-specific linear time
trends and a set of control variables, as presented in Column 2, I find that the adoption of a non-
economic damage cap is associated with a statistically-insignificant 0.06 percentage point reduction in a
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state's cesarean rate. Even assuming that the true effect is at the lower end of the estimated 95%
confidence interval for this coefficient, the adoption of a non-economic damage cap would only be
associated with a -1.2 percentage-point reduction in prevailing cesarean rates, representing a relatively
modest 5% reduction in the prevailing cesarean rate.
These estimates confirm the findings presented in Currie and MacLeod (2008) to the extent that
they too challenge the conventional wisdom that malpractice pressure is responsible for much of the
excess in cesarean utilization. However, contrary to the findings of Currie and MacLeod, I do not
document strong evidence of a positive response in cesarean utilization to the adoption of non-
economic damage caps. Moreover, their estimated damage cap coefficient of 1.2 is above the upper
end of the 95% confidence interval for the estimated damage-cap coefficient indicated in Column 2 of
Table 3.5. Currie and MacLeod's empirical approach does benefit from the large sample sizes provided
by Natality data, though they rely on an arguably inadequate level of variation in damage-cap laws.
While the results of this exercise do not suggest that malpractice threats over an improperly performed
cesarean procedure overcome malpractice threats arising from the possibility of a failed vaginal
delivery, they do suggest that these risks balance each other enough that the resulting impact on
physician behavior may be minimal.
3.5.4 Health Outcomes
The above results indicate that malpractice pressure may lead to certain increases in the
intensity of care provided by obstetricians in the delivery of children, including increased utilization rates
for episiotomies and increased delivery lengths of stay. It is of course possible that these positive
utilization forces do not meet the definition of "defensive" behavior put forth above, in that they are
actually associated with improvements in relevant health outcomes in the affected states. I explore this
possibility in Table 3.6, presenting estimates of the relationship between the adoption of non-economic
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damage caps (and related tort reforms) and the 5-minute Apgar scores assigned to each newborn in a
sample of both cesarean and vaginal deliveries from the 1978-2004 Natality Detail files.
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.6, I present estimation results for difference-in-difference
specifications that use the log of the 5-minute Apgar score as the dependent variable (with full control
variables and state-specific linear time trends). The latter column includes 2-year lead indicator
variables for the non-economic damage cap laws and collateral-source rule reforms. Columns 3 and 4
analogously estimate specifications that use the incidence of a "good" Apgar score (>= 7) as the
dependent variable. In all four specifications, I estimate very small, statistically-insignificant coefficients
for the damage-cap and collateral-source rule reform measures. For instance, while non-economic
damage cap adoptions are associated with a 10-20% reduction in the episiotomy utilization rate (4 - 8
percentage-point reduction) and a roughly 4% reduction in the average delivery length of stay, I
estimate that they are only associated with a 0.03 percentage-point reduction in the probability of
having a "good" Apgar score. Even assuming that the estimated effect of damage-cap adoptions is at
the lower end of the relevant 95% confidence interval, the estimated effect would still entail a minor 0.1
percentage-point reduction in the likelihood of having a "good" Apgar score (or a roughly 0.1%
reduction in the "good" Apgar rate).
Consistent with a defensive-medicine story, these findings suggest that the positive utilization
pressures created by malpractice fears do not generate corresponding improvements in health
outcomes to the affected patient population.10 If anything, the estimated positive coefficients
presented in Table 3.6 for the "indirect" malpractice reforms suggest that the documented reductions in
utilization rates stemming from "indirect" reform adoptions may be associated with improvements in
neonatal health, implying that malpractice pressures felt prior to these reforms both increased
utilization rates and depressed neonatal health outcomes.
10 Moreover, the pattern of results presented in Table 1.6 remains largely unchanged when I drop those states that
repeal previously-adopted damage cap laws over the sample period.
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3.6 Conclusion
This Chapter contributes to an understanding on the manner in which malpractice pressure may
shape physician behavior. For the purposes of this investigation, I focus on certain decisions faced by
obstetricians during (and immediately) after the delivery of a child, a medical context that often
implicates significant malpractice concerns. Consistent with much of the relevant literature, I use
adoptions of various malpractice / tort reforms to identify within-state variations in malpractice
pressure. However, unlike the analysis undertaken recently by Currie and MacLeod (2008), which
addresses a substantially similar set of questions, I draw on a dataset of hospital discharge records that
allows for the identification of variation in physician behavior over the entire 1980's, a time period
during which the most significant and relevant sources of legal variation occurred. The richness of the
legal variation provided by this longer sample period provides greater confidence in the consistency of
the estimated results. Nonetheless, I confirm the findings of Currie and MacLeod to the extent that I can
reject the conventional wisdom that malpractice pressure contributes significantly to the excessive
cesarean utilization rates observed across regions. However, I find no evidence to support Currie and
MacLeod's findings that non-economic damage cap adoptions may actually lead to increases in cesarean
utilization rates.
Extending this analysis to other aspects of obstetric care, I find evidence of positive defensive
behavior in the utilization of episiotomies during vaginal deliveries and in the durations of maternal
lengths of stay. In each instance, I estimate that the adoption of a non-economic damage cap leads to a
reduction in the relevant utilization measure without a corresponding change in observed neonatal
outcomes, implying that malpractice pressure had previously induced over-utilization of these
measures. These findings are intuitive considering that the imbalance of risks involved in the relevant
decision context may induce a risk-adverse physician to elect the arguably unnecessary procedure (or
additional bed day). In the cesarean context, however, the risks associated with the procedure may be
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high enough and the medical circumstances of the marginal cesarean mother may be minor enough that
the balance of risks may not tip strongly in the direction of positive defensive medicine.
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Table 3.1. Variations in Non-Economic Damage Caps (1979-2005)
State Year Adopted Year Repealed State Year Adopted Year Repealed
Alaska 1986 Mississippi 2003
Alabama 1987 1992 Montana 1996
Colorado 1987 North Dakota 1996
Florida 2004 New Hampshire 1987 (2) 1981 (1);
1991(2)
Hawaii 1987 Ohio 2003 (2) 1992(1)
Idaho 1988 Oklahoma 2004
Illinois 1995 1998 Oregon 1988 2000
Kansas 1987 Texas 2004(2) 1988(1)
Massachusetts 1987 Utah 1988
Maryland 1987 Washington 1986 1990
Michigan 1987 Wisconsin 1986
Minnesota 1986 1990 West Virginia 1986
Missouri 1986
Years of adoption and repeal (if applicable) of laws imposing caps on non-economic damage awards in malpractice
cases (or tort cases generally) are indicated above. States are only included if their relevant malpractice laws
varied over the 1979 - 2005 period. Legislative variation is excluded from this table if it represents a situation in
which an adoption and repeal occurred during the same year.
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Table 3.2. Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Panel A: Utilization Rates (NHDS)
Episiotomy (from sample of vaginal
deliveries)
Delivery Bed Days
Cesarean Section
Panel B: Outcome Measures (Natality
Data)
Apgar Scores (5-Minute)
"Good" Apgar Score (>= 7)
Panel C: Tort Variables (in NHDS sample)
Non-Economic Damage Caps
Non-Economic Damage Caps: Adoption-
Only States
Collateral Source Rule Reform
Punitive Damage Cap
"Indirect" Tort Reform
40.8
(49.1)
2.8
(2.7)
23.4
(42.4)
8.97
(0.86)
98.4
(12.7)
39.3
(48.8)
43.3
(49.5)
57.7
(49.4)
39.8
(49.0)
74.5
(43.6)
N (full delivery sample) 749,225
N (vaginal delivery sample) 573,670
N (Natality Data) 3,895,107
All statistics are multiplied by 100, with the exception of those presented for 5-minute Apgar scores. Reported
statistics for Panels A and C are from an individual sample of deliveries from the 1979-2005 National Hospital
Discharge Survey records. Unlike Chapter 1, the statistics here are reported from the full, non-restricted sample.
Episiotomy utilization rates are presented from the subsample of vaginal deliveries. Statistics for the tort variables
are presented out of the full delivery sample in the NHDS records. The statistics for the tort variables are nearly
identical (not shown) using the subsample of vaginal deliveries. Statistics reported in Panel B are from a 5% random
sample of the 1978-2004 Natality Detail files.
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Table 3.3. Episiotomy Utilization: Difference-in-Difference Estimates (among Sample of Vaginal Deliveries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EXCLUDING
ALL STATES DAMAGE CAP
REPEAL STATES
Non-Economic Damage -4.58* -5.69** -3.73 -3.28* -7.69**
Cap Dummy (2.61) (2.34) (2.38) (1.96) (3.68)
Non-Economic Damage -1.31 -3.41** 3.50
Cap Dummy: 2-Year Lead (1.11) (1.69) (2.14)
Collateral Source Rule 3.01 2.24 4.45
Reform (CSR) Dummy (3.00) (2.85) (3.54)
1.70CSR Dummy: 2-Year Lead (1.88)(1.88)
Punitive Damage Cap 0.56 0.58 0.18
Dummy (2.45) (2.33) (2.43)
-2.03 -2.67 -7.88**
"Indirect" Tort Law Dummy (3.43) (3.08) (3.11)
Control Variables? NO YES NO YES YES
State-Specific Linear Time
NO YES NO YES YESTrends?
N 573,670 439,357 573,670 439,357 363,488
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors
corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference
regressions, using a sample of vaginal deliveries, of the incidence of episiotomy utilization on the adoption of non-economic damage cap laws. The
specifications estimated in Columns 2, 4 and 5 also include additional state-year tort provisions along with state-specific linear time trends and other
state-year controls. Columns 3 - 5 also include two-year lead indicator variables for the damage-cap adoption dummies (which switch from 0 to 1 two
years prior to the adoption of damage cap laws). Column 5 drops any state that varied its damage cap laws over the sample period by repealing a
previously-enacted damage cap provision. Data on episiotomy utilization is from the 1979-2005 National Hospital Discharge Survey records.
Table 3.4. Delivery Bed Days: Difference-in-Difference Estimates (among Sample of all Deliveries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EXCLUDING
ALL STATES DAMAGE CAP
REPEAL STATES
Non-Economic Damage -3.84* -3.53** -3.09 -2.63** -4.76*
Cap Dummy (2.27) (1.64) (2.32) (1.28) (2.76)
Non-Economic Damage -1.16 -1.33 -0.94
Cap Dummy: 2-Year Lead (1.37) (1.01) (1.71)
Collateral Source Rule 3.92** 3.16** 5.70***
Reform (CSR) Dummy (1.88) (1.55) (1.96)
1.65
CSR Dummy: 2-Year Lead (1.02)
Punitive Damage Cap 1.82 1.85 -0.73
Dummy (1.60) (1.58) (2.18)
-4.34** -4.63*** -5.93**
"Indirect" Tort Law Dummy -. 34** -4.63***(1.75) (1.73) (2.42)
Control Variables? NO YES NO YES YES
State-Specific Linear Time
NO YES NO YES YESTrends?
N 749,225 576,416 749,225 576,416 476,368
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors
corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference
regressions, using a sample of vaginal and cesarean deliveries, of the number of bed days associated with an individual delivery stay (logged) on the
adoption of non-economic damage cap laws. The specifications estimated in Columns 2, 4 and 5 also include additional state-year tort provisions
along with state-specific linear time trends and other state-year controls. Columns 3 - 5 also include two-year lead indicator variables for the
damage-cap adoption dummies (which switch from 0 to 1 two years prior to the adoption of damage cap laws). Column 5 drops any state that varied
its damage cap laws over the sample period by repealing a previously-enacted damage cap provision. Data on delivery lengths of stay is from the
1979-2005 National Hospital Discharge Survey records.
Table 3.5. Cesarean Section Utilization: Difference-in-Difference Estimates (among Sample of all Deliveries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6)
EXCLUDING
ALL STATES DAMAGE CAP
REPEAL STATES
Non-Economic Damage 0.08 -0.06 0.14 0.27 0.50
Cap Dummy (0.63) (0.57) (0.54) (0.52) (1.10)
Non-Economic Damage -0.09 -0.44 0.39
Cap Dummy: 2-Year Lead (0.50) (0.34) (0.66)
Collateral Source Rule 0.32 0.47 0.37
Reform (CSR) Dummy (0.57) (0.44) (0.68)
-0.32CSR Dummy: 2-Year Lead 0.32(0.48)
Punitive Damage Cap -0.27 -0.28 -0.64
Dummy (0.43) (0.44) (0.65)
0.07 0.01 -0.66
"Indirect" Tort Law Dummy 0.62) (0.63) (1.03)
(0.62) (0.63) (1.03)
Control Variables? NO YES NO YES YES
State-Specific Linear Time
NO YES NO YES YESTrends?
N 749,225 576,416 749,225 576,416 476,368
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors
corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference
regressions, using a sample of all deliveries, of the incidence of cesarean section utilization on the adoption of non-economic damage cap laws. The
specifications estimated in Columns 2, 4 and 5 also include additional state-year tort provisions along with state-specific linear time trends and other
state-year controls. Columns 3 - 5 also include two-year lead indicator variables for the damage-cap adoption dummies (which switch from 0 to 1 two
years prior to the adoption of damage cap laws). Column 5 drops any state that varied its damage cap laws over the sample period by repealing a
previously-enacted damage cap provision. Data on cesarean utilization is from the 1979-2005 National Hospital Discharge Survey records.
Table 3.6. 5-Minute Apgar Scores: Difference-in-Difference Estimates (among Sample of all Deliveries)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LOG(APGAR SCORE LEVEL) "GOOD" APGAR SCORE (0/1)
Non-Economic Damage 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03
Cap Dummy (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
Non-Economic Damage -0.03 0.04
Cap Dummy: 2-Year Lead (0.10) (0.04)
Collateral Source Rule 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.00
Dummy (0.10) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
Collateral Source Rule 0.16*** 0.00
Dummy: 2-Year Lead (0.06) (0.03)
Punitive Damage Cap -0.15 -0.14 -0.08* -0.08*
Dummy (0.12) (0.13) 0.05 (0.05)
0.13* 0.12* 0.09** 0.10**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
Sample ALL STATES ALL STATES ALL STATES ALL STATES
Control Variables and
State-Specific Linear Time YES YES YES YES
Trends?
N 3,730,732 3,730,732 3,730,732 3,730,732
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term
are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference regressions, using a sample of cesarean and vaginal deliveries, of the log
of each individual Apgar score associated with the delivery (Columns 1 and 2), or the individual incidence of a "good" Apgar score (Columns 3 and 4), on the
adoption of non-economic damage cap laws and other tort provisions. Apgar scores of 0 are set to 0.1 prior to the log transformation in Columns 1 and 2.
Each specification also includes a set of individual demographic and other state-year controls, in addition to state-specific linear time trends. Columns 2 and 4
also include two-year lead indicator variables for the damage-cap and collateral-source rule reform adoption dummies. Data on neonatal outcomes is from a
5% sample of all deliveries in the 1978-2004 Natality Detail files.
